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PracticeFinal

# PracticeFinal - Econ 166a Fall 10   ...

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Unformatted text preview: Econ 166a Fall 10    Practice Final Questions        Questions from Harrington:    1) Harrington 7.7    2) Harrington 8.1    3) Harrington 9.10    4) Harrington 10.1    5) Harrington 11.5    6) Consider the following 2x2 game:      A  B  A  4,4  0,5  B  5,0  2,2      Sinervo/Musacchio      7) Harrington 16.2    Key Concepts:    Mixed Strategy Equilibrium    Subgame Perfect Equilibria    Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibria      (Pooling vs. Seperating vs. Semi Seperating Strategies)      Folk Theorem    Evolutionary Games       Evolutionary Stable Strategies, Replicator Dynamics  a) For each player, find a strategy that maximizes the worst payoff that player could get, given that what the other player does is uncertain. This kind of strategy is known as a “security strategy.” (3 points) b) Does either player have a dominant strategy? If so, verify it; if not, explain how you know that none exists. (3 points) c) Now let the same two players play the given game over and over. Give an example of a strategy for this situation. (3 points) d) What is the highest total payoff that can be sustained in Nash equilibrium by these players? Be sure to include specific qualifications for your answer, e.g., in terms of how patient they must be. (6 points) e) Is it possible for the players to sustain (as a Nash equilibrium)  alternating payoffs of 5 and 0? If so, spell out the Nash equilibrium  strategies; if not, explain the obstacle. (5 points)  ...
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