AnswerstofinalexamDEC10.2008

AnswerstofinalexamDEC10.2008 - 1 ECMC02H3 Final Exam –...

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Unformatted text preview: 1 ECMC02H3 Final Exam – December 10, 2008 Time: 3 hours Professor Gordon Cleveland ______________________________________ ____________________ Your name (Print clearly and underline your last name) Your student number This exam consists of multiple choice questions and short answer questions. There are 25 multiple choice questions, each worth 3 marks, which are to be answered on the front sheet of this exam in the spaces provided. If two multiple choice answers seem reasonable, choose the best possible answer. There are three short answer questions at the end of this exam paper. Space is provided to answer those questions directly on this exam paper. Your exam consists of 18 pages (counting this first page). Please count your exam's pages immediately and report any problems. FILL IN YOUR NAME NOW. 1. _S____ 6. __G____ 11. __A____ 16. __H___ 21. __F____ 2.__B____ 7. ___H___ 12. __U____ 17. __X__ 22. __G____ 3.__I____ 8. ___O___ 13. __P____ 18. __K___ 23. __E____ 4.__C____ 9. ___L___ 14. __B____ 19. __E___ 24. __X____ 5.__C___ 10. __M___ 15. __B___ 20. __G____ 25. __W____ 2 PART I - 25 Multiple Choice Questions – 3 marks each. 1 - 3 You are given the following 5 strategic games involving two firms. Firm I can adopt either of strategy A or strategy B. Firm II can adopt either of strategy Y or strategy Z. Payoffs to the firms appear in the matrix. Questions 1 through 3 concern these five games. Firm II Strategy Y Strategy Z Game #1: Firm I Strategy A (5, 7) (3, 4) Strategy B (2, 1) (4, 3) Firm II Strategy Y Strategy Z Game #2: Firm I Strategy A (1, 4) (2, 5) Strategy B (2, 5) (1, 4) Firm II Strategy Y Strategy Z Game #3: Firm I Strategy A (3, 3) (7, 2) Strategy B (2, 7) (5, 5) Firm II Strategy Y Strategy Z Game #4: Firm I Strategy A (1, 4) (-3, 3) Strategy B (-1, 2) (-4, 5) Firm II Strategy Y Strategy Z Game #5: Firm I Strategy A (1, 7) (7, 6) Strategy B (2, 3) (5, 8) 3 1. Assume that these are sequential games in which Firm II moves first and Firm I moves second. In which of these five games is “Strategy A – Strategy Y” a Nash equilibrium?: A) only #1 B) only #2 C) only #3 D) only #4 E) only #5 F) only #1 and #2 G) only #1 and #3 H) only #1 and #4 I) only #1 and #5 J) only #2 and #3 K) only #2 and #4 L) only #2 and #5 M) only #3 and #4 N) only #3 and #5 O) only #4 and #5 P) only #1, #2, and #3 Q) only #1, #2, and #4 R) only #1, #2, and #5 S) only #1, #3, and #4 T) only #1, #3, and #5 U) only #1, #4, and #5 V) only #2, #3, and #4 W) only #2, #3, and #5 X) only #2, #4, and #5 Y) only #3, #4, and #5 Z) all of the games 2. Again, assuming these are sequential games, in which of the games do we observe two Nash equilibria?: A) only #1 B) only #2 C) only #3 D) only #4 E) only #5 F) only #1 and #2 G) only #1 and #3 H) only #1 and #4 I) only #1 and #5 J) only #2 and #3 K) only #2 and #4 L) only #2 and #5 M) only #3 and #4 N) only #3 and #5 O) only #4 and #5 P) only #1, #2, and #3 Q) only #1, #2, and #4 R) only #1, #2, and #5 S) only #1, #3, and #4...
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This note was uploaded on 04/21/2011 for the course ECMC 02 taught by Professor Cleveland during the Fall '08 term at University of Toronto.

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AnswerstofinalexamDEC10.2008 - 1 ECMC02H3 Final Exam –...

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