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Unformatted text preview: ECON 201 1 / 34 Game Theory and Oligopoly B ECON 201 Preliminaries Preliminaries Chaps 13 & 14 Plan Definitions Game trees, pp5067 Subgame perfection, pp5067 Fig 14.2 Two subgames in fig 14.2 Recipe Equilibria and strategies Example 1, p5068 Example 2, p465 Example 3 Conclusions ECON 201 2 / 34 Chaps 13 & 14 Preliminaries Chaps 13 & 14 Plan Definitions Game trees, pp5067 Subgame perfection, pp5067 Fig 14.2 Two subgames in fig 14.2 Recipe Equilibria and strategies Example 1, p5068 Example 2, p465 Example 3 Conclusions ECON 201 3 / 34 We have covered: 1. static games and pure strategies; pp 452463, 494497 and still have to cover 2. sequential games; pp 464472, 505512 Plan Preliminaries Chaps 13 & 14 Plan Definitions Game trees, pp5067 Subgame perfection, pp5067 Fig 14.2 Two subgames in fig 14.2 Recipe Equilibria and strategies Example 1, p5068 Example 2, p465 Example 3 Conclusions ECON 201 4 / 34 Definitions Oligopoly examples: Stackelberg duopoly with discrete strategies (pp 5068) Stackelberg duopoly with continuous strategies (pp 4656) strategic trade with discrete strategies (Perloff does strategic trade with continuous strategies (pp 4679), but it is a bit gnarly) Definitions Preliminaries Chaps 13 & 14 Plan Definitions Game trees, pp5067 Subgame perfection, pp5067 Fig 14.2 Two subgames in fig 14.2 Recipe Equilibria and strategies Example 1, p5068 Example 2, p465 Example 3 Conclusions ECON 201 5 / 34 game tree (extensive form) p507 backward induction p507 Game trees, pp5067 Preliminaries Chaps 13 & 14 Plan Definitions Game trees, pp5067 Subgame perfection, pp5067 Fig 14.2 Two subgames in fig 14.2 Recipe Equilibria and strategies Example 1, p5068 Example 2, p465 Example 3 Conclusions ECON 201 6 / 34 A game tree illustrates the extensive form of a game, showing shows (i) the order of the moves, (ii) all possible decision nodes with the relevant choices and (iii) payoffs at the terminal nodes In ECON201, we wont draw game trees for games with simultaneous moves. Subgame perfection, pp5067 Preliminaries Chaps 13 & 14 Plan Definitions Game trees, pp5067 Subgame perfection, pp5067 Fig 14.2 Two subgames in fig 14.2 Recipe Equilibria and strategies Example 1, p5068 Example 2, p465 Example 3 Conclusions ECON 201 7 / 34 If players know all actions taken and events occurring before their choice, a subgame consists of all the subse quent decision and terminal nodes A strategy profile is a subgame perfect equilibrium if it specifies a Nash equilibrium in every subgame of the orig inal game. Fig 14.2, p510 Two subgames in fig 14.2 Preliminaries Chaps 13 & 14 Plan Definitions Game trees, pp5067 Subgame perfection, pp5067 Fig 14.2 Two subgames in fig 14.2 Recipe Equilibria and strategies Example 1, p5068 Example 2, p465 Example 3 Conclusions ECON 201 9 / 34 1. the game starting from the incumbents decision node (ie. the whole game), and 2. the game starting from the entrants decision node Recipe...
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 Fall '10
 PaulClacott
 Microeconomics, Game Theory, Oligopoly

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