Capital-Punishment-Law-Stevenson-Fall06

Capital-Punishment-Law-Stevenson-Fall06 - [I] Introduction...

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[I] Introduction to Capital Punishment Law and Litigation 4 [A] "The Death Penalty in 2005," Death Penalty Information Center (December 2005) 4 [B] “Death Row U.S.A.,” NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. (Spring 2006) 4 [C] “A Peculiar Institution? Capital Punishment and the American Civilizing Process,” David Garland, Moffett Lecture on Ethics (Dec. 2004) 5 [II] Framework of the Modern Death Penalty 8 [A] NAACP Litigation Strategy 8 [B] Furman v. Georgia (1972): as applied, discriminatorily and arbitrarily, the DP violates the C&U clause of the 8th amendment 8 [C] Gregg v. Georgia (1976): upholding the const. of GA’s new bifurcated aggravation/mitigation DP statute 14 [D] Woodson v. North Carolina (1976): mandatory DP is unconst. and must make an individualized look into the crime/criminal when applying the DP 17 [E] Coker v. Georgia (1977): it’s unconst. to sentence rapists to the DP 19 [III] Aggravation, Mitigation and Victim Impact 20 [A] Introduction 20 [B] Lowenfeld v. Phelps (1988) 21 [C] “Tokens of our Esteem: Aggravating Factors in the Era of Deregulated Death Penalties,” Jonathan Simon and Christina Spaulding, The Killing State ed., Austin Sarat (1999) 22 [D] Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 25 [E] Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) 26 [F] Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 27 [IV] Death Qualification and Jury Selection 27 [A] Introduction 28 [B] Wainwright v. Witt (1985): judges who cannot be impartial (that is can’t apply the law free from prejudice) may be excluded for cause 29 [C] Morgan v. Illinois (1991): extending Wainwright to Defendants’ rights to exclude biased jurors 31 [D] Lockhart v. McCree (1986): Rejects argument that “death happy” jurors shouldn’t determine the guilt of Ds because they are more likely to convict 32 [E] Turner v. Murray (1986): you can question jurors about potential racial biases 34 [F] Castenada v. Partida (1977) 35 [G] Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 37 [H] Powers v. Ohio (1991) 39 [I] Stevens/Deliberate Indifference: Judicial Tolerance of Racial Bias in Criminal Justice 41 [V] Scottsboro, Lynching and an Historical Context for Death Penalty Litigation 43 [A] The Social Meanings of Lynching: 43 [VI] The Appeals Process: Procedural Default, Retroactivity and Postconviction - 1 – 
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Litigation 45 [A] Introduction: 45 [B] Ford v. Georgia (1991): state procedural bar/adequacy and a firm and regularly applied procedural bar 50 [C] Lee v. Kemna (2002): state procedural bar/adequacy and exception to usual rule when no state interest is furthered 52 [D] Teague v. Lane (1989): new rules will not retroactively apply if the new rule is announced when you are in the post-conviction stage (after conviction is final); habeas review cannot be used to establish new rules unless one of the two narrow exceptions is made 53 [E] Example: Rule 32, Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure 55 [F] Brady v. Maryland (1963): prosecutor suppression of companion’s confession 55 [G] Giglio v. United States (1972): application of the Brady holding to a situation when the prosecutor
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This note was uploaded on 04/04/2008 for the course LAW ALL taught by Professor Multiple during the Fall '06 term at NYU.

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Capital-Punishment-Law-Stevenson-Fall06 - [I] Introduction...

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