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moore - G.E Moore Certainty Moore is concerned with the...

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G.E. Moore, “Certainty” Moore is concerned with the following argument: P1) If it is not certain that I am not dreaming, then it is not certain that I am standing up. P2) I am not certain that I am not dreaming. C) I am not certain that I am standing up. This is, of course, an argument that is familiar from Descartes and others. But is it a good argument?
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G.E. Moore, “Certainty” P1) If I don’t know that I am not dreaming, then I don’t know that I am standing up. P2) I don’t know that I am not dreaming. C) I don’t know that I am standing up. Moore thinks that P1 is true. Why? Suppose I dream that I am sitting in a chair in Moscow. As it turns out, I am sitting in a chair in Moscow—this is where I’ve fallen asleep. While dreaming, I’ve got a belief (that I’m sitting in a chair in Moscow) that turns out to be true. Do we want to say that I know I’m sitting in a chair in Moscow?
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G.E. Moore, “Certainty” P1) If I don’t know that I am not dreaming, then I don’t know that I am standing up.
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