Unformatted text preview: in the game. Let p(t) denote the proportion of the population consisting of L types in period t, so 1p(t) is the proportion consisting of R types. (a) What is the expected payoff of each type as a function of p(t)? (b) What is the average payoff in the population? (c) If the population of types evolves according to replicator dynamics, write down the firstorder differential equation that defines the population dynamics: dp/dt = ? (d) Sketch a graph of dp/dt. (e) Identify all the values of p for which dp/dt = 0. These points are called the “dynamic rest points”. (f) If p(0) = 0.5, what will be the limit of p(t) as t goes to infinity?...
View
Full
Document
This note was uploaded on 06/09/2011 for the course ECON 354 taught by Professor Econ during the Spring '11 term at University of Texas.
 Spring '11
 econ

Click to edit the document details