Lecture_15_2011

Lecture_15_2011 - Lecture15:Alliances,PartII 21February2011...

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Lecture 15 : Alliances, Part II 21 February 2011
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Bargaining and Alliances The formation of an alliance can deter war  if it convinces a would-be attacker it will  lose any war it starts against an alliance  member. See Figure in next slide How can the allies make their alliance  credible?  Why would State A believe C  will risk all the costs of war to help B?
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Bargaining and Alliances Diagrammed
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Moral Hazard and Alliances A reverse credibility problem arises if B  thinks C will help it regardless of how  reckless its foreign policies become. Moral Hazard  arises when guarantees of  assistance produce reckless behavior by  the guarantee. The guarantor ally faces a dilemma  because it wants to help B, but does not  want B to become reckless.
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Making Alliances Credible, (but not too credible…) Decreasing the Costs of Fighting Joint military planning
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This note was uploaded on 05/31/2011 for the course PL SC 014 taught by Professor Gartzke during the Spring '99 term at Penn State.

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Lecture_15_2011 - Lecture15:Alliances,PartII 21February2011...

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