PS2 - Econ/CIS/Bio 166A UCSC Fall 2008 Dan Friedman Problem...

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Econ/CIS/Bio 166A Fall 2008 UCSC Dan Friedman Problem Set #2 Due in class Friday October 17. Part I. Word Problems. 1. Find the Normal Form Game corresponding to the surprise quiz game in PS #1. Find all Nash equilibria of this NFG. Then use the original extensive form game (EFG) to illustrate one of them. 2. Find all Nash equilibria of the Cournot and Stackelberg games from PS #1. Assume that the strategies are continuous variables. Hint: first find the BR function for the Stackelberg follower. For the Stackelberg game, plug this into the leader’s payoff function and maximize. For the Cournot game, find simultaneous BR’s. If you use this hint, you must explain why it works in order to receive full credit. 3. Recall the TASP (or RPSD) game played in class, 0 0, 20 90, 20 90, 20 90, D 90 20, 90 90, 0 120, 120 0, C 90 20, 120 0, 90 90, 0 120, B 90 20, 0 120, 120 0, 90 90, A D C B A  .  First consider the smaller game, called RPS, in which players do not have access to strategy D. a. Find the best response (BR) function for each player in the RPS game.
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PS2 - Econ/CIS/Bio 166A UCSC Fall 2008 Dan Friedman Problem...

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