FM11 Ch 17 Instructors Manual

FM11 Ch 17 Instructors Manual - Chapter 17 Capital...

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Chapter 17 Capital Structure Decisions: Extensions ANSWERS TO END-OF-CHAPTER QUESTIONS 17-1 a. MM Proposition I states the relationship between leverage and firm value. Proposition I without taxes is V = EBIT/r sU . Since both EBIT and r sU are constant, firm value is also constant and capital structure is irrelevant. With corporate taxes, Proposition I becomes V = V u + TD. Thus, firm value increases with leverage and the optimal capital structure is virtually all debt. b. MM Proposition II states the relationship between leverage and cost of equity. Without taxes, Proposition II is r sL = r sU + (r sU – r d )(1 – T)(D/S). Thus, r s increases in a precise way as leverage increases. In fact, this increase is just sufficient to offset the increased use of lower cost debt. When corporate taxes are added, Proposition II becomes Here the increase in equity costs is less than the zero-tax case, and the increasing use of lower cost debt causes the firm’s cost of capital to decrease, and again, the optimal capital structure is virtually all debt. c. The Miller model introduces personal taxes. The effect of personal taxes is, essentially, to reduce the advantage of corporate debt financing. d. Financial distress costs are incurred when a leveraged firm facing a decline in earnings is forced to take actions to avoid bankruptcy. These costs may be the result of delays in the liquidation of assets, legal fees, the effects on product quality from cutting costs, and evasive actions by suppliers and customers. e. Agency costs arise from lost efficiency and the expense of monitoring management to ensure that debtholders’ rights are protected. f. The addition of financial distress and agency costs to either the MM tax model or the Miller model results in a trade-off model of capital structure. In this model, the optimal capital structure can be visualized as a trade-off between the benefit of debt (the interest tax shelter) and the costs of debt (financial distress and agency costs). g. The value of the debt tax shield is the present value of the tax savings from the interest payments. In the MM model with taxes, this is just interest x tax rate / discount rate = iDT/r, and since i = r in the MM model, this is just TD. If a firm grows and the discount rate isn’t r, then the value of this growing tax shield is r d TDg/ (1+r TS ) where r d is the interest rate on the debt and r TS is the discount rate for the tax shield. Answers and Solutions: 17 - 1
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h. When a firm has debt outstanding it can choose to default if the firm is not worth more than the face value of the debt. This decision to default when the value of the firm is low is like the decision not to exercise a call option when the stock price is low. If management (and hence the stockholders) make the debt payment, they get to keep the company. This makes equity like an option on the underlying value of the entire firm, with a strike price equal to the face value of the debt. If D is the face value of debt maturing in one year and S is the value of the entire firm (the firm’s
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This note was uploaded on 03/10/2011 for the course FINANCE 2344 taught by Professor Kevin during the Spring '09 term at Auburn University.

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FM11 Ch 17 Instructors Manual - Chapter 17 Capital...

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