final_Winter2007

# final_Winter2007 - Econ 51 Final Exam Instructions This is...

This preview shows pages 1–3. Sign up to view the full content.

This preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full Document
iv. (2 points) How would your answer to parts b.i and b.ii above change if there was Y 2 = f ( y a ; y b ) : y b & 0 ; y a = ± y b g ? Explain. c. Suppose now that there are no &rms, but that agents’ preferences are di±erent (en- dowments are the same as before). Agent i ’s utility is given by: u i ( a i ; b i ) = (2 i ± 1) log a i + log b i Note : 2 i means 2 to the power of i . i. (4 points) Solve for the Walrasian Equilibrium prices and allocations when N = 2. ii. (4 points) Solve for the Walrasian Equilibrium prices and allocations when N = 3.
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

{[ snackBarMessage ]}

### Page1 / 4

final_Winter2007 - Econ 51 Final Exam Instructions This is...

This preview shows document pages 1 - 3. Sign up to view the full document.

View Full Document
Ask a homework question - tutors are online