AnswerstofinalexamDEC10.2009

AnswerstofinalexamDEC10.2009 - 1 ECMC02H3 Final Exam...

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1 ECMC02H3 Final Exam – December 10, 2009 Time: 3 hours Professor Gordon Cleveland ______________________________________ ____________________ Your name (Print clearly and underline your last name) Your student number This exam consists of multiple choice questions and short answer questions. There are 24 multiple choice questions, each worth 3 marks, which are to be answered on the front sheet of this exam in the spaces provided. If two multiple choice answers seem reasonable, choose the best possible answer. There are three short answer questions at the end of this exam paper. Space is provided to answer those questions directly on this exam paper. Your exam consists of 18 pages (counting this first page). Please count your exam's pages immediately and report any problems. FILL IN YOUR NAME NOW. 1. ___ S ____ 6. __C____ 11. __A____ 16. ___D___ 21. __U_____ 2. ___Z___ 7. ___C____ 12. __O____ 17. ___F__ 22. __B_____ 3. ___V____ 8. __Y____ 13. __X___ 18. ___C___ 23. __M____ 4. ___L_____ 9. __K____ 14. __K___ 19. ___A__ 24. __S____ 5. ___F____ 10. __D___ 15. ___C____ 20. ___U___
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2 PART I - 24 Multiple Choice Questions – 3 marks each. 1 – 4. You are given the following 5 strategic games involving two firms. Firm I can adopt either of strategy A or strategy B. Firm II can adopt either of strategy Y or strategy Z. Payoffs to the firms appear in the matrix. Questions 1 through 4 concern these five games. Firm II Strategy Y Strategy Z Game #1: Firm I Strategy A (1, 2) (3, 4) Strategy B (2, 1) (4, 3) Firm II Strategy Y Strategy Z Game #2: Firm I Strategy A (1, 4) (2, 3) Strategy B (2, 1) (1, 4) Firm II Strategy Y Strategy Z Game #3: Firm I Strategy A (3, 3) (5, 2) Strategy B (2, 5) (6, 6) Firm II Strategy Y Strategy Z Game #4: Firm I Strategy A (1, 4) (3, 3) Strategy B (-1, 2) (4, 5) Firm II Strategy Y Strategy Z Game #5: Firm I Strategy A (1, 4) (7, 6) Strategy B (7, 6) (5, 4)
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3 1. Assume that these are sequential games in which Firm II moves first and Firm I moves second. In which of these five games is “Strategy B – Strategy Z” a Nash equilibrium?: A) only #1 B) only #2 C) only #3 D) only #4 E) only #5 F) only #1 and #2 G) only #1 and #3 H) only #1 and #4 I) only #1 and #5 J) only #2 and #3 K) only #2 and #4 L) only #2 and #5 M) only #3 and #4 N) only #3 and #5 O) only #4 and #5 P) only #1, #2, and #3 Q) only #1, #2, and #4 R) only #1, #2, and #5 S) only #1, #3, and #4 T) only #1, #3, and #5 U) only #1, #4, and #5 V) only #2, #3, and #4 W) only #2, #3, and #5 X) only #2, #4, and #5 Y) only #3, #4, and #5 Z) #1, #2, #3 and #4 AA) #2, #3, #4, and #5 BB) #1, #3, #4 and #5 CC) #1, #2, #4 and #5 DD) #1, #2, #3 and #5 EE) all of the games 2. Again, assuming these are sequential games, in which of the games is there one and only one Nash equilibrium?: I) only #1 and #5 J) only #2 and #3 K) only #2 and #4 L) only #2 and #5 M) only #3 and #4 N) only #3 and #5 O) only #4 and #5 P) only #1, #2, and #3 Q) only #1, #2, and #4 R) only #1, #2, and #5 S) only #1, #3, and #4 T) only #1, #3, and #5 U) only #1, #4, and #5 V) only #2, #3, and #4 W) only #2, #3, and #5 X) only #2, #4, and #5 Y) only #3, #4, and #5 Z) #1, #2, #3 and #4 AA) #2, #3, #4, and #5 BB) #1, #3, #4 and #5 CC) #1, #2, #4 and #5 DD) #1, #2, #3 and #5 EE) all of the games
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