32 - Model Giving game with giver and fund-raiser. Timing:...

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Unformatted text preview: Model Giving game with giver and fund-raiser. Timing: Stage 1 : No Flyer: Giver at home with probability h = h Flyer: Giver sees f yer with probability r Can alter probability of being at home h from baseline h at cost c ( h ) , with c ( h ) = 0 , c ( h ) = 0 , and c 00 ( ) > Stage 2 : Fund-raiser visits home of giver: If giver at home (w/ prob. h ), in-person donation g If saw f yer (w/ prob. r ), donation via mail g m Utility function of giver: U ( g ) = u ( W g g m ) + av ( g + g m , G i ) s ( g ) Agent cares about: Private consumption u ( W g g m ) , with u ( ) > and u 00 ( ) Giving to charity av ( , G i ) , with v g ( , ) > , v 00 g,g ( , ) < , lim g v g ( g, ) = 0 , and v (0 , G i ) = 0 . Two special cases for v ( g, G i ) : Pure altruism (Charness and Rabin 2002, Fehr and Gchter, 2000): v ( g, G i ) = v ( g + g m + G i ) , a is altruism parameter Warm glow (Andreoni, 1989 and 1990): v ( g, G i ) = v ( g ) , a is weight on warm glow Giving via mail is less attractive ( < 1 ): less warm glow, cost of giving,... Social Pressure s ( g ) = S ( g s g ) 1 g<g s Social pressure s = 0 if not at home or if giving g g s (socially acceptable amount) Social pressure s > for giving g < g s , decreasing in g Captures identity (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000), social norms, or self-signalling (Bodner and Prelec, 2002; Grossman, 2007) Psychology evidence: Tendency to conformity and obedience (Milgram, 1952 and Asch, 1957) E f ect stronger for face-to-face interaction Figure. Social Pressure Cost At Estimated Parameters Figure....
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This note was uploaded on 03/18/2011 for the course ECON 196 taught by Professor Pierre during the Spring '10 term at University of California, Berkeley.

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32 - Model Giving game with giver and fund-raiser. Timing:...

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