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materiality of voice -SchuermannCommentBertauIPBS (p)

materiality of voice -SchuermannCommentBertauIPBS (p) -...

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COMMENTARIES The Materiality of the Abstraction Voice Volker Schürmann Published online: 7 December 2007 # Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2007 Abstract The comment on Bertau s paper underlines the importance of the internally social character of the dialogical self, which is not trivial and can not be taken for granted. A consistent theory of this internal character demands specific theoretical means native to a tradition of Leibniz philosophy. In consequence the concept of dialogical self is presented as a non-empirical one based in an ethos. We, and not nature, are responsible for the modes of conceptualising. Keywords Dialogical self . Hermeneutics . Utterance . Voice . Non-empirical concepts The paper by Marie-Cécile Bertau On the Notion of Voice is convincing in its resolute thinking. The resoluteness is remarkable in pointing out the dialogical and material character of the process of utterance. This resolute character can not be taken for granted. It s easy to postulate the dialogical and material character, but it is not easy to give a consistent theoretical framework for that. One has to use specific theoretical means in this case. Bakhtin and Vygotsky Even the term dialogical is in some sense unlucky, because it suggests exactly the opposite of its meaning. When you usually think about a dialogue, you think of a speaker A saying something, and of another speaker B answering to what is said. If someone comes along and stresses the deeply social character of the so-called dialogue, the only possible answer is to yawn. To be a social affair is an analytic determination of a dialogue; already the word tells you that at least two persons belong to what can be called a dialogue. What is, after all, important about hearing that we live under the condition of the mere fact that there are other people? In Integr Psych Behav (2008) 42:114 120 DOI 10.1007/s12124-007-9037-4 V. Schürmann ( * ) Universität Leipzig, Sportwissenschaftliche Fakultät, Jahnallee 59, 04109 Leipzig, Germany e-mail: [email protected]
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contrast to that boring message it is really upsetting to hear and to bring to a convincing end by using specific theoretical means that utterance is internally social or dialogical. Internally social means that the answer of B is not only the necessary fact and condition to communicate, but that the utterances of A and of B are what they are, namely utterances, only as answers to someone else. This is indeed a radical change in the view of language [and utterance] itself. Addressivity becomes the foundation of this language conception (Bertau 2008). Of course nearly every paper nowadays stresses that this internal character is meant, but one doesn t find, this is only a daring assumption, many papers which have the theoretical means to not only wish, but also say this with resoluteness. Even Scheler ( 1922 ), who sharply marked the difference between outer and inner sociability, didn t manage to formulate it well. His own concept of the consciousness of the other
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