PracticeFinal

PracticeFinal - Econ
166a
Fall
10
 


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Unformatted text preview: Econ
166a
Fall
10
 
 Practice
Final
Questions
 
 
 
 Questions
from
Harrington:
 
 1)
Harrington
7.7
 
 2)
Harrington
8.1
 
 3)
Harrington
9.10
 
 4)
Harrington
10.1
 
 5)
Harrington
11.5
 
 6)
Consider
the
following
2x2
game:
 
 
 A
 B
 A
 4,4
 0,5
 B
 5,0
 2,2
 
 
 Sinervo/Musacchio
 
 
 7)
Harrington
16.2
 
 Key
Concepts:
 
 Mixed
Strategy
Equilibrium
 
 Subgame
Perfect
Equilibria
 
 Perfect
Bayesian
Nash
Equilibria
 
 
 (Pooling
vs.
Seperating
vs.
Semi
Seperating
Strategies)
 
 
 Folk
Theorem
 
 Evolutionary
Games

 
 
 Evolutionary
Stable
Strategies,
Replicator
Dynamics
 a) For each player, find a strategy that maximizes the worst payoff that player could get, given that what the other player does is uncertain. This kind of strategy is known as a “security strategy.” (3 points) b) Does either player have a dominant strategy? If so, verify it; if not, explain how you know that none exists. (3 points) c) Now let the same two players play the given game over and over. Give an example of a strategy for this situation. (3 points) d) What is the highest total payoff that can be sustained in Nash equilibrium by these players? Be sure to include specific qualifications for your answer, e.g., in terms of how patient they must be. (6 points) e) Is
it
possible
for
the
players
to
sustain
(as
a
Nash
equilibrium)
 alternating
payoffs
of
5
and
0?
If
so,
spell
out
the
Nash
equilibrium
 strategies;
if
not,
explain
the
obstacle.
(5
points)
 ...
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This note was uploaded on 03/03/2011 for the course ECON 414 taught by Professor Staff during the Spring '08 term at Maryland.

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