NtDrugsCrimeMex

NtDrugsCrimeMex - NtDrugsCrimeMex [Last edited 4-8-2010]...

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NtDrugsCrimeMex [Last edited 4-8-2010] Notes taken from NtTraffic&Rebollo to put with discussion of Monica Serrano’s chapter in Dominguez: US Drug War creates incentives for corruption of police Andreas conceives of bribes and payoffs as a cost of doing business , a form of tax that traffickers have to pay. In 1983, traffickers spent an estimated $1.5 to $3.2 million on bribery , but, by 1993, they were spending an estimated $450 million— far more than the budget of the Mexican Attorney General’s office. [And Bertram and Sharpe said that bribes hit an estimated $6 billion in 1997 .] Thus, increased drug enforcement capacity , while failing to deter the drug trade significantly, successfully increases the capacity to tax the trade in the form of corruption . … This selective enforcement is pragmatic: officials can perform their job —seizing drugs and arresting smugglers—while also collecting taxes from the drug trade . Those smugglers with the most resources and connections are the ones most able to afford the corruption tax, whereas the smaller smuggling entrepreneurs are treated as tax evaders.” That’s why the arrest numbers can be up, while smuggling is also up. Consider the following examples of the “tax” potential of drug enforcement . The profit potential “created enormous competition within law enforcement agencies for assignment to key posts along smuggling corridors . One attorney general under Salinas said that top drug enforcement posts were auctioned off to the highest bidders , and their value was determined by market forces.” [A similar dynamic was also reported for Peru.] Take the case of Mario Ruiz Massieu, assistant attorney general and top anti-
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This note was uploaded on 02/15/2011 for the course POLSC 271 taught by Professor Erickson during the Fall '10 term at CUNY Hunter.

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NtDrugsCrimeMex - NtDrugsCrimeMex [Last edited 4-8-2010]...

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