Frankfurt--alternate possibilities

Frankfurt--alternate possibilities - Frankfurt (1969)...

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Frankfurt (1969) “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility” Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP): “a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise.” This article argues against this principle—Frankfurt thinks that a person could still be morally responsible even if he could not have done otherwise. The reason for confusion: the paradigm cases that lead us to PAP have two elements in common: 1) Something in the circumstances in question bring about the agent’s action 2) the person could not have avoided doing it Frankfurt thinks that there is some genuine worry to a specific type of 1, but not 2. That 2 often accompanies 1 is a coincidence. Keeping Up With the Jones-es For the first three Jones-es, imagine that: 1. each has decided to φ 2. afterwards is told to φ and threatened if he does not φ 3. he φ s. Jones-1 : a very stubborn and unreasonable man who refuses to change his mind once it’s made up Jones-2
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This note was uploaded on 04/28/2011 for the course PHIL 101 taught by Professor Pleto during the Fall '08 term at Ohio University- Athens.

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