Lecture_6_2011-1

Lecture_6_2011-1 - Bargaining and the Status Quo Bargaining...

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Lecture 6 : Bargaining and War, I 26 January 2011
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The Central Puzzle of War Given that war is costly (lives lost, property destroyed, military spending, opportunity costs, leaders lose jobs), why is it ever fought? Why don’t states identify bargains that would prevent wars? Example : Mexican-American War: US offered Mexico $25M for Rio Grande border. After war, US paid Mexico $15M for same. War devastated Mexico, cost US 13,000 dead and $100M in costs.
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War as Coercive Bargaining, I War is conflict over things states value Territory, policies, and regime type So war is bargaining. Threats to use force to resolve crises are efforts by states to convince each other that the reversion point (non- agreement) is costly. There ALWAYS exist bargains that could prevent wars. Why states fail to perceive these bargains is the main
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The Bargaining Range
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Unformatted text preview: Bargaining and the Status Quo Bargaining Failure Due to Incomplete Information, I • States A and B have private information about their resolve in the crisis, their war-fighting strategy, the quality of their armies, etc. • This private info can lead them to have inconsistent views of the bargaining space. • Why don’t A & B tell each other their private info so as to harmonize expectations and avoid war? Bargaining Failure Due to Incomplete Information, II • If revealing their private info to the other would weaken their bargaining position, they may be better off fighting. – Example: private info about battle plans. • State A may lie to B about its resolve, to get B to make larger concessions. – Incentives to Misrepresent can prevent A & B from telling each other the truth. To be continued…...
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Lecture_6_2011-1 - Bargaining and the Status Quo Bargaining...

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