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USLADominanceFragMitchell1974

USLADominanceFragMitchell1974 - 177 Dominance Dd...

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Unformatted text preview: 177 Dominance Dd Fragmentation in UHS fl @;‘-;re.nfly_ executed.‘ Dale L. Johnson, for example, has argued along Latin Amerimn Pollcy and by and large rationally, from the structure [“of ,mternational system . . . a stratified system of power relations”] . HERE-5.2:. ited States foreign policy is a conceptigruafi national intereg‘asjnherently. in- d in the strengthening of internationaLcapitali-sm against thethreats of socialism” fiatio‘fia‘lism. . . . United States private investment, aid programsJoie—iénpgligy, 1, itary sistance, milit‘arymirmiteryentions,.and international agencies, under the in- flame or control of the internationa‘l'business community, are interwoven and nted toward the promotion and maintenance of influence and control in other ntries. These are the dimensions of irnperiifliw 5' ' ‘ _ __ W sme CHRISTOPHER NilTCHELL izlflpw-M LAT-W IQ-rigmm km; "We Liar: TED E _ ‘ ’THa Cam/63mm our—[Ma REA—tutti 3.4 .. EDS TIA—Lilo Co'TLErL ut—‘chgm Q_ F4: 5 TMfim £4.15, 1017—51, l Two facts stand iut when one looks at U.S. policy toward Latin Am ica over the past 0 years: since the early 19505, the Unlted SJ“ tes h often been insens ive and inflexible in dealingmith the hemls ere, a more particulaily 'n attemptin'g‘td'd‘orriinate Latin America' t the sa time, her policy . as frequently been fragmented, pporly coordmat _ .. and even confused. _ _ _ -d _ and r coordi to cancel each other out. In other cases, the US. has aimed at various in- Of 111165: aw") pa:1‘iyEsaliaraciegfitEZTrthoglg-egi‘i:n inflggfgggclea ' patible goals simultaneously, making her policy appear hypocritical lion—t ‘5 ”5 15- 1 B Y' ogmz ' . . ., 1. lawn... a. .-.o-- deatethneseltiortlmameaieanmoneepr - 13W treatmen- fish prepondm’ant in any fields 0f in'ter'Amema” “muons” tam theft? mammamrntaermsmeensueeemamuesamammmay ‘ finance, military ifairs, trade,aid,and communications. POhtlcaliwa'l‘ ld only be termed—incoherent.“ ..-- ._ . __ . _~ . - - - . ' ' ' - or . . - figuredommance has ' hlbltefi two prmc1paltaspec dguifiistilnehigsmean , hung the past 20 years, three separate and distinct PQIlEYJllEEBS ‘f War II period 0 . servatism and interven- 10 . 0:3 r'can nation at goals) have been evident in US. hemispheric policy: (1) military and general U.S. aver Itort to pbcihtlflfl‘ (311mg: lgtiélgénhasnfiviays preferred F l,ological‘ security, (2) US. supervision of meerican economic ' . ‘ d: ' vita 8,. 6 '_. ' ' ' ' - if change seemc .1 Incl t'on aditional “intervention” (the sen dm’f; fivelopment, and (3) promotion and protection of US. private invest C , elemental to Ladifflmno‘fa 1 ‘ d B t in a broa «a i fillts- The exact definition of these themes has varied over the years, as 'of’ troops) has 36;“ {alimeilyt rare largcegiti::t:iitlylin Latin Ame 's.rheir relative importance, but the lines of policy are clear. It is clear, ,the Unite ta es as in ervene m ‘ . 11, t _ _ $23531] S agencies have exercised direct and often powerful influence e hat each oal 9321?de Abygsegntaent giggles}: Government!) ‘ ' ' l . ‘ . . ‘ ' ' . '-‘-' w 3,... m ' Em . “law - " the domestic politics of Latln American states. Conservatism'and‘ inter . merican policy. L mmmtehnthe‘semhememsf - WM“; vention (possible: analytical distinctions aside) have become Justlflatlil' linked in Latin Aimerican‘cycs with U.S— pQ!iii§.§1:.illeflance- " I But the second characteristic of US. policy—its generally poor coq flirtation—is seldom noted. Most critical‘observers have assumed thaw since the United‘States has been the dominant hemispherlcpowel‘, hen policies have also been centrally determined, rationally interlaced, an '* ' But the record of the past 20 years indicates, I think, that North Amer- ‘an policy (“U.S. imperialism”) has 11W have ;‘ intained. It may be more accurate to vmllmmassehdfdm- 'erialisms:3 a . . err. pummedehwheaflesceéfioiveananmt ' mmmeammmieamem . k of cnordin- . ‘ See Lowenthal (this volume) for a discussion of other critical view: on U.S. policy. Dale L. Johnson, “Dependence and the International System,” in James D. Cockcroft, {M e Gunder Frank, and Dale L. Johnson, Dependence and Underdevelopmenr (New York: ’332), pp. 98-100; bracketed phrases from p. 9]. f_, I must‘add, one wants to use the term "im at-all. I find the word unclear, and trip shall not use it elsewhere in this cesay. The test for “coherence” in policy proposed by I. M. Destler is a useful one: 5 things we do to be consistent with one another and " ems, Bureaucrars and Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ. [icy has too often failed this test during the past 20 years. perialism“ to describe North American domi- pled by its historical and theoretical associations; ~l Christopher Mitchell is a member of the Department of Political Science, New York Universit 1 Bronx New York. This is the revised version (January 197 3) of a paper 0113mm!" dellVBIEdrg. the seminar held in Lima. t “ié “We want the with our broader purposes." See his : 1972), p. 4. US. Latin American (3 178‘ Christopher Mitchel ‘ L 179 ‘1. Military and idea ogical security. In the best-known crises of recen 1d not be deterred Th . inter-American relatilo SuGuatemala in 1954, Cuba in 1961 and 1962.. h:3 -‘ I ere has been COHSldcl’ablc Yillliltlflll, llUWBVBl' and the Dominican Republic crisis of 1965—the United States has been miniftlirgrtlildfiince of the f0relgn~investment theme during the last rem; gh among U‘S. policy themes. This marked s1nce 1969. During other pe— - dy years) investor interests were not ing North America dir-c .. . . ,u' _ ra_-., We. . c . . “. .14 s .,.l earnscnhegpflqheagléhtoatheafio : . mustepomseflihwthefliflnflefl‘ States has consistentlyj pieturaeflgflafigheragggfitgfiggjrggggggimwb . '.. American nations as _csaesril threaenin hemisheric secur' 2. U.S.-supervision o'm'atm merrcan econom'c’ : American policy-makers have sought to sit in judgment on the models of economic development adopted by Latin American nations: and have shaped U.S. economic gassistance policies in accord with “acceptable” do ‘ trines. However, the d finition of what the U.S. considers acceptable h " changed considerably over the past two decades. Under Truman ani during. most of the Eisenhower Administratio the engine of Latin American development was assumed to be the priva sector, especially U.SL private investment. U.S. economic assistance w to play a complementary but minor role. Abandonment of this line policy began under Eisenhower. A new willingness to grant large amounts of direct economic aid under thWW ’6 ed d justified by cceptancgof a re e rivate and an eXaua '.~'§ . blic ro e in a WSome o the early . faith in outsi e econ mic assis ance as since been lost (together wi‘ 1 ‘ many of the funds), and the influence of private investment interests has increased under the Nixon Administration. But the North Americ image of a “proper” Latin American development model has permainernill shifted toward formerly unacceptable statist ideas. ' 1‘ ‘ reaucran'c Pluralism as a Source. of Policy Fragmentation ‘ What underlies the frequent separation among these mispheric policy? B '. ___ _ hin the nation-state itself.- Isolated and/or on ea‘ucracy, we are finding, often do much t ,s that were previously tra item to the President. 1 this ' ' , - , . Kali??? View diaws 0“. the Pa’ddlgms suggested by Graham Alli- 3. 'Prornotion and protection of. U.S. private investment. Americ ‘ ' ana yzed 1“ detail by Ernest May (131118 volume). The making Policy in relation to U.S. private investments in Latin America has be '. g Ablrnaham F- Loventhal. The Dominican Intervention (Cambridge, Mass: rem rkably consiste t sincethe 1950s. Overseas investment has been e -~ in a o .Smcs (P' is) The “‘0'” “39"” 0f American‘in‘mlvement in [the Cari E ' . . stsmlthat the mam, Interest of the U.S. Government has not been economic Se couraged, and the .8. Government has proolaimed the benefits of t nd traditional axioms, not simple conquest orlprofit, have motivmd Am'efi investment to prosp ,ctive recipients. Also, the U.S. has pressed for “eq table and Speedy compensation,”S when Latin American nationalizatio mpeting fragments of the . . o shape foreign policy ac- ced to a centrahzed governmental “decision, 1972), PP. bbean] . . . curity con- 2‘ . _ _ Can involve- the Dominican Republic and the rest of the Caribbean for many decades.” Further evi- g. this effect emerges in’my discussion (below) of the United Fruit Company's relative ln'rfluenoe on Eisenhower’s action in Guatemala. This is notto say, of course, . that corpo- . :3 never persuasive pressure. groups- see, for em 15, in discussi , . 5Hugh Thomas, Cuba: The Pursuit ofFreea‘om (New York: 1971)> p. 1061. ' olicy toward Peru. , p y ; on Of [PC 8. Influence 5 . . . . _ _ . . d l R. b ‘ ‘ - . This phrase IS the one used in the Hickenlooper Amendment,quoted m CharlesT Goo sisal e o ert Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, eds, Transnational Relations an ' ' “Diplomatic Protection of :U.S. Business in Peru,” in Daniel A. Sharp, ed., U.S. Foreign Po '(2. Mass d World P01!!!“ -3 19.72) especially the introduction by the editors Conte ’ - m or tr _ and Peru (Austin: 1972), pi 247. p ary ansns torsjnclude “1.01.13 religions,multinational corporations, philanthropic foundations and movements. ‘‘‘‘‘‘ - -- ~ ., -- ~“' _ . ’ r 180 _ Christopher Mitchel y k I of foreign policy, Allison argues, may be described by at least three mod \J A Ci e H) 315. The Rational Actor or “Classical” Model (Model 1) views governmen—ilins :9 J31 actions as the result of centralized and fully rational decisions byi£3 ‘" " L-‘Greater accuracy is Ccrtainl t "°' ,3 y d ' bl b ‘ ‘ .. _ esrra e, ut are the explanations af~ . crded by the analysrs of bureaucratic politics relevant to any im orta t uestrons? I believe they are. So far fr p n ragmented government. unified national governments. In the Organizational Process Model (Mod 'i 5 organizations. These u. lunt instruments” may not maximize th_e_nationa C r' :3" interest with respect ti) “the problem,” but may further their own interest with respect to a partial conception of the problem instead. Finally, th Governmental Politics: Model (Model III) puts its emphasis on influentia individuals “and. on competition “among them; policy, according to thi model, results from the éb‘fihtfi‘iand negotiations among decision-make strategically located in the foreign-policy mechanism.9 One of the mai theses of this essay is that Model II and Model III are more helpful tha Model I in explaininglUS. policy toward Latin America over the past 2 years. ' This approach—striessing 'the problem of policy coordination as wellg as the fact of U.S. hemispheric dominancemhas a number of advantages First and most basic it gets us cl'oser to the facts: By relieving us of th I assumption that there must be some single motive that guides all the a tions of the United Statesg’it frees us to look carefully at the particul causes of particular U.S. policies. Why did the U.S. embassy in Havarli act as it did toward U.S. investors in 1960? What effect did Thomas ;. Mann have on U.S. hemispheric policy? Why did White House and Stat??? Department staffers support Latin American economic integration etc" forts in 1965-67? A Model I analysis not only would give rather mislea’ . ing answers to these 3 gnificant questions; it might well not even ask them Although my approach stresses the problem of_ policy coordinatio it does not commit the error of assuming‘that U.S. hemispheric policy: necessarily unintendisd, or unconscious, or accidental. Clearly there a many interests in North American society and government c'onsciOusly committed to dominance overWest con i ,l however, only part of a policy mosaififinosatvthat‘irfo‘f‘tenfi-no-t-eo 9See Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuber.- MiSsiie Crisis (Bostti 1971), passim. Other discuissions of bureaucratic politics and foreign policy are: Allison’s " earliei' formulation of his analysis: “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis,"AmE Political Science Review, vi 1. 53, September 1969; Destler, Presidents, Bureaucratic; ‘Alliso Morton l-I. Halperin, “Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications,” in K!) mond Tanter and Richard Ii. Ullman, eds, “Theory and Policy in International Relations,” §y plement to War-[d Poiiticsfivol. 24, Spring 1972; and Morton H. Halperin, “Sources of Powfi the Foreign Affairs Bureaucracy ." paper prepared for delivery at the 1972 annual meeting 03“ American Political Science Association. I-lalperin’s analysis will appear in expanded formliii forthcoming Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, the Brookings Institution (Washin: D.C.). With regard to the past, the evidence I shall liar ~ . . .. ; and to reCOUp the political capital thusi ry likely to undertake an interventionist and act nvested, he would ivist policy toward , aves us little less pes— the “centralized imperialism” ap- r informed. In the discussion that f North American policy since the ,Alliance for Progress and Nix . , on turn. The essay wrll then look more thoroughly into the sources mentation and poor coordination in U.S. hemispheric policy. Fi- shall discuss policy chan ' ' er , . gem more detail, to ether wit tic vrew of the prospects for change. g h my own but it may leave us rather bette ;I shall first review the record 0 T 9505, discussing the Eisenhower 132 Eisenhower: The Illusion of Coordination tration’s policies toward Latin America. Continuing trends begun under Truman,i0 the new ad ' inistration stressed military and ideological securi- . ty over other policy t emes. The enemy, of course, was the “international “ ' Communist apparatu .”” The chief defenses were to be (1) U.S.-assisted armed forces to repel conventional attack, and (2) inter-American soli- darity through the GAS. to coordinatepolitical and military defense, including. that against “subversion” from within.12 North America’s approaches to economic development and private in- vestment—developed in the State Department and the Treasury—seemed in harmony with the Pentagon’s security premises. As a “safe” area, Latin America was free to ollow the liberal road—the only proper routewto economic deve10pm t. The area’s governments, U.S. agencies argued needed to play little ole in economic development. Nor did the United States believe that North American public economic aid for Latin Amer‘ _ ica was neceSsary; in any case, European recovery and the Korean Wa' “i unreasonable, At Latin Americans . . such princ1pal ohc - . had PHOUW- _ ' ,, . ' . 24 at and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles? andyitnzialifirs as the Pros:- ..The entrance of forelgticapltal, Milton Eisenhower wrote in 19533}.-i erlcan opposition to Col Jacobo A e ermined North ._.__,,_ . . “-—-~.___. . . . -- was “essential to development in Latin America, but he added that mo . ‘of that foreign capitiil must be private. Only a marginal role, he reconi mended, Should be eserved for World Bank and Export-Imporfian loans.13 - .. w... ...._a nations. The “reciprocity” that had defined the Good Neighbor policy“ North America’s pro ise not to intervene militarily, and a, reduction cooperation on defer-(5e and expropriation‘4—had been eroded from be mFor a critical account of the Truman policies toward Latin America, see David Green, “=th Cold War Comes to Latin America," in Barton J. Bernstein, ed.,P01'itics and Policies of the T man Administration (Chicago: 197 2). ' , 11Dulles, quoted in U.S. Department of State, The Intervention of International Comm .. in Guatemala (Washington, D.C.: August 1954), p. 2. ‘ E lE'See Edwin Lieuwcn, Arms and Politics in Latin America (New York: rev. ed., 1963 ,‘ 203, 241. Reitzel et a1. alsd discuss U.S. security policy with relation to the hemisphere: “Fr" the point of view of the U ited States, here was avery Special regional structure that, in tei'rw of the world situation, co tributed directly to the security of the United States." William 13: ac], Morton A. Kaplan, an Constance G. Cobbcnz, United States Foreign Policy, 1945— the Brookings Institution (Washington, D.C.: 1966),_p. 77. l3Miilton S. Eisenhower, “U.S.-Latin American Relations: Report to the President," Defi menial” State (Washington. D.C.: 1953), pp. 8, l7—18. n conferences, see also Jerome " and Juan de Onis‘s excelle . Way (Chicago: 1971) pp. 36- nt The Alliance ThatLort Its I; ., “international Unit " .v 951 (press conference, June 3’ 1954).” U.S. Department of State Bulletin, vol. 30, 150' perfectly plausible, as Ric 1st theme in its public relations cam its _ . . mercenary inter- to have determined U.S: official policy. See Barnet ‘_ : ' 968 . - by the State Department to Arbcnz J. P 231. On the details of the UFCO claim pIe-‘ -‘ i see “-5- Department of State Bull r' . . , . _ i _1954, Pp-‘6i8—79; also 58.6 Fredrick B. Pike, “Guatemai h e m, vol. 30. no. See Bryce Wood, The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy (New York. 1961), p I‘ll nlsm in the Americas, a, t e United States, and ‘ ,_ _ _ ” Review ofPaiirrcs, vol. 17 1 and Chapter 13- ' pl 'fistment m Guatemala in 1954, and its role in the chaifiiiii'eiiiéfi; on the mm or 184 Christopher Mitchell 185 other Latin American 11 tions concerning Guatemala.” In inter-Ameri-_ _ , can conferences, the Unjted States sought open, collective intervention ‘2 j - . mi??? tZ‘iRQ-iiil-‘lfliflg‘llfinfita D01icy. Per- ,. against Arbenz; in fact, she carried out covert subversion of his regime 1. ' ' ‘ - -' ' d Vslcilf:ar NCdStm was .preorda.med’ bUt It is aided (in secret) only by Honduras and Nicaragua.” Many Latin Amer-r ' I ‘ a ing orth American policy was, as th‘? ican states hoped that the 1954 Caracas meeting would deal principally. with economic matters, either on their merits or as a quid pro quo for} support of the United StI tes against Guatemala. But economic program were shelved once politi al negotiations had produced paper agreements —accords that, without conomic backing, could only be superficial.2 The Guatemala affair in de the United States appear not only cynically. interventionist, but hypocritical as well, and unwilling to make up in economic assistance for some of her overemphasis on ideological secu- rity. . In the late 19505, many U.S. officials recognized the divisions beneath. the surface of U.S. policy, and the frictions with Latin America caused by these lines of action. Milton Eisenhower, C. Douglas Dillon (Under-I secretary of State for conomic Affairs), Thomas C. Mann (Assistant Secretary of State for E nomic Affairs), and Roy Rubottom (Assistant Secretary of State for Inter—American Affairs) discussed sympathetically- such policy changes as support 501‘ an inter-American development bank, '- for commodity-price stabilization, and for social reform.“ But these sug- gestions were vague, and Secretarial and Presidentia'l'aattention could sel- dom be garnered to sort out‘ Latin American problems.22 Although aj number of their proposals were adopted, the policy reformers tended to} be simply one contending bureaucratic group among many. They became]: part of a larger pattern of discord and confusion among decision-maidngF agencies in the late Eisenhower years. ' , who StaUILCthQRpOSBd Castro’s 1 . “ . n _ . ' Department’s uncertain actions, its .3 . gleftgtfdoctrine, and its blindness to possible solutions without Castro if helped bring Fidel to power.23 f! ' Philip Bonsai,‘ on the other hand, succeeded Smith and recommended l,a policy of firm but sympathetic watchful waiting toward Castro. He Opposed the cancellation of Cuba’ssugar quota in 1960, but was alerted only a few hourslbefore it took'placerii Both Bonsai and the State De- i-Ipartment itself, in turn, were largely in the dark about Eisenhower’s "authorization (March 1960) to the CIA to plan Castro’s overthrow.25 U.S. actions toward her investors, as well, wgigwcpnflicting. When the U.S.-owned ngan Telephone Company was exprOpri...
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