old Midterm 1

old Midterm 1 - Name: _ ECO 4400 Games and Decisions:...

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Name: ________________________ ECO 4400 Games and Decisions: Midterm 1 You will have 75 minutes to complete this exam. Please allocate your time accordingly and show your work where appropriate. “Rational”, when used in this exam, means the same as it did when he used it in class. There are 100 points possible. True or False: Circle your answer. No explanation needed. 2 points each. 1. True or False: A player must make the same decision at every node inside an information set. 2. True or False: If all players are rational, then the outcome of a game will be a Nash equilibrium. 3. True or False: A strictly dominated strategy can never be part of a Nash equilibrium. 4. True or False: If a strategy profile survives the iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies, then it must be a Nash equilibrium. 5. True or False: In a two-player normal form game, if Player 2 is randomizing among strategies, then if Player 1 is rational, he should also randomize among strategies. 6. True or False: In an extensive form game with imperfect information, for each terminal node, there is exactly one path from the initial node which ends at that terminal node. 7. True or False: Assuming both players are rational, pre-play communication cannot have an effect on the outcome of a prisoner’s dilemma game. 8.
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This note was uploaded on 02/24/2011 for the course ECO 4400 taught by Professor Lightle during the Fall '10 term at FSU.

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old Midterm 1 - Name: _ ECO 4400 Games and Decisions:...

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