Ethical-Theory-Murphy-Sp07

Ethical-Theory-Murphy-Sp07 - MAP OF THE CLASS 1. Moral...

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MAP OF THE CLASS 1. Moral Psychology: what kind of motivations is it possible to have? a. ALL agree but Hobbes: it IS possible to be motivated by something other than seeking pleasure/pain… i. Hobbes: This skepticism doesn’t play main role in his arg 1. Hobbes Main Argument : picks up on strategic problem = bc not everyone can be guaranteed to be seeking good of everyone else, everyone trying to defend self even he didn’t think boiled down to brute seeking of pleasure o ALL agree on: people have all sorts of desires, some might be to do what is right Disagree on: in order to act need something like desires OR if its possible to be moved to act based on belief/reason alone Hume: only desires, feelings, aspects of our general motivational setup will move us to act Kant: NO, recognition of a truth can itself generate some kind of motivational state which will move us to act; don’t need a pre-existing desire to do the right thing in order to be motivated; can be motivated to do the right thing bc recognize its true it’s the right thing 2. Sources of Normativity a. Nagel: REASONS=so urces of normative demands Language we should use when talking about “ought ” is the language of reasons Won’t do to say for example that it’s morally required; that isn’t a final answer; the acceptable final answer is YOU HAVE REASON to do it …. Even if think this normativity is all about reasons we have to act, practical reason (and Hume was a skeptic of practical reason!), there is a whole disagreement of what kind of reasons there are Possible diff kinds of reasons (See January 18 for kinds of substantive normative demands) o 1. Only instrumental reasons (instrumental rationality) o 2. Prudential reasons (Demands of prudence) o 3. Moral reasons? (demands of morality) o 4. reasons of perfection (Wolf) Nagel: multiplicity of diff kinds of reasons; o some moral are deontological ; o some are agent neutral ; o some prudential reasons he characterizes as reasons of autonomy Susan Wolf: talks of reasons of perfection, which don’t fit easily into prudential or moral camp…. Others: don’t find this a helpful way of thinking about it , b/c unclear why we should do what we have reason to do o = Q of when do you reach rock bottom o understand someone might say yeah I have instrumental reason= idea of rationality; understand what it means to be irrational; but that’s just instrumental reason; when comes to morality, doesn’t help to be told “I have reason to do it”… Others: duty or moral rightness/wrongness is the end of the road= rock bottom o response to “why should I do my duty” is “b/c you have reason to do it” counterresponse= “why should I do what I have reason to do” in that broad sense?”
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Understand primitive normative oomph of instrumental reason and of duty, but don’t understand why I have reason to do what I have all things considered reason to do o
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This note was uploaded on 04/04/2008 for the course LAW ALL taught by Professor Multiple during the Fall '06 term at NYU.

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Ethical-Theory-Murphy-Sp07 - MAP OF THE CLASS 1. Moral...

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