Counterterrorism military and non-military responses -student-S3L2

Counterterrorism military and non-military responses -student-S3L2

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Unformatted text preview: Counterterrorism: Military & Non-Military Responses Counterterrorism Conceptualized Counterterrorism Offensive measures taken that are designed to respond to a terrorist attack Anti-terrorism a defensive position inclusive of a range of policies, actions, and measures taken to prevent further terrorist attacks Deterrence- a military strategy designed to prevent aggressive acts by promising immense retaliation if attacked Strengths When issued by state with significant capacity is effective Elicits compliance with little military cost Can be marginalized when overused Less effective against certain leaders Challenges Risk aversion Risk acceptance Works best against states rather than non-state actors Limited efficacy Defining Hard & Soft Power Hard Power- Use military & Economic ability to "alter" the preferences of political actors Coercion/payment "Might makes right" Co-option/attraction "By consensus" The combination of hard & soft power to achieve policy goals Soft Power- Use of diplomatic, cultural, or historical means to "alter" preferences of political actors Smart Power Use of diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal, and/or cultural tools "[I]nvolves the strategic use of diplomacy, persuasion, capacity building, and the projection of power and influence in ways that are cost-effective and have political and social legitimacy" (Institute of Peace) Hard Power Military Might Symmetric vs. asymmetric warfare Symmetric: warfare b/w two sides of similar capacities Historically, most prevalent form of violent conflict Asymmetric: violent conflict b/w entitles possessing disparate capabilities to wage ware Guerrillas, insurgents, terrorists "The experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown that overwhelming power will not succeed in the context of asymmetric warfare. . ." (Nacos, 2010, 185) Military Retaliations & Reprisals Hard Power Reactionary military responses to illegal acts for which there is no other form of peaceful redress Challenge of retaliations & Reprisals w/ terrorism is that having an ambiguous enemy with no "control" of a nation-state makes punitive actions difficult to enact For reprisals to be legal (recognized under international law), they: Must not be open-ended Must comply with specific conditions & limitations Must have exhausted diplomatic avenues Must be proportional to the initial act of aggression Must not harm innocents Recent trends- "troubling" Must occur with in a "reasonable" window of time from original aggressive act (72 hours commonly accepted) Hard Power Preemption Striking in advance of hostile action to prevent its occurrence and to avoid suffering injury Justification: to avoid suffering, prevent larger conflict Challenges: may appear to be the actual aggressor, can increase "enemy" recruiting What do you think? "Direct military force will continue to play a role in the long-term effort against terrorists and other extremists. But over the long-term, the United States can not kill or capture its way to victory" (Gates, 2009, 29) "When it comes to transnational terrorism and in particular global terrorist networks, good old police work may be more promising than military action" (Nacos, 2010, 189) Hard Power Commando Raids Utilization of special strike forces or unmanned drones to "remove" threat or enemies Strengths Weaknesses Sending special forces into hostile environments w/out reinforcement increases risk Mercenaries can be "bought" Use of commandos increases accuracy of attacks & minimizes risk of harming innocents Plausible deniability- mercenaries Mivtzan Elohim (Wrath of God) Moussad Hard Power Assassination (continued) Assassination was outlawed by President Carter in 1976 Bush never repealed this law However, bin Laden is not the head, or representative, of any state Are bin Laden and other terrorists "fair game", then? Hard Power Hostage Rescue Missions Many states developed hostage rescue teams after 1972 Olympic Slayings: Israel: Shin Bet ("the unseen shield")* Germany: Grenschutzgruppe 9 UK: Special Air Service US: Delta Force, Special Operations Forces Permissive: Infiltration & rescue mission of 2008 Non-permissive: Sudden strike * Already formed The Soft Side of Hard Power Economic coercion Sanctions "Penalties" imposed on one actor from another to coerce behavior Economic Trade Foreign aid Food Diplomatic "Money has been identified as the most important fuel of terrorism" (Nacos, 2010, 194) The Soft Side of Hard Power Challenges of Sanctions in general Challenges of Sanctions regarding terrorism The Soft Side of Hard Power Challenges of Sanctions in general Loss of export business Loss of goods from sanctioned state Needs support & cooperation from other states to be successful Injures masses rather than elite May not bring desired change in behavior Challenges of Sanctions regarding terrorism The Soft Side of Hard Power Challenges of Sanctions in general Loss of export business Loss of goods from sanctioned state Needs support & cooperation from other states to be successful Injures masses rather than elite May not bring desired change in behavior The lion's share of terrorist funding is illicit and is therefore difficult to track much less control Terrorism in terms of killing innocents is relatively cheap Challenges of Sanctions regarding terrorism Soft Power Soft Power Soft Power- ability to obtain what one wants through co-option and attraction Joseph Nye, Harvard University Primary avenues of soft power Deterrence State Diplomacy Civic diplomacy Strategic communication (media) Economic development Economic reconstruction Soft Power State Diplomacy The changing face of state-centric diplomacy Heads of state 2008 debate of Iran Technology Globalization Integration/cooperation Policy against "negotiating" with terrorists Third party diplomacy NGOs MNCs Other states Soft Power Conciliation & Peace Offering compromise is often overlooked when it comes to terrorism Goals of terrorists: Separatist groups may be inclined to settle for a degree of political, economic, or social autonomy. . Consociational (pluralist) democracies- Lijphart Proportional representation Segmented autonomy Organizations with "ultimate goals" may be less compromising Absolutist mentalities Soft Power Conciliation & Peace Amnesty Pros Cons Can make entity appear weak Amnesty alone may not be sufficient reward for risking betraying group Model more successful w/ conflict b/w states and domestic groups rather than terror organizations More effective w/ secular groups Offers fringe in terrorist groups an escape w/out punishment Opens possibility of impunity Soft Power Public Diplomacy The enactment of foreign policy by engaging foreign populations (Propaganda by another name) Disaster relief Medical aid Humanitarian aid Education & training* Exchange programs* Communication media* Can be accomplished by TV Radio Soft Power Public Diplomacy The enactment of foreign policy by engaging foreign populations (Propaganda by another name) Can be accomplished by Disaster relief Medical aid Humanitarian aid Education & training* Exchange programs* Communication media* TV Radio * Three pillars of Cold War public diplomacy program Soft Power Third Party diplomacy IGOs International entities wherein states are members UN NGOs International entities that states are not members Corporations that have an international presence MNCs Nike Dell/IBM Third party diplomacy debated Pros Plausible deniability Saves face in international community Saves state from appearing like a bully by making demands or retaliation or weak by compromising or capitulating Cons Limits control of process Can encourage further events Agreements are easier to break Less terrorist less apt to compromise Termination of Terrorist Organizations 1968-2006 Military Force 7% Found Political Solutions 43% Policing 40% Objectives too limited 10% ...
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This note was uploaded on 07/02/2011 for the course POLI 391T taught by Professor Beaudoin during the Spring '11 term at South Carolina.

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