Midterm examination Designing Political Institutionsfin

Midterm examination Designing Political Institutionsfin -...

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Midterm examination Designing Political Institutions ; Prof Steven J Brams March 21, 2011 Nathaniel Elghanayan Question 1) MD)Yes it is possible. Refer to table 1 Here candidate B wins by MD but only voter 1 would have voted for candidate B in AV voting. Refer to table 1 The number chosen for each Candidates MD is determined in a way described in mathematical analysis of MD part 1 Question 2) MN) Yes it is possible for only 1 person to approve of the winning candidate by AV voting standards. In the example of table 2 that would be voter 5. Refer to table 2 . This is because 1 voter can attach a weight of 6 to his preferred candidate and 1 to his least preferred candidate. This means his candidate gets a boost ((6-1)/number of voter) boosts which here comes out to a full 1 point here where n = 5. Whereas the other the other 4 voters could all give a weight of 2 to their preferred candidate and 1 to their least preferred candidate. Leading to a net boost of (2-1/n) that is repeated 4 times totaling to a boost of 4/5 in the mean.Which means that the influence of
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This note was uploaded on 05/04/2011 for the course POLITICS V53.0810 taught by Professor Stevenjbrams during the Spring '11 term at NYU.

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Midterm examination Designing Political Institutionsfin -...

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