Rural development, with manual eradication, crop subst,
His original plan didn’t mention mil aid.
In the final plan, 75% of Col’s share went to the armed
forces and police.
b. US reconceived the plan, as Gen Barry McCaffrey, drug
czar, urged that the mil replace the police in a combined
counter-drug, counter-insurgency plan, and ultimately
convinced the mil to join the drug war, because that’s
where they would get the most aid funds.
i. The US revised Plan Col, in English in Sept 1999,
and promised Pastrana that “the US ‘would sharply
increase aid if he develop[ed] a comprehensive plan
to strengthen the military, halt the nation’s economic
free fall, and fight drug trafficking.’”
Uribe was elected in 2002 by voters’ hard-line reaction to the
failures of Pastrana’s peace plans.
4. The Fumigation Strategy, centerpiece of Plan Col.
From 2000 through 2003, herbicide sprayed on 380,000
hectares, more than 8% of Col’s arable land.
b. Dubious claims of success by US observers.
i. [Illustrate with CIP graph, AndesCocaCIP2007]
ii. [Use Fig 4.2 on spraying, 114.]
iii. [Illustrate with Adam Isacson’s Nov 2006 graph of
coca cultivation and coca eradication in Col and in
Putumayo province, p. 7.]
5. Fumigation’s Collateral Damage.
a. Alternative development: Too Little, Too Late
i. UNODC data:
340,000 hectares sprayed between
2001 & 2003, and USAID supported cultivation of
legal crops in fewer than 39,000 has.
b. Health & Envtal Risks.
NtColDrugsRamirez2005, p. 2