Beardsley&Asall - Journal of Conflict Resolution...

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View Full Document Right Arrow Icon Journal of Conflict Resolution The online version of this article can be found at: DOI: 10.1177/0022002708330386 2009 53: 278 originally published online 30 January 2009 Journal of Conflict Resolution Kyle Beardsley and Victor Asal Winning with the Bomb Published by: On behalf of: Peace Science Society (International) can be found at: Journal of Conflict Resolution Additional services and information for Email Alerts: Subscriptions: Reprints: Permissions: Citations: at LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO on August 26, 2010 Downloaded from
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278 Authors’ Note: Replication data are available at Journal of Conflict Resolution Volume 53 Number 2 April 2009 278-301 © 2009 SAGE Publications 10.1177/0022002708330386 hosted at Winning with the Bomb Kyle Beardsley Department of Political Science Emory University, Atlanta Victor Asal Department of Political Science State University of New York, Albany Nuclear weapons’ effects on an actor’s success in coercive diplomacy are in part a function of how nuclear weapons change the perceived costs of conflict. The authors argue that states can improve their allotment of a good or convince an opponent to back down and have shorter crises if their opponents have greater expected costs of crisis. Noting that nuclear weapons increase the costs of full-escalation scenarios but decrease their probability, it is uncertain what impact nuclear weapons should have on expected costs of conflict. The authors assess crisis outcomes from 1945 to 2000 using the International Crisis Behavior data set. The evidence confirms that nuclear actors are more likely to prevail when facing a nonnuclear state. The expected duration of crisis in such asymmetric directed dyads is substantially smaller than the duration of crisis for actors in nonnuclear dyads. Nuclear actors in asymmetric dyads are also more likely to prevail than states in symmetric nuclear dyads. Keywords: nuclear weapons; victory; international crisis behavior N uclear weapons are destructive instruments created to coerce other states. Indeed, the Manhattan Project was launched, in part, out of fear that Hitler would develop the bomb first en route to global domination, and the first uses of atomic weapons in combat were attempts to precipitate a Japanese surrender. States endure considerable risks and costs to develop nuclear weapons, presumably to enhance their bargaining leverage toward getting a larger share of the global resource pie, or, at a minimum, to better holding onto the resources already possessed. Use of atomic weapons, however, has not been attempted since 1945, and they are
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This note was uploaded on 02/27/2011 for the course PLSC 300D taught by Professor Melin during the Spring '11 term at Loyola Chicago.

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Beardsley&Asall - Journal of Conflict Resolution...

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