Cyber National Guard

Cyber National Guard - Education Editors Matt Bishop bishop@cs.ucdavis.edu Cynthia Irvine irvine@nps.edu 56 COPUBLISHED BY THE IEEE COMPUTER AND

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Unformatted text preview: Education Editors: Matt Bishop, bishop@cs.ucdavis.edu Cynthia Irvine, irvine@nps.edu 56 COPUBLISHED BY THE IEEE COMPUTER AND RELIABILITY SOCIETIES ■ 1540-7993/10/$26.00 © 2010 IEEE ■ JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 Government support for civil- ian cyberspace appears daunting. The government has no hope of building up sufficient cyber expertise across all the nation’s critical infrastructures. Too many areas require specialized exper- tise, uncompetitive government salaries would result in a continual brain drain to the private sector, and the cyberspace terrain changes quickly. On the bright side, larger private entities have pockets of security experts who could serve part or all of the nation, but they don’t necessarily have employees in all states. Dating back to the American Revolution, the US has a tradition of citizen-soldier volunteers. The National Guard has worked well for physical emergencies. Volun- teers enlist for a fixed term. Boot camp prepares them for duty. They meet regularly throughout the year and annually have ex- tended training. They receive var- ious benefits and, as sanctioned by Congress, can be called up by the president in response to national emergencies. In a similar vein, the US could create a nationally funded CNG. This corps could be quickly mobilized to assist dur- ing and after serious cyberattacks. This idea directly follows from the recommendations in the White House’s cybersecurity review (see the sidebar). Those assigned to CNG units would be volunteers with a keen interest in computer technology and possibly with private-sector jobs aligned with their guard ac- tivities. Enlistment qualifications would have to be established. En- detection systems crashed re- peatedly, and diagnostic utilities malfunctioned. Multiple attempts to fend off the attacks failed, and most of the production-critical IT systems were in a shambles. With the threat of physical damage looming, the situation grew increasingly dire. Each com- pany had solid IT support, but the problems’ magnitude and extent were beyond its capacity and ex- perience. Even if the attacks could be deflected, it was becoming ap- parent that returning the systems to normal might take weeks. Meanwhile, the target levels of heating oil needed for the com- ing winter were nowhere in sight. The economic and social disrup- tion’s cost would be high without more IT help. A call to the Cyber Tsar was in order. She immediately requested mobilization of the Cyber Na- tional Guard (CNG); within the hour, trained cyberunits were on the scene, either physically or remotely. Their expertise in net- work disaster recovery, forensics, and cyberdefense was legendary. Best of all, with a combination of technical skills and an un- derstanding of refinery business processes (a result of the Guard members’ “regular” jobs), enough talent was working on facets of the problem that the systems were back online at partial capacity within three days, and at close to full capacity shortly thereafter.full capacity shortly thereafter....
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This note was uploaded on 02/27/2011 for the course EE 92 taught by Professor John during the Spring '11 term at Bethany WV.

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Cyber National Guard - Education Editors Matt Bishop bishop@cs.ucdavis.edu Cynthia Irvine irvine@nps.edu 56 COPUBLISHED BY THE IEEE COMPUTER AND

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