old Midterm 2

old Midterm 2 - Name: _ ECO 4400 Games and Decisions:...

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Name: ________________________ ECO 4400 Games and Decisions: Midterm 2 You will have 75 minutes to complete this exam. Please allocate your time accordingly and show your work where appropriate. There are 100 points possible. True or False: (3 pts each) 1. True or False: In a sequential game with perfect information, there is exactly one Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) in pure strategies. 2. True or False: If all players are rational, and rationality is common knowledge, then the outcome of a sequential game with perfect information will be a SPNE. 3. True or False: If a subgame includes a node inside an information set, then all other nodes which are also inside that information set must also be included in the subgame. 4. True or False: In an indefinite horizon repeated game, a player’s action in the current round will depend on how many rounds will be played in the future. 5. True or False: In a sequential war of attrition game, the SPNE involves the first player ending the game at the first node. 6. True or False: In a sequential preemption game, the SPNE involves the first player ending the game at the first node. 7. True or False: If the stage game of a repeated game has a unique Nash equilibrium, then the only SPNE of the repeated game is to play the stage game Nash equilibrium every round of the repeated game. 8. True or False:
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old Midterm 2 - Name: _ ECO 4400 Games and Decisions:...

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