{[ promptMessage ]}

Bookmark it

{[ promptMessage ]}

kelseyjusticepoliticalauthorityandarmedconflict

kelseyjusticepoliticalauthorityandarmedconflict - The...

Info icon This preview shows pages 1–15. Sign up to view the full content.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Image of page 1

Info icon This preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Image of page 2
Image of page 3

Info icon This preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Image of page 4
Image of page 5

Info icon This preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Image of page 6
Image of page 7

Info icon This preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Image of page 8
Image of page 9

Info icon This preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Image of page 10
Image of page 11

Info icon This preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Image of page 12
Image of page 13

Info icon This preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Image of page 14
Image of page 15
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

Unformatted text preview: The Sacred and the Sovereign Religlon and International Politics JOHN D. CARLSON & ERIK C. OWENS, Editors Georgetown University Press WASHINGTON, DC. * Georgetown University Press, Washington, DC. (0 200'; by Georgetown University Press All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America 10987654321 200'; This book is printed on acid-free recycled paper meeting the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence in Paper for Printed Library Materials. Portions of R. Scott Appleby‘s essay “Serving 'l'wo Masters? Affirming Religious Belief and Human Rights in a Plnralistic World" originally appeared in his book 'l'he Ambivalence oft/re Sacred (Lanhani, Md: Rmnnan and Littlefield. 2000). Reprinted with permission. Library of Congress Catalogirig-in-Publication Data The sacred and the sovereign : religion and international politics / Iohn D. Carlson and Erik C. Owens, editors. p. cm. Includes bibliographic references and index. ISBN 0—87840—908—4 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1, Religion and international affairs. 1. Carlson, John D. (John David) 11. Owens, Erik C. inrosagggsgg 2003 291.17 7—( e21 2002013808 M... 5 Justice, Political Authority, and Armed Conflict: Challenges to Sovereignty and the lust Conduct of War IOHN KELSAY INCE THE END 01“ THE corn WAR, the sovereignty of states has been differently conceived. So we are told, and there is arnplc evi- dence to support the statement. In this chapter, I point to three direc- tions from which the sovereignty of states is now challenged: from “above"—that is, in terms of the claims of international organizations; from “alongside"—that is, in terms of states, often operating in loose coalitions with others, who claim the right and/or duty to cross interna- tional borders in pursuit of specified interests; and from “below"—that is, in terms of citizens' militias or pcoples’ armies who present themselves as defenders ofa justice to which established state and/or international authorities are indifferent or even actively hostile.l In every case, the no— tion of states as political entities whose borders are sacrosanct appears to be outdated. Was such a notion ever really in vogue, however? There is much to suggest that the answer is no. The United Nations charter as well as im- portant religious and moral considerations militatc against the judgment that the borders of states are inviolable. The idea that borders are sacro- sanct did, and does, carry moral weight, largely as a check against im- perialism and as a retainer of the international balance of power. Stated in terms of sanctity or inviolability, however, the sovereignty of states is 113 114 IOHN KELSAY overdrawn. (This is a central theme of Robert Gallucci’s argument in chapter 10 of this book.) Post—cold war challenges to sovereignty from above, alongside, and below demonstrate a recovery of the importance of justice in political discourse, specifically in terms ofbehaviors that le- gitimate the exercise of political and military authority within a speci- fied geopolitical context. When these challenges are tied to discussions of humanitarian intervention, efforts to limit terrorism, or the pursuit of“peoples’ justice," they point to a renewed emphasis on the notion of just cause in the use of armed force. This emphasis on justice helps us to conceive of sovereignty properly as a political framework, albeit not an innnovable one. Such a renewed emphasis has its problems, however. Thus, I close with some reflections on the problematic of comparative justice—of competing notions of justice, as they relate to the justification and es- pecially the conduct of war. Challenges to State Sovereignty From “Above" One sign ofa shifting conception of state sovereignty is found in the de- bate over humanitarian intervention, specifically with respect to the role of the United Nations and other international organizations, In this de- bate, the contributions of Secretary—General Kofi Annan are most in- structive. In his 1998 Ditchley Lecture, and more recently in his report on the state of the UN and his report to the UN Millennium Commit— tee, Secretary—General Annan argues that intervention is a moral and legal necessity in some cases if the UN is to keep its covenant with the peoples of the world. Nonetheless, the secretary-general notes, the UN recognizes state sovereignty as one of its bedrock principles. Its charter regards state boundaries, once established and recognized by the mem- ber states, as nearly saerosanet. Indeed, throughout the charter we read again and again that the UN exists to assist in and regulate international relations between states. States may be penalized or even become the object of armed force for violations of the boundaries of other states. Yet according to Chapter 2, Article 7 of the charter, nothing in the charter should be taken to legitimate interference in the domestic affairs of the Challenges to Sovereignty and the lust Conduct ofWar 115 members. It is as though the charter builds a wall at the boundaries of each of the member states; respect for these walls is one of the rules of international society codified by the UN. One would need to overcome a considerable burden of proofto justify intervention within the bound- aries of states—if indeed it is even proper or possible to speak of over- coming such a burden as a possibility. The one case in which the charter clearly legitimates intervention in a state’s internal affairs might be described in terms of the threat of “spillover." Thus, whenever unrest or strife within the boundaries of a member state poses a threat to international order or other states, the charter indicates that the organization is to take an interest and indeed may be justified in intervening. As the secretary-general puts it, this pro— vision typically has been understood in terms of the type of conflict in which a civil war somehow threatens to spill over into the territory of other states—as, for example, one often heard in the past ten years or so, as European or North American leaders worried about the prospect that the various conflicts within the former Yugoslavia might carry beyond Yugoslav borders into Macedonia, Albania, or beyond. Even here, of course, there is a question of whether such spillover—actual or feared— justified intervention within Yugoslavian borders or more modest at- tempts to build a firewall to contain the conflict. As the secretary—general has it, however, some form of action by the UN, inclusive of armed force, has been considered justifiable by member states in such cases, and this intervention has been understood as a kind of exception to the general rule against such action. One may pause here to wonder why the rule against intervention en- joys sueh privileged status—nearly, if not in fact, the status of an absolute rule. The answer is not hard to find. According to the secretary-general, the UN charter’s recognition of the value of sovereignty, and the orga- nization’s continued affirmation of it, provides protection against impe- rialism. The emphasis on sovereignty, and thus against intervention, is tied to the development of international society in a postcolonial world. Small and weak states thereby are protected against domination by the established states, whose will often is identified with the interests of the “international community.” In a sense, protection of those smaller states becomes one of the implicit—or perhaps even declared—purposes for which the UN exists. :erxm w 4.4 :vrw—wuwmzm: 116 jOHN KELSAY Nevertheless, the secretary-general asserts, no one should think that the UN was created to protect the sovereignty of states, even small and weak ones, in a way that allows this bedrock principle of international society to be used as a cloak for violators ofhuman rights. The covenant of the UN is with the peoples of the world, not the states, he argues. Thus, in cases in which the interests of peoples conflict with the sover- eignty of states, the UN must—in the moral and legal sense of that term—consider intervention, by means proportionate to the problem and calculated to achieve the end ofbringing relief. Many problems are the result of poverty or underdevelopment, and therefore are tied to the mandate of the UN to enable the peoples of the world to further their ability to live a decent life. In those cases, economic intervention or eco- nomic aid may assist in the provision of relief. In other cases, however, violations of human rights are the result of local elites pitting some por- tion ofa state’s population against others; ifrelief cannot be obtained by other means, armed intervention may be required. If it is, the member states have a duty to support the mission. In his report to the Millennium Committee, Secretary-General Arman stipulates that the UN’s covenant with the peoples of the world is to secure freedom from want and freedom from fear. The member states—especially those that are strong—owe a debt of solidarity to peoples who are victims of want or oppression; indeed, says Arman, the UN was created to recognize and pay off this debt.Z From “Alongside" Secretary-General Arman is an advocate for an increased UN role in hu— manitarian intervention. Others are not so convinced that the UN is well situated to carry out this role. Thus, a variety of just war analysts (includ- ing Jean Bethke Elshtain in chapter 4 of this book) argue that ifhumani- tarian intervention is justified at all, it is justified in terms of claims of jus- tice.3 The question of agency—or, in just war terms, right authority— is less important than the duty to respond to those claims. Consider, for example, the oft-cited essay by Michael Walzer, “The Politics of Rescue."4 Interven- tion, Walzer writes, has always been a problem, even for thinkers who favor an “internationalist ethic,” by which the suffering ofpeople outside one’s own state carries moral weight. This has been so because of fears of impe- rialism. When the United States was locked in cold war “combat" with Challenges to Sovereignty and the lust Conduct ofWar 117 the Soviet Union, this attitude made sense. Now, however, “in this post— imperial and post—cold war age," a “small but growing number of people on the left now favor intervening, here or there, driven by an internation— alist ethic." Walzcr's comment is that these people “are right to feel driven." Internationalism has always been understood to require support for, and even participation in, popular struggles. Liberation should always be a local initiative. In the face oflniinan disaster, however, internationalism has a more urgent meaning. It's not possible to wait; anyone who can take the initiative should do so. Active opposition to massacre and massive dc- portation is morally necessary; its risks must be accepted.8 There are important questions about timing and means. Furthermore, there is an important qucstion about who can authorize intervention; Walzer judges that in many cases an international force will be best. Nev- ertheless, the claims of justice are primary; for the victims of wrongdoing, intervention is necessary: “Anyone who can take the initiative should do so.” One cannot rule out intervention by individual states, in cases where such action is a means to prevent massive violations of human rights. Similarly, consider the 1993 statement by the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, “The Harvest of Justice Is Sown in Peace."6 “IIu- manitarian intervention," the bishops say, has to do with “the forceful, direct intervention by one or more states or international organizations in the internal affairs of other states for essentially humanitarian pur- poses." Such intervention aims at the protection of human rights; in some cases, it is not only permissible but an obligation of the strong, act- ing out of solidarity with the weak. Here the bishops quote Pope John Paul Us 1987 encyclical On Social Concern: [When] populations are succumbing to the attacks of an unjust aggres- sor, states no longer have a “right to indifference." It seems clear that their duty is to disarm the aggressor ifall other means have proved ineffective. The principles ofsovercignty ofstates and of noninterferencc in their in- ternal affairs . . . cannot constitute a screen behind which torture and murder may be carried out.7 Thus, the demands of justice are of primary concern. States that vio- late those demands provide a just cause for intervention. Such inter- vention may be carried out by international organizations such as the F 118 min: KELSAY UN. It also may be carried out by individual states. The point is the de- fense of justice; agency is a secondary concern. Discussions of humanitarian intervention therefore suggest that the sovereignty of states is under challenge not only from “above"—that is, from those agencies such as the UN that in some sense constitute hu- manity’s gesture toward world order. These discussions also suggest that sovereignty is under challenge from “alongside"—that is, from states whose governments understand themselves as responding to the duty to defend people who are victims of oppression. This particular challenge is enhanced by the post—Septernber 11, 2001, campaign against terrorism led by the United States. The campaign against terror announced by President Bush targets not only Usama bin Ladin and the al-Qa‘ida organization associated with him but all persons or groups who carry out acts of terror. Moreover, the president’s an— nounced program makes no distinctions between those who carry out acts of terror and those who “harbor" or otherwise provide support for them. Thus, a nation that “hosts" groups associated with international terrorism may be subject to attacks. The full implication of the presi- dent’s program will take years to appreciate fully. In the case. of Afghanistan, the “no distinctions" provision led to a direct effort to de- pose the Taliban in their capacity as governors of Afghanistan. lll other cases, however, one could imagine the president’s edict to involve less in the way of direct attacks 011 an established regime and more in the way ofcrossing international boundaries to strike at training camps or other facilities related to acts oftcrror. This strategy could mani- fest in the form of US. military and intelligence cooperation with other nations (as in the Philippines). Suppose, for example, that group X, which has been identified with strikes against American nationals trav- eling in the Middle East, utilizes bases in Lebanon. The government of Lebanon, though not identifiable as a sponsor of group X and offi- cially desiring to disassoeiate itself from the actions of the group, is un- able to bring the group’s members under control. In the strict sense, the Lebanese government is not engaged in state sponsorship of terrorism; its relationship is more one of acquiescence. Yet for a variety of reasons, the government is reluctant to invite a foreign or international orga- nization to intervene. In fact, it resists the idea ofintervention, making its objections known in a variety of international forums. 7'? Challenges to Sovereignty and the lust Conduct of’War 119 Under the Bush doctrine, would the United States and/or its coali- tion partners be justified in violating the borders of Lebanon to prevent the members of group X from carrying out acts of terror? It is hard to know in the abstract. In any case, there will be important questions of timing and means. Surely, however, the logic of the president’s dictum lends itself to a positive answer. Just as state sovereignty ought not pro- vide a shield behind which governments may oppress their citizens, it also ought not provide a shield behind which terrorist groups may hide, when particular governments prove either unable or unwilling to exer- cise control. Thus, state sovereignty is under challenge from alongside, as well as from above—from individual states and their coalition part- ners, as well as from established international organizations. From “Below” In our imagined scenario, the government of Lebanon cannot or will not discipline a group based on Lebanese territory, and the United States and its coalition partners intervene to prevent the group from carrying out its program ofinternational terrorism—that is, they intervene in the name of justice. The case can be made more complex, however. If we imagine that group X thinks ofitselfas engaged in the pursuit ofjustice (as most such groups do), we have a challenge to Lebanon's sovereignty that proceeds from more than one direction. The challenge is not only from alongside but from ”below." At this point, we do better to turn from imaginary to real-world sce— narios. In the case of al-Qa‘ida, we have a good example of the phe- nomenon. Here a group that does not hold the status ofa state never- theless challenges state sovereignty and considers itself justified in doing so. Al-Qa‘ida is one of many such groups, and each poses distinctive challenges. Nevertheless, we get a sense of the claims advanced by at- tending to this singular group. Consider, for example, the reasoning advanced in the February 23, 1998, Declaration Concerning Struggle against Iews and Crusaders signed by Usama bin Ladin and his colleagues.8 This document argues that the United States and its allies are engaged in a war ofannihilation against Muslims. It accuses the United States of occupying the Arabian peninsula, in direct violation of longstanding Islamic tradition. The H 120 mm: KELSAY Saudi regime, which bases its legitimacy 011 its role as “guardian" of the integrity of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, is either too weak to end this occupation or too corrupt to care. In either case, the state can— not be regarded as adequate to the task of defending justice, and Mus- lims need not wait for orders from the state to defend themselves. In ter— minology drawn from classical Islamic jurisprudence, the authors of the Declaration articulate “the judgment that it is an individual duty for any Muslim who is able to fight the Americans and their allies, civilians and soldiers, in any country where that is possible.” By stipulating that the duty is “individual,” the authors indicate that this situation is an emer- geney, which in the Islamic law of war flows from and indicates the ex- istence ofa context in which the ordinary lines of authority no longer hold In classical texts, a woman need not obtain the permission of her husband or father to fight; an underage person need not obtain the per- mission ofhis or her parents. By extension, ordinary Muslims need not wait for the order ofan existing government. The call, to each and to all, is to fight in defense of Islamic values. In a 1996 statement—sometimes known as the Ladenese Epistle—the call to fight is focused 011 the Arabian peninsula.g Muslims are asked to support efforts, characterized in terms of “lightning-quick strikes” aimed at the removal of US. troops from the peninsula—again, without regard for the authority of the Saudi regime. In the 1998 declaration, the scope of the campaign is expanded. One must strike not only at targets close to one’s homeland; one also must carry the campaign to an international level. In a sense, this substate group is claiming trans—state authority. Its members or allies are authorized to fight members of the enemy and “plunder their wealth" in any geographic or political location where that is possible. Alongside the claims ofjustice, the notion of state sovereignty pales. State Sovereignty: Respect versus Sanctity Thus, the sovereignty of states is under challenge from a variety of di- rections. Indeed, some thinkers have argued that the very concept ofsov- ereignty is changing—that international society is moving away from a Westphalian notion, in which the borders of st...
View Full Document

{[ snackBarMessage ]}

What students are saying

  • Left Quote Icon

    As a current student on this bumpy collegiate pathway, I stumbled upon Course Hero, where I can find study resources for nearly all my courses, get online help from tutors 24/7, and even share my old projects, papers, and lecture notes with other students.

    Student Picture

    Kiran Temple University Fox School of Business ‘17, Course Hero Intern

  • Left Quote Icon

    I cannot even describe how much Course Hero helped me this summer. It’s truly become something I can always rely on and help me. In the end, I was not only able to survive summer classes, but I was able to thrive thanks to Course Hero.

    Student Picture

    Dana University of Pennsylvania ‘17, Course Hero Intern

  • Left Quote Icon

    The ability to access any university’s resources through Course Hero proved invaluable in my case. I was behind on Tulane coursework and actually used UCLA’s materials to help me move forward and get everything together on time.

    Student Picture

    Jill Tulane University ‘16, Course Hero Intern