intentionality -article

intentionality -article - Indo-Pacific Journal of...

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Unformatted text preview: Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology, Volume 7, Edition 1 May 2007 Page 1 of 11 Understanding the Ubiquity of the Intentionality of Consciousness in Commonsense and Psychotherapy by Ian Rory Owen Abstract A formal and idealised understanding of intentionality as a mental process is a central topic within the classical Husserlian phenomenological analysis of consciousness. This paper does not define Husserl’s stance, because that has been achieved elsewhere (Kern, 1977, 1986, 1988; Kern & Marbach, 2001; Marbach, 1988, 1993, 2005; Owen, 2006; Zahavi, 2003). This paper shows how intentionality informs therapy theory and practice. Husserl’s ideas are taken to the psychotherapy relationship in order to explain what it means for consciousness to have intentionality in various ways. The role of intentionality in psychopathology and its treatment within cognitive behavioural therapy is explained as a way of showing how understanding intentionality creates a medium for the delivery of care. From 1913, Edmund Husserl made it clear that phenomenology is about the intentionality of consciousness. As he put it: “Intentionality is the name of the problem encompassed by the whole of phenomenology” (Husserl, 1913/1982, p. 349). The precise way in which Husserl intended his phenomenology of the mental relation to being and non-being, belief and non-belief, is that theory should be promoted for practices of every kind. The specific ways in which Husserl claimed that phenomenology could help were: (1) in the creation of a theoretical or pure psychology for promoting the practice of any applied psychology (Husserl, 1928/1997), and (2) in creating a pure phenomenological philosophy that would justify and promote theory for the sciences and applied philosophy in academic disciplines. The Husserlian definition of intentionality specifically infers the donation or interpretation of the meaning of an object onto the perceptual sensations that are present (Husserl, 1900/1970, p. 860). While this notion is central to the argument presented in this paper, Husserl exegesis is beyond its intent. The aim of this paper is, rather, to show that the original domain of phenomenology is understanding the conscious objects of qualitative experience in relation to how they are conscious, the forms of being-aware, the modes of intentionality (Husserl, 1913/1982, pp. 220-221, 244-245, 251-252). Such understanding makes the nature of psychological situations, and hence their treatment, clearer. Why intentionality is useful is that it accounts for all forms of psychological existence, many of which are not current but temporal (actively remembered, automatic influence of the past, the immediate moment that is coming, the anticipation of the future, the imagination of something at any time). In essence, understanding intentionality is about a fundamental understanding of what it is to be in a conscious world with others and share meaning experientially....
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intentionality -article - Indo-Pacific Journal of...

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