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Unformatted text preview: i times (12 x T ), where x T = x 1 + x 2 is the sum of the two choices. a. What is player 1s best response when player #2 chooses x 2 = 0? When x 2 = 12? b. Which strategies of player #1 are dominated? Which strategies are rationalizable? c. Find player #1s best response to an arbitrary x 2 . Graph it in the (x 1 , x 2 ) plane. d. Find a Nash equilibrium of the game. e. How would the game change if player #1 moved first? Explain briefly. f. For extra credit, solve the extensive form game in part e., and find an interpretation in social sciences or biology or engineering for that game. 3. Chapter 2 Harrington Question 11 4. Chapter 3 Harrington Question 4 5. Chapter 3 Harrington Question 9 6. Chapter 4 Harrington Question 1 7. Chapter 4 Harrington Question 8 8. Chapter 5 Harrington Question 1 9. Chapter 5 Harrington Question 2 10. Chapter 6 Harrington Question 3 11. Chapter 6 Harrington Question 7...
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 Spring '08
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 Econometrics

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