NtColDrugsRamirez2005

NtColDrugsRamirez2005 - NtColDrugsRamirez2005 [Last edited...

Info iconThis preview shows pages 1–3. Sign up to view the full content.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
NtColDrugsRamirez2005 [Last edited 5-12-10] What are Col’s problems? 1. Underdevelopment and lack of employment 2. Rural landlessness, and need for agrarian reform 3. Abuse of peasants’ rights and lives by security forces 4. Abuse of peasants’ rights and lives by drug traffickers 5. Civil conflict, with attempted solutions from 1982 6. Consolidation of democratic insts since 1991 Const Solutions to the Drug Problem: Note that both Ramírez Lemus, and Jones’ op-ed believe Plan Col won’t work. Ramírez Lemus states that four years after the approval of Plan Col, “the country is no closer to overcoming its structural problems, drug trafficking continues unabated, and peace remains a distant dream.” 101 1. Plan Colombia as conceived by US a. Cold War Counter-Insurgency i. Shift emphasis from police, from late 1980s, to mil in Plan Col, with $1.3b after July 2000. ii. Rhetoric shifts from “narcoguerrillas” to “narcoterrorists” after 9/11. iii. US policy supported forces of “indigenous irregulars” to battle insurgency in 1960s, and from these ultimately come the paramilitaries. b. Fumigation c. Military control: Human rights violations d. Results i. Massive internal refugee flows ii. Spreading of drug cultivation, and, with it, of FARC rebels NtColDrugsRamirez2005, p. 1 [Last edited, 4-5-10]
Background image of page 1

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon
Pastrana a. Rural development, with manual eradication, crop subst, development aid. His original plan didn’t mention mil aid. In the final plan, 75% of Col’s share went to the armed forces and police. b. US reconceived the plan, as Gen Barry McCaffrey, drug czar, urged that the mil replace the police in a combined counter-drug, counter-insurgency plan, and ultimately convinced the mil to join the drug war, because that’s where they would get the most aid funds. i. The US revised Plan Col, in English in Sept 1999, and promised Pastrana that “the US ‘would sharply increase aid if he develop[ed] a comprehensive plan to strengthen the military, halt the nation’s economic free fall, and fight drug trafficking.’” 107 3. Uribe was elected in 2002 by voters’ hard-line reaction to the failures of Pastrana’s peace plans. 4. The Fumigation Strategy, centerpiece of Plan Col. 112 a. From 2000 through 2003, herbicide sprayed on 380,000 hectares, more than 8% of Col’s arable land. b. Dubious claims of success by US observers. i. [Illustrate with CIP graph, AndesCocaCIP2007] ii. [Use Fig 4.2 on spraying, 114.] iii. [Illustrate with Adam Isacson’s Nov 2006 graph of coca cultivation and coca eradication in Col and in Putumayo province, p. 7.] 5. Fumigation’s Collateral Damage. 116 a. Alternative development: Too Little, Too Late i. UNODC data: 340,000 hectares sprayed between 2001 & 2003, and USAID supported cultivation of legal crops in fewer than 39,000 has. 117 b. Health & Envtal Risks. NtColDrugsRamirez2005, p. 2
Background image of page 2
Image of page 3
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

This note was uploaded on 02/15/2011 for the course POLSC 271 taught by Professor Erickson during the Fall '10 term at CUNY Hunter.

Page1 / 14

NtColDrugsRamirez2005 - NtColDrugsRamirez2005 [Last edited...

This preview shows document pages 1 - 3. Sign up to view the full document.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Ask a homework question - tutors are online