Thefirmisapricetakerforboththeinputandoutputmarkets

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Unformatted text preview: framing because of an asymmetric value system Anchoring and adjusting Judgemental heuristics Abstain 29. If one were to compare the average contributions to the public pot in a public goods game without communication to one where cheap talk is allowed, the results would show that: [Pen. 1] A. cheap talk is ineffective for increasing co‐operation B. punishment is the only way to sustain co‐operation in solving collective action problems C. anonymous individuals are better at solving public goods problems than closely‐knit communities D. None of the above E. Abstain 30. Introducing competition amongst proposers in the ultimatum game tends to [Pen. 1] A. decrease the size of the offers made by Player A B. increase the likelihood that Player B will accept a low offer C. increase the size of the offers made by Player A D. has no effect on offers at all E. Abstain 31. If economists tend to be left‐handed, then [Pen. 0] A. if you find an economist and assume you have a left‐handed person, you are falling into the anchoring bias trap B. if a person is rig...
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This note was uploaded on 05/23/2011 for the course ECON 203 taught by Professor Jules during the Spring '11 term at University of Cape Town.

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