Modern Strategy Paret.pdf - H I STORY POLITI C AL SC I E N...

This preview shows page 1 out of 952 pages.

Unformatted text preview: H I STORY / POLITI C AL SC I E N CE Makers of M odern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age EDITED BY PETER PARET WITH C OR DO N A. C RA I G AN D FE LIX C I L B F. RT I he ~''J\'\ 10 thl\ 'ul umc: ,JJulytl' \\',.t r, lh ...,r-::ucgic ..:hara..:a·n,tt~.:s and u.; pnlat ~eal ~l nJ 'lh.I JI tunctton .... nH'r the.· PJ't fi\'t.' \en wne~. ~I he d1ver:,uy of ns theme~ and rhe hro,tJ pc.·r,pt(tl\ <..'' ~t pphc.·J tu th\'m m.1kt· thl' hook ·' work o f general h1story ,1, lll\H.h ·'' J lw.. tory ol tht' 1 hcur~ :~ nd p r:H.l h.:t' o f won from rh.: Rena.li'i:l n.;e to the.• rrc.'\l'OI. I h~. . 'll hit'" h .tt.h.l re-. ..t·t.l r .lll~c Iro111 m.llt.•r t hc:orl'.. b and puluit·._,) .m J milu .try lt>.h.lc:r-. 10 llllJll'r\Ptl.lllor~.L''· ~Lh.:hiJvclh. (.I.Ju-.cwtt7., .1nd ~t.ux .1nd ... ngds .Ht' Jl't..:u..,,cJ, ·'' Jrt.' N.trulcun, ( hun.:h1ll, .md r-.. Ltu. Oth('res~.w~ trace tht' lnter.H.lHm (•t th(.·ory .1nd <.''< pcru:nn· on·r gcner.l£ 1011,-(he ~:\·oiLHIOil of America n ~tra t­ cgy. tor llh(~lnu· , or the.· cmL~rg<: n u· ot rn·olutJon.Jq' w J r m th(.· modern wor1d. ._,1111 other' .lll.l l y~t· thl· 'lrJtl'~Y ot p.truc.:u br 1.:onfl h.:h- 1he F1rsr and Second \X'orld \X',tr•,--·or the: rel.nulll'.. hlp twn\'(.' C'n te(hnolvgy. pohcv, .Hld war 111 the n u~.:1L'.Jr .t~l'. \X'hJH'\'t.·r 11' rhclll(,' . c.·.tch ..~,,.1, pl.h·t·-, the 'Pt'\."tfil~ ol mdn.try rhoughc .md .l (tlon m dw1r J'HJIIlt\.;.ll. lo<t(t.ll. Jnd t'l.UilOill iC r:n' 1ronrnl'rll. Togtther tht L"nmnhuturlo hJ\ l' pruJuLcd .1 hook th.u fl'l1Ht.:rp r l'1' .mJ rll unun3tC') war. one o f tht> mu'l JlO\\ t.'rtul loru~!<> 111 hl'tnn .md one th.u t.:.l OIHlt bt.· ~,.·om rolled 111 thl' tu· HHt.' wtthout .mundt:r,t.mdm~ ot 11' p.l,t. l'cwr l'.trtt " :\ndrt•w \X. :O.kllon l'rnk""' 111 Jht· ll um.mi! IC>, Institute lor AJ,·Jnn·J '>tudv, l'nnct' l!lll. I lc " th,· ,111thor nl Clauscwtt~ ,md tlte \t,l/e: flu· .\!,m, //;, /IJ('III'I<'S, ,mel fits •tiiii<'S (l'rulC<'I!IIt) and editOr :mel tr.llhl.uor. wnh \hdt,tel H11\\.trd. ot Cl.lu,cw il1·, On \V,, ( Prin~cron). <.ordon :\. (.r,11g 1' J. L \'(1 Jli.tce \ tcrlmt; l'rolt'WJr o t HumJm Jies Ementu' .11 '>t.tnlor.llln""'"l''· ~"'" (,,n,,·n ''Pro le''"' Emeritus 1n the School of Hhton~.. ..tl ~tudit·-., ln~tl ltltl' tor Ad\'._Hlu·d ~tu Jy. ))ri ncet o n . (ontnf,,,,ors: THOMA.., \X.. ,\ I AKTIN A I IXA:'<.IJ I K, 1\H I AI\ Ho!\D, (() I I I I k. (,(}I{I)ON A.(. H.AI(., Pil l I II• i\11 C IIA ~I C..ARV~ H.. A. C K OW I, ED \l'A RD !\\ 1- AD f- >\ t( I I • I A \'C'I<I N( I J- R I I lH1 A:-.,. ~~I( IIA 1- L (, F Y f R, FF I I XC II R F R T , Ht r-.RY Ct1J Kt ,,< . 1\lAH.K \ n' HAt.r N. HAlO Hot ROMS, h-1u_t t A ~-> t H O \l:' · •\Ril. ll. { l t\ \ 1 0 ' )A\l i \,1>\\' I J) 1\IA< hAA(, ~1 AUR I <..f> 1\lATI.OFF , S t G- i'\t U MA,N. R. R. PAl ~u R, Pt T t R PARFT, \'(! At TFR P r NTN FR, lhH•<.J A... P(l R( 11. < o' tHH rt· 11 A I{ t< 1. (d t N 1 111 M E. Ro nnNnt:RG, ' ""~~ I ll . Rll"l I I I. \X' II(. I I I . Ml . ND The.' 00\'t r illusrration co mbi nes :;~ delail from Albrecht DUrer. T riumphal Arth of MoximiUan I ( 15 15) w1th a phutognph of the dotld productd b)' the acom bomb dropped on Nagasaki in August 1945 (photo no. 5M450 A.(., U.S. Air Forcc:-Na<ional Alf and Space Museum). I' RI NC:ETON PAP E RBA C KS Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age The Editors and Publisher wish to acknowledge the cooperation of the Institute for Advanced Study in the publication of this volume, the successor to the first Makers of Modern Strategy, which originated in a seminar in American foreign policy and security issues at the Institute and Princeton University in 194L Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age edited by PETER PARET with the collaboration of Go R D O N A. CRAIG and F E L I X GI LBE R T Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey Copyright© I986 by Princeton University Press This is a sequel to Makers of Modern Strategy, copyright I943,© I97I by Princeton University Press. The essays by Henry Guerlac, R. R. Palmer, and Edward Mead Earle are reprinted without significant change. Those by Felix Gilbert on Machiavelli and by Sigmund Neumann on Engels and Marx have been rewritten; the essays by Gordon A. Craig on Delbriick and by Hajo Holborn on the Prusso-German School have been revised. The remaining twenty-two essays are new. Michael Howard's essay "Men against Fire: The Doctrine of the Offensive in I9I4" appeared in a slightly different form in International Security, Summer I984 (Vol. 9, No. I). Published by Princeton University Press, 4I William Street, Princeton, New Jersey 08540 All Rights Reserved Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data will be found on the last printed page of this book ISBN 0-69I-0923 5-4 ISBN o-69I-02764-I (pbk.) This book has been composed in Linotron Saban type Princeton University Press books are printed on acid-free paper and meet the guidelines for permanence and durability of the Committee on Production Guidelines for Book Longevity of the Council on Library Resources Printed in the United States of America I5 I4 I3 I2 II IO 9 (hbk.) I5 I4 I3 I2 II IO 9 8 7 (pbk.) Contents vii Acknowledgments Introduction Peter Paret 3 PART O N E. THE O R I G I N S o F M o D ERN WAR r . Machiavelli: The Renaissance of the Art of War II Felix Gilbert 2. Maurice of Nassau, Gustavus Adolphus, Raimondo Montecuccoli, and the "Military Revolution" of the Seventeenth Century Gunther E. Rothenberg 32 3 . Vauban: The Impact of Science on War 64 Henry Guerlac 4· Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bulow: From Dynastic to National War R. R. Palmer 9I PART Two. THE ExPAN S I O N o F WAR 5. Napoleon and the Revolution in War 6. Jomini Peter Paret I23 143 John Shy 7· Clausewitz I 86 Peter Paret PART THREE. F R O M THE I N D U STRIAL REV O LUTI O N T o THE F I R S T WoRLD WAR 8. Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton, Friedrich List: The Economic 2I7 Foundations of Military Power Edward Mead Earle 9 · Engels and Marx on Revolution, War, and the Army in Society Sigmund Neumann and Mark von Hagen 262 IO. The Prusso-German School: Moltke and the Rise of the General 28 I Staff Hajo Holborn I I . Moltke, Schlieffen, and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment Gunther E. Rothenberg 296 I 2. Delbriick: The Military Historian 3 26 Gordon A. Craig v C O N TENTS I 3. Russian Military Thought: The Western Model and the Shadow of Suvorov Walter Pintner 354 I 4 . Bugeaud, Gallieni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial Warfare Douglas Porch 376 I 5. American Strategy from Its Beginnings through the First World War Russell F. Weigley 408 I6. Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian 444 Philip A. Crowl P ART FouR. FROM THE FIRST TO THE S E C O N D W O RLD WAR I 7. The Political Leader as Strategist Gordon A. Craig 48I I 8 . Men against Fire: The Doctrine of the Offensive in I 9 I 4 Michael Howard 5 Io I 9 . German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare, I 9 I 4-I945 Michael Geyer 5 27 20. Liddell Hart and De Gaulle: The Doctrines of Limited Liability and Mobile Defense Brian Bond and Martin Alexander 59 8 2 1 . Voices from the Central Blue: The Air Power Theorists David Macisaac 624 22. The Making of Soviet Strategy 648 Condoleezza Rice 23. Allied Strategy in Europe, I939- I945 Maurice Matloff 24. American and Japanese Strategies in the Pacific War D. Clayton James 677 703 PART FIVE. S I N C E I94 5 2 5 . The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists Freedman 26. Conventional Warfare in the Nuclear Age Lawrence 73 5 Michael Carver 779 27. Revolutionary War John Shy and Thomas W. Collier 8I5 28. Reflections on Strategy in the Present and Future Craig and Felix Gilbert 8 63 Gordon A . List of Contributors 873 Bibliographical Notes Index 877 Vl 933 Acknowledgments T H E E D I T O R S owe a debt of gratitude to the authors of this volume, who have made our task an unusually pleasant one. We also want to express our appreciation to Michael Howard, John Shy, and Russell Weigley for their advice in planning the book, to James E. King, whose criticism has been pertinent as always, and to Donald Abenheim for his assistance with the bibliographies. Loren Hoekzema, Elizabeth Gretz, and Susan Bishop of Princeton University Press saw the book through publication with exemplary intelligence and care. Rosalie West once again produced an index that is useful rather than impenetrable. To Herbert S. Bailey, Jr., Director of Princeton University Press, whose belief in the importance of the subject helped make the volume possible, go our special thanks. Vll Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age Introduction P ETER PARET C A R L V O N CLAU S EW I TZ defined strategy as the use of com­ bat, or the threat of combat, for the purpose of the war in which it takes place. This formulation, which a modern historian has characterized as· bbth revolutionary and defiantly simplistic, can be amended or expanded without difficulty.' Clausewitz himself, setting no great store in absolute definitions, varied the meaning of strategy ac­ cording to the matter at hand. Strategy is the use of armed force to achieve the military objectives and, by extension, the political purpose of the W;ar.To those engaged in the direction and conduct of war, strategy 'has oft�n appeared more simply, in Moltke's phrase, as a system of � al����q,<;l�)�,.th.�d..e,y,elexpedi�nts. _g,ptnent,-i.r.tt ctuaGil.as.te.r.y..,_and utilization of all of the staJ.e�s�tes.omces����gtiJ1g.j!,�...ooli&¥-...i�.e�. It is in both of these senses-the narrower, operational meaning, and its broadly inclusive implications-that the term is used in this volume. ·· ':.{L ;:\ \tc\'"t 1 ,;r,ft Strategic thgnghr is ineyjtabj,�mgJJ;�J�c. It is dependent on ;t:\, the r!lrli'ti��St¥-..�Rh; . socieh: economics, an� o ·f . �S...\%�ln'!$,"Qf l l,. mi:Ter,"()'fre'n�:neet'in factors tliat . ive ise to t e issues an co · c s war -IS'"'ilieant to reso ve.-The istorian of strategy cannot ignore these forces. He must analyze the varied context of strategy, and the manner in which context and ideas act on each other, '«W,k...he,.ttac.e.��th�.d�LQP.Jll1;!JJ · a progression that in turn will .,f�to do�tri .e to · give rise to further ideas. The s£ewzi� history not of pure but of applied reason. onsequently the essays in this volume go far beyond theory and touch on many of the military and nonmilitary factors that help shape war. In a variety of ways they demonstrate the close interaction of peace with war, the links between society and its military institutions and policies; but the thread of strategic thought runs through them all. The essays explore ideas of soldiers and civilians since � · _ h�ggry ' Michael Howard, "The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy," Foreign Affairs (Summer reprinted in Michael Howard, The Causes ofWar, 2d ed. (Cambridge, Mass., I 984), I 979 ); IOI. 3 \ . INT R O D U C T I O N the Renaissance on the most effective application of their society's mil­ itary resources: how can the fighting power available, or potentially available, be used to best purpose? Having addressed these ideas, the essays turn to the further issue: what impact did strategic theory have on wars and on the periods of peace that followed? I The concept of this volume, and some of its substance, derive from an earlier work. In 1 9 4 1 Edward Mead Earle organized a seminar on American foreign policy and security issues for faculty of the Institute for Advanced Study and Princeton University. The seminar led to a col­ lection of twenty-one essays on "military thought from Machiavelli to Hitler, " which Earle, assisted by Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert, brought out two years later under the title Makers of Modern Strategy. One of the striking features of this book was the confidence of its editors and authors that in the midst of a world war the history of strategic thought deserved serious and wide attention. In their eyes, the trials of the present did not diminish the significance of the past. On the contrary, history now seemed particularly relevant. In his introduction, Earle de­ clared that it was the purpose of the book "to explain the manner in which the strategy of modern war developed, in the conviction that a knowledge of the best military thought will enable . . . readers to com­ prehend the causes of war and the fundamental principles which govern the conduct of war. " He added, "we believe that eternal vigilance in such matters is the price of liberty. We believe, too, that if we are to have a durable peace we must have a clear understanding of the role which armed force plays in international society. And we have not always had this understanding."2 The impact on these words of the condition in which they were written is apparent. A society that until recently had paid little attention to events beyond its borders was now fighting .in the greatest war of all time. A new interest in learning about war, about matters that had been ignored but tHat now dominated public life, ev.en an interest in gaining some kind of historical perspective not only on the political and ideo­ logical but also on the military elements of the conflict, might be expected. And as much a part of the atmosphere in which the essays were written was the belief not alone in the need but also in the possibility of a citizenry that understood the determining realities of war. Makers of Modern Strategy was a scholarly contribution from the arsenal of democracy in ' Edward Mead Earle, "Introduction," in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Edward Mead Earle (Princeton, 1943), viii. 4 INTRODUCTION the best sense of that contemporary term; a serious and fundamentally optimistic response to important intellectual needs of America at war and at the threshold of world power. It was a further remarkable aspect of the book that its wartime origin and mission did not compromise its scholarly objectivity.Its con­ tents varied in quality, although the general level was very high, but none of the essays was marred by chauvinism or denigrated current enemies; even essays on "Japanese Naval Strategy" and "The Nazi Concept of War " maintained an exemplarly intellectual honesty. No doubt that is one reason for the collection's continued success, decades after the war ended. The book has now provided two generations of readers with a rich fund of knowledge and insight; for some, very likely, it has been their only encounter with the sophisticated study of war, as opposed to its drum-and-bugle variety. Makers ofModern Strategy became a modern classic.That the essays dealing with the Second Wodd War were soon overtaken by events did not weaken its overall impact. No book of this kind can remain up to date; more important was the fact that it defined and interpreted crucial episodes in earlier phases of strategic thought, showed their connection with general history, which even many historians tend to ignore, and placed some continuing issues of war and peace in broad historical per­ spective. But, inevitably, over time the volume as a whole became less satisfactory. Since the defeat of Germany and Japan and the advent of the nuclear age strategic analysis has moved in new directions, while historical research has continued to change and deepen our understanding of the more remote past. A replacement for Makers of Modern Strategy has now become desirable. In preparing the new volume, the editors have had no wish to discard the model of the old. Neither comprehensiveness nor interpretive uni­ formity is aimed for. Contributors were not asked to employ a particular theoretical scheme; each approaches the subject from his or her point of view. As in the earlier work, too, significant figures and episodes in the history of strategy have had to be excluded if the volume, already large, was to be kept to reasonable size. Nevertheless, collectively the essays­ linked chronologically and often thematically-offer the reader a guide to strategic theory and to ideas on the use of organized violence from the time Machiavelli wrote his Arte della guerra to the present. The new Makers ofModern Strategy contains eight more essays than did its predecessor. A few essays have been taken over from the earlier work; most were not.3 Three essays of the 1 943 edition remain unchanged ' Of the essays that were not retained, several did not fit into the new distribution of 5 INTRODUCTION except for some corrections and stylistic alterations: Henry Guerlac on Vauban and the impact of science on war in the seventeenth century, Robert R. Palmer on Frederick the Great and the change from dynastic to national war, and Edward Mead Earle on the economic foundations of military power. More might certainly be said about these figures and issues, but each essay retains a strong voice in the continuing scholarly discourse. The bibliographical notes of these essays have been updated. Two further essays have been very extensively rewritten, and two others revised.4 The remaining twenty-two essays in the pr�sent volume are new. To conclude this brief comparison of the two books, it may be appropriate to note some of the more significant thematic differences between them. The new volume has far more to say about American strategy than did its predecessor. It also contains four essays on the period since 1 94 5 , which still lay in the future for Earle and his collaborators. More generally, the new Makers of Modern Strategy takes a somewhat broader view of its subject. Earle would have preferred to limit himself and his collaborators to the analysis of major theorists, although the nature of the subject compelled him to look further. Because the United States had "not produced a Clausewitz or a Vauban, " the only American soldiers discussed in the earlier volume were Mahan and Mitchell. Other American and European figures were not included "either because they were more tacticians than strategists or because they bequeathed to pos­ terity no coherent statement of strategical doctrine. " This last consid­ eration also explains the absence of an essay on Napoleon. In his intro­ duction, Earle wrote that Napoleon "recorded his strategy on the battlefield (if we exclude his trite maxims); hence he is represented here by his interpreters Clausewitz and Jomini."5 This seems too exclusive a point of view. The difference between strategy and tactics is worth pre­ serving; but strategy is not exclusively-or even mainly-the work of great minds, interested in spelling out their theories. Although Napoleon did not write a comprehensive treatise on his ideas on war and strategy, they deserve to be studied, and not only through the intervening screen of Clausewitz's and Jomini's interpretations. An essay on Napoleon will topics-e.g., Derwent Whittlesey's study of geopolitics and Theodore Ropp's sketch of Continental doctrines of sea power. Others were written before adequate documentation on their subject was available or, although advancing scholarship at the time, have now been superseded. One or two-e.g., the essay on Maginot and Liddell Hart by the author who used the pseudonym Irving M. Gibson-did not achieve the quality of the rest. • Felix Gilbert has rewritten his essay on Machiavelli, as has Mark von Hagen the essay on Marx and Engels by Sigmund Neumann. Gordon Craig has made some changes in his essay on Delbriick, and Peter Paret has revised the first part of Hajo Holborn's essay on Moltke, the second part of which has been replaced by a new essay. s Earle, "Introduction," ix. 6 INTRODUCTION therefore be found in the present volume. But it must also be recognized that Napoleonic strategy was not created by the emperor alone. It was made possible because he had the genius and the compulsion to combine and exploit the ideas and policies of others. Some of these men, and even such forces as conscription, which cannot be identified with any particular individual, also belong to the history of strategy and are discussed here. As a contributor has c...
View Full Document

  • Left Quote Icon

    Student Picture

  • Left Quote Icon

    Student Picture

  • Left Quote Icon

    Student Picture