Quiz 4A-Micro II - BSc II-Sec B Microeconomics Spring 2010

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BSc II-Sec B Microeconomics Spring 2010 Quiz 4A Lahore School of Economics Microeconomics II BSc 2 – Section B Quiz 4A – Total Points: 56 A "sequential game" is a. another term for a repeated game. b. another term for a cooperative game. c. the term for a game in which individuals receive their payoffs at different times. d. the term for a game in which individuals do not commit to strategy choices at  the same time. e. the term for a game in which each outcome occurs, one after the other, as the game is  repeated over time. Scenario 12  Consider the game below: Player C Strategy C1 Strategy C2 Player R Strategy R1 600, 600 100, 1000 Strategy R2 1000, 100 200, 200 Playing the above game by using a maximin strategy would a. not change the equilibrium from the equilibrium of the original game. b. change the equilibrium to (R1,C2). c. change the equilibrium to (R2,C1) if R moved first. d. change the equilibrium to (R2,C1) if C moved first. e. change the equilibrium to (R2,C2). Scenario 14  Consider the game below: Player C Q=50 Q=100 Q=150 Player R Q=50 37, 37 30, 40 20, 37 Q=100 40, 30 32, 32 15, 25 Q=150 37, 20 25, 15 0, 0 - 1 -
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BSc II-Sec B Microeconomics Spring 2010 Quiz 4A What is true of equilibrium in the game in Scenario 14? a. In equilibrium, both firms choose Q = 50. b. In equilibrium, both firms choose Q = 100. c. There are two equilibria, at Q = 50 and at Q = 100. d. The only equilibrium is in mixed strategies. e. The two equilibria are those associated with the (40,30) outcome and the (30,40)  outcome. If, in the game in Scenario 14, R moves first, it will select a. Q = 50. b. Q = 100. c. Q = 150. d. a mixed strategy over the three choices that includes some positive likelihood for  each Q. e. a mixed strategy over the choices Q = 50 and Q = 100. Relative to a simultaneous-move situation, the gain to firm R from being able to move first in  the game in Scenario 14, would be a. 40 b. 37(Will be given credit although the correct answer is “5”) c. 32. d. 5. e. 3. When sellers have more information about products than buyers do, we would expect a. sellers to get higher prices for their goods than they could otherwise. b. buyers to pay lower prices for goods than they would otherwise. c. high-quality goods to drive low-quality goods out of the market. d. low-quality goods to drive high-quality goods out of the market. When states make car insurance mandatory for all drivers, it
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This note was uploaded on 04/19/2011 for the course ECON 101 taught by Professor Gul during the Spring '11 term at Lahore School of Economics.

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Quiz 4A-Micro II - BSc II-Sec B Microeconomics Spring 2010

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