Unformatted text preview: in the game. Let p(t) denote the proportion of the population consisting of L types in period t, so 1-p(t) is the proportion consisting of R types. (a) What is the expected payoff of each type as a function of p(t)? (b) What is the average payoff in the population? (c) If the population of types evolves according to replicator dynamics, write down the first-order differential equation that defines the population dynamics: dp/dt = ? (d) Sketch a graph of dp/dt. (e) Identify all the values of p for which dp/dt = 0. These points are called the “dynamic rest points”. (f) If p(0) = 0.5, what will be the limit of p(t) as t goes to infinity?...
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This note was uploaded on 06/09/2011 for the course ECON 354 taught by Professor Econ during the Spring '11 term at University of Texas.
- Spring '11