Lecture_7_2011-1

Lecture_7_2011-1 - territory – Example: Golan Heights •...

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Lecture 7 : Bargaining & War, II 28 January 2011
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The Bargaining Range
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Mechanisms of Bargaining Failure Three mechanisms explain why bargains are not reached: Private information + incentives to misrepresent Commitment Problems Indivisibility
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Bargaining Failure due to Commitment Problems, I A credible commitment to abide by a deal is a commitment that assures the other side that the state will not threaten force to revise the terms of the deal in the future. (p.105) A commitment problem arises when a state cannot make such a promise in a credible manner. (p.105)
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Bargaining Failure due to Commitment Problems, II States have complete information here, different from previous bargaining failure There are three categories of commitment problems: When the bargain is over a source of future bargaining power War in response to changing power War in response to 1 st Strike advantages
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Bargaining over Sources of Future Bargaining Power Strategically important pieces of
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Unformatted text preview: territory – Example: Golan Heights • Development of weapons systems – Example: Iranian nuclear weapons program • In both of these instances concessions A gave to B to get the territory/weapons system could be demanded back by a now-more-Bargaining Failure due to Shifting Power Bargaining Failure due to First-Strike Advantages Bargaining Failure due to Indivisibility • If the good in contention cannot be divided in some way between the bargainers, then the bargaining range is empty. – Examples: Temple Mount in Jerusalem, policies of genocide • Importantly, there are still bargains , they just involve concessions on other issues. Summary • Since war is costly, rational actors should identify bargains to avoid war • They may fail to identify these bargains due to: – Unequal Informational combined with incentives to misrepresent one’s private info – Problems of credible commitment – Issue indivisibility...
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This note was uploaded on 05/31/2011 for the course PL SC 014 taught by Professor Gartzke during the Spring '99 term at Penn State.

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Lecture_7_2011-1 - territory – Example: Golan Heights •...

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