{[ promptMessage ]}

Bookmark it

{[ promptMessage ]}

finalexamAUG11.2007 - 1 ECMC02H3 FinalExam August 11,2007...

Info icon This preview shows pages 1–4. Sign up to view the full content.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
1 ECMC02H3 Final Exam  – August  11, 2007    Time: 3 hours  Professor Gordon  Cleveland ______________________________________            ____________________ Your name (Print clearly and  underline  your last name)                     Your student  number This exam consists of multiple choice questions and  short answer questions.  There  are 20 multiple choice questions, each worth  3 marks, which are to be answered   on  the front sheet of this exam in the spaces provided.   If two multiple choice  answers seem reasonable, choose the best possible answer.  There are four short  answer questions at the end of this exam paper.  Space is provided  to answer those  questions directly on this exam paper. Your exam consists of  17 pages  (counting  this first page). Please count your exam's  pages immediately and  report any problems.  FILL IN YOUR NAME NOW. 1. _______ 6.  _______   11. ________ 16. _______    2. _______ 7. _______    12. ________ 17. _______    3. _______ 8. _______ 13. ________ 18. _______               4. _______ 9. _______ 14. ________ 19. _______      5. _______ 10. _______ 15. ________ 20. _______    
Image of page 1

Info icon This preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
2 PART I - 20 Multiple Choice Questions  – 3 marks each. 1 - 4 You are given the following  5 strategic games involving  two firms.  Firm I can adopt   either strategy  A or strategy B.  Firm II can adopt  either strategy Y or strategy  Z.  Payoffs  to the firms appear  in the matrix.  Questions 1 through  3 concern these five games. Firm II Strategy Y Strategy Z Game #1:               Firm I Strategy A (3, 4) (4, 5) Strategy B (4, 5) (5, 6)        Firm II Strategy Y Strategy Z Game #2:               Firm I Strategy A (3, 4) (4, 5) Strategy B (4, 5) (3, 4)        Firm II Strategy Y Strategy Z Game #3:               Firm I Strategy A (3, 4) (4, 5) Strategy B (2, 3) (6, 2)        Firm II Strategy Y Strategy Z Game #4:               Firm I Strategy A (3, 4) (-4, -5) Strategy B (4, -3) (-1, -2) Firm II Strategy Y Strategy Z Game #5:               Firm I Strategy A (3, 4) (4, 5) Strategy B (2, 3) (5, 2)
Image of page 2
3 1. Assume  that these are sequential games in which Firm II moves first and  Firm I moves  second.  In which of these five games is “Strategy B – Strategy Z” a Nash  equilibrium?: A) only #1 B) only #2 C) only #3 D) only #4 E) only #5 F) only #1 and  #2 G) only #1 and  #3 H) only #1 and  #4 I) only #1 and  #5 J) only #2 and  #3 K) only #2 and  #4 L) only #2 and  #5 M) only #3 and  #4 N) only #3 and  #5 O) only #4 and  #5 P) only #1, #2, and  #3 Q) only #1, #2, and  #4 R) only #1, #2, and  #5 S) only #1, #3, and  #4 T) only #1, #3, and  #5 U) only #1, #4, and  #5 V) only #2, #3, and  #4 W) only #2, #3, and  #5 X) only #2, #4, and  #5 Y) only #3, #4, and  #5 Z) all of the games
Image of page 3

Info icon This preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Image of page 4
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

{[ snackBarMessage ]}

What students are saying

  • Left Quote Icon

    As a current student on this bumpy collegiate pathway, I stumbled upon Course Hero, where I can find study resources for nearly all my courses, get online help from tutors 24/7, and even share my old projects, papers, and lecture notes with other students.

    Student Picture

    Kiran Temple University Fox School of Business ‘17, Course Hero Intern

  • Left Quote Icon

    I cannot even describe how much Course Hero helped me this summer. It’s truly become something I can always rely on and help me. In the end, I was not only able to survive summer classes, but I was able to thrive thanks to Course Hero.

    Student Picture

    Dana University of Pennsylvania ‘17, Course Hero Intern

  • Left Quote Icon

    The ability to access any university’s resources through Course Hero proved invaluable in my case. I was behind on Tulane coursework and actually used UCLA’s materials to help me move forward and get everything together on time.

    Student Picture

    Jill Tulane University ‘16, Course Hero Intern