150 Artikel Pranata editan - ANALISIS HUBUNGAN MEKANISME...

Info iconThis preview shows pages 1–2. Sign up to view the full content.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
SIMPOSIUM NASIONAL AKUNTANSI VI Surabaya, 16 – 17 Oktober 2003 ANALISIS HUBUNGAN MEKANISME CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DAN INDIKASI MANAJEMEN LABA PRATANA PUSPA MIDIASTUTY Fakultas Ekonomi Universitas Bengkulu MAS’UD MACHFOEDZ Fakultas Ekonomi Universitas Gad jah Mada Yogyakarta Abstract Earnings management is the moral hazard problem of a manager that arises because of the conflict of interest between the manager as agent and the shareholder and the owner as principal. The behavior of earnings management will immediately influence the reported earning. The objective of this research was to examine the influence of several corporate governance mechanisms, namely, managerial ownership, institutional ownership, and number of board of directors on the indication of earnings management (known as the value of discretionary accrual) and earnings quality (known as the earnings response coefficient /ERC). Sample used in this research was the firms that are not included in the categories of banking industry, institution of credit matters, security, and insurance, for an observation period of 1995-2000. The other criteria of sample were the firm that had the data of managerial and institutional ownerships as well as the number of board of directors. By using the method of pooling data, the sample of 85 firms was collected with 367 observations for that period. By using the method of ordinary least square (OLS) regression analysis, the result of this research suggested that the stock holding by managerial and institutional had negative influence on earnings management. Whereas, the size or the number of board of directors have positive influence on earnings management. Whereas, the managerial and institutional ownerships had positive influence on the earning quality, but the number of board of directors did not have influence on it. In general, this research indicated that managerial ownership and institutional ownership could be corporate governance mechanism that could reduce the conflict of interest between manager and the various interested parties in the corporation which finally had impact on reducing the agency problems. However, the size of board of directors did not indicate the influence as mechanism of good corporate governance. This requires the further examination by using not only the size or number of boards but also independence, competence and motivation of managing board. The keywords : Corporate Governance, Earnings Management, Earnings Response Coefficient, Agency Theory. LATAR BELAKANG PERMASALAHAN Menurut teori keagenan ( agency theory ), adanya pemisahan antara kepemilikan dan pengelolaan suatu perusahaan dapat menimbulkan masalah keagenan ( agency problems ), yaitu ketidaksejajaran kepentingan antara principal (pemilik/pemegang saham) dan agent (manajer). Jensen dan Meckling (1976) memandang baik principal dan agent merupakan pemaksimum kesejahteraan, sehingga ada kemungkinan besar bahwa agent tidak selalu bertindak demi kepentingan terbaik dari
Background image of page 1

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon
Image of page 2
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

This note was uploaded on 03/01/2011 for the course AKUNTANSI 0806322104 taught by Professor S1 during the Spring '10 term at Universitas Indonesia.

Page1 / 26

150 Artikel Pranata editan - ANALISIS HUBUNGAN MEKANISME...

This preview shows document pages 1 - 2. Sign up to view the full document.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Ask a homework question - tutors are online