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RubinsTextP10 - 92 The Politics of Public Budgeting Table...

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Unformatted text preview: 92 The Politics of Public Budgeting Table 3.1 Mayoral Veto Power in Large US. Cities M The Politics of Process 93 Table 3.2 Mayoral Veto Power in California Cities —....—__.——_—_ City Governmentstructure Mayoral veto Votes to override City City government farm Mayoral veto Votes to overturn New York Strong mayor/council yes 2/3 Los Angeles Strong mayor/council yes 2/3, some 3/4 Los Angeles Strong mayor/council yes 2/3, some 3/4 San Diego Strong mayor/council yes 5/8 Chicago Strong mayor/council yes 2/3 San Jose Council manager/ Houston Mayor/council no n/a weak mayor no n/a Philadelphia Strong mayor yes 2/3 San Francisco Strong mayor/ Phoenix Council manager/ ‘ county board yes 2/3, some 3/4 weak mayor no n/a Long Beach Mayor/council; San Diego Strong mayor/council yes 5/8 weak mayor yes 2/3 for budget San Antonio Council/manager no n/a Fresno Strong mayor yes 5/7 Dallas Council/manager no n/a Sacramento Council manager/ San lose Council, manager, weak mayor no n/a weak mayor no n/a Oakland Strong mayor/ Detroit Strong mayor yes 2/3 council no n/a Indianapolis Strong mayor, Santa Ana Council manager/ city-county council yes 2/3 weak mayor no n/a Jacksonville Strong mayor yes depends Anaheim Council manager] San Francisco Strong mayor yes 2/3 weak mayor no n/a , 4 Bakersfield Council manager! Saurce:Appendur 3 of the San Diego Charter Review Committee Report, 2007. ‘ weak mayor no n/a Note: Chicago has been legally a weak mayor form, but a strong mayor by dint of the Riverside Council manager/ personalities of the mayors, weak mayor no n/ a Stockton Council manager/ some cases can prevent the passage of the budget or force compromises as the weak mayor “0 n/ a price for their support. To summarize, there are major differences in the formal powers and patterns of negotiation between the executive and legislative branches at the federal, state, and local levels. At the federal level, where the balance is relatively even, executive and legislative members must engage in extensive formal or informal bargaining. The results of these negotiations tend to frame the budget and set limits for depart- ments. While bottom-up budget requests continue to be generated and examined, they may play a small role in determining outcomes because the agreements reached by the executive and legislative branches take priority over the expressed needs of the departments and agencies.9 The federal government has put a great deal of time and energy into trying to devise budget agreements across branches. The result has been a considerable shift to top~down budgeting. At the state level, governors generally have more powerful vetoes than the pres» ident. There is little occasion or use for omnibus legislation. Instead, particular Source: Appendix 3 of the San Diego Charter Review Committee Report, 2007. Note: For San Diego, the majority required to pass anordinance is the same size as that necessary for overturning a veto, leading some to claim this is a power of reconsideration, not a real veto, which should require a supermajority of the council to overturn. budget lines may be merged or obscured to evade the governor’s line»item veto pen. At the local level, the budget is typically a single piece of legislation. Budgeting may be dominated by the mayor, or the manager and the council, depending on the form of government. There may be some contestation between the legisla- tive and executive branches, especially over fiscal policy, such as which programs should be cut by how much to balance the budget. But bottom-up budgeting is more common, in which requests coming up from the departments and programs ...
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