This preview shows pages 1–3. Sign up to view the full content.
This preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.
View Full Document
Unformatted text preview: Noah Williams Economics 714 Department of Economics Macroeconomic Theory University of Wisconsin Spring 2010 P ROBLEM S ET 3 Solutions by Tim Lee 1. (a) Although households take prices, taxes and transfers as given, it must be able to project next periods prices and taxes in order to solve its problem. So we need to introduce a perceived law of motion , which we do by assuming rational expections. To do this, define the aggregate state as the vector X = [ K z ] . DEFINITION 1 A recursive competitive equilibrium (RCE) with a government is a value function V ( k ; X ) , a set of decision rules { c ( k ; X ) , k ( k ; X ) , n ( k ; X ) } , a set of prices { r ( X ) , w ( X ) } , transfers { T ( X ) } , and a perceived law of motion for capital K ( X ) , given the tax rate and transistion function P ( z , z ) and N = 1 , such that i. Given prices, taxes, transfers and the law of motion, the decision rules solve the households problem: V ( k ; X ) = max c , k u ( c ) + Z z V ( k ; K ( X ) , z ) dP ( z , z ) c + k = ( 1 )( w ( X ) n + r ( X ) k ) + ( 1 ) k + T ( X ) ii. For all X = [ K z ] , ( K , N ) solves the representative firms problem given prices: zF K ( K , N ) = r ( X ) zF N ( K , N ) = w ( X ) iii. For all X, the government balances budget: T ( X ) = ( w ( X ) N + r ( X ) K ) iv. Markets clear, i.e. k ( k ; X ) = K ( X ) and n ( k ; X ) = N = 1 for all [ k ; X ] , v. k = K, i.e. aggregate state equals individual state. This is required due to the representative agent setting. vi. The law of motion is induced by K ( X ) = zF ( K , N ) + ( 1 ) K c ( K ; X ) = k ( K ; X ) , 1 (b) Given todays aggregate state X and the law of motion K ( X ) , the household rationally projects next periods aggregate state as X = [ K ( X ) , z ] . Since there is no preferences for leisure, n ( k ; X ) = 1 for all k , X . To write a FE in terms of k ( k ; X ) , it will be easier to let the agents state variable be his wealth, which in turn is a function of [ k X ] : a ( k ; X ) ( 1 )[ w ( X ) + r ( X ) k ] + ( 1 ) k + T ( X ) , so from the perspective of the agent who chooses k but forecasts X , it faces the individual law of motion: a ( k ; X ) = ( 1 )[ w ( X ) + r ( X ) k ] + ( 1 ) k + T ( X ) . (1) Now let V ( a ( k ; X ) , z ) V ( k ; X ) , the Bellman equation for the HH is V ( a ( k ; X ) , z ) = max k u ( a ( k ; X ) k ) + Z z V ( a ( k ; X ) , z ) dP ( z , z ) subject to the law of motion ( 1 ). The f.o.c. at the solution is u ( a ( k ; X ) k ( k ; X )) = Z z ( 1 ) r ( G ( X ) , z ) + 1 V a ( a ( k ( k ; X ) ; X ) , z ) dP ( z , z ) and combining with the envelope condition V a ( a ( k ; X ) ; X ) = u ( a (...
View
Full
Document
This note was uploaded on 06/19/2011 for the course ECON 714 taught by Professor Staff during the Spring '08 term at University of Wisconsin.
 Spring '08
 Staff
 Economics

Click to edit the document details