print-ANALISA FREE CASH FLOW DAN KEPEMILIKAN MANAJERIAL TERHADAP KEBIJAKAN UTANG

Print-ANALISA FREE CASH FLOW DAN KEPEMILIKAN MANAJERIAL TERHADAP KEBIJAKAN UTANG

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278 SIMPOSIUM NASIONAL AKUNTANSI VI Surabaya, 16 – 17 Oktober 2003 ANALISA FREE CASH FLOW DAN KEPEMILIKAN MANAJERIAL TERHADAP KEBIJAKAN UTANG PADA PERUSAHAAN PUBLIK DI INDONESIA TARJO Universitas Dr. Soetomo Surabaya DR. JOGIYANTO HM, MBA, Ak Universitas Gajah Mada Yogyakarta ABSTRACT The main objective of this research is to examine behavior public company in Indonesia to manage of free cash flows and the role managerial ownership on corporate debt policy. The using dependent variable on this research is debt, so independent variables are free cash flows and managerial ownership. The sample used was the public companies listed in the Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSX). There were 59 companies which have and during the period from 1996-2000. Data collected by purposive sampling. The result examination is that public company in Indonesia have low investment opportunity set (IOS) when free cash flow high attending by using debt for cost operation company. This result robust because evidence with chow test the result that significant difference regression stability between free cash flow to corporate debt policy have low and high investment opportunity set. Although, when divided based big company have low investment opportunity and small company have low investment opportunity, both have the same effect between free cash flow on corporate debt policy. The result chow test suggest examination there are not statistically significant difference. Managerial ownership association negative with debt policy, this result evidence that agency cost of debt can be reduce by managerial ownership. Keywords: free cash flow, managerial ownership, debt policy, company size, dividend yield and investment opportunity set (IOS). 1. PENDAHULUAN 1.1. Latar Belakang Masalah Ross et al. (2000) mendefinisikan bahwa free cash flow merupakan kas perusahaan yang dapat didistribusikan kepada kreditor atau pemegang saham yang tidak diperlukan untuk modal kerja atau investasi pada asset tetap. Free cash flow biasanya menimbulkan konflik kepentingan antara pemegang saham dan manajer. Hal tersebut terjadi karena adanya perbedaan kepentingan diantara kedua belah pihak, yaitu pemegang saham menginginkan sisa dana tersebut dibagikan untuk meningkatkan kesejahteraannya. Manajer berkeinginan dana yang ada digunakan untuk investasi pada proyek-proyek yang menguntungkan karena pada masa mendatang akan menambah insentif bagi manajer. Penelitian ini mengangkat isu tentang: (1) Perilaku perusahaan-perusahaan di Indonesia dalam mengelola free cash flow dalam kaitannya dengan kebijakan utang; (2) Kepemilikan manajerial terhadap kebijakan utang. Kedua hal tersebut menarik karena ada kepentingan yang berbeda diantara pemegang saham dan manajer dalam mengelola free cash flow dalam hubungannya dengan kebijakan utang. Ross et al . (1999) menyatakan semakin besar proporsi kepemilikan manajemen pada perusahaan maka manajemen cenderung berusaha lebih giat untuk kepentingan pemegang saham yang notabene adalah
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This note was uploaded on 03/01/2011 for the course AKUNTANSI 0806322104 taught by Professor S1 during the Spring '10 term at Universitas Indonesia.

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Print-ANALISA FREE CASH FLOW DAN KEPEMILIKAN MANAJERIAL TERHADAP KEBIJAKAN UTANG

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