Problem Set 05 Solutions

Problem Set 05 Solutions - Econ 121 Fall 2010 Prof...

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Unformatted text preview: Econ 121 Fall 2010 Prof. Santesteban Problem Set 5 Solutions 1. If the prisoners are allowed to retaliate the payoffs of the game would change. This could result in the Pareto efficient outcome for the game. (Think of the case where the prisoners expect the other to kill them if they confess.) 2. ...
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This note was uploaded on 05/04/2011 for the course ECON 121 taught by Professor Woroch during the Fall '07 term at Berkeley.

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