Lecture+06 - ARTS1811 ARTS1811 Continuity and Change...

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Unformatted text preview: ARTS1811 ARTS1811 Continuity and Change Lecture 6: 24 August, 2009 Development of the International System: Great Power Relations Test will be available on Web Vista after today’s lecture Submission of Assignments and Extensions Assignments are to be submitted to the School Office, located on Ground Floor, Morven Brown Building, by being placed in the appropriate box. These will be stamped by the School Office with the receipt date in case of late submission only. Your assignment must be submitted by 4.30pm on the due date (27 August) to avoid a late penalty. Make sure you attach and sign the green cover sheet before submitting. Defeating Global Terrorism ­ counter­terrorism, Defeating Global Terrorism ­ counter­terrorism, modern warfare & rule of law in countries of war David Kilcullen ­ 2009 Wallace Wurth Memorial Lecture Kilcullen a leading expert on guerrilla warfare. Has served in every theatre of so­called War on Terror since 9/11 as special advisor for counter­insurgency to Condi Rice, senior counter­ insurgency advisor to General Petraeus in Iraq, & chief counter­ terrorism strategist for US State Department. A former Australian army officer with combat experience in South­ East Asia and the Middle East. PhD in political anthropology from ADFA. John Niland Scientia Building, UNSW Kensington campus. Thursday 3 September 2009, 6:30pm More information contact Renee Falvey on 9385 2355 http://www.unsw.edu.au/images/pad/2009/aug/Invitation_2009_Wallac http://www.unsw.edu.au/events/db/2009/09/wallacewurth.html Lecture Outline Lecture Outline Major developments in modern international system. Key influences: Balance of power; Hegemony; Multipolar/bipolar/unipolar frameworks; Growing interdependence; Weapons of Mass Destruction – the nuclear threat; Détente. Treaty of Westphalia ­ 1648 Treaty of Westphalia ­ 1648 Westphalia introduces themes that dominate the international system today: End of 30 years war ­ driven by religious fervour/fundamentalism. Rejection of power of religious leaders ­ start of the idea of the separation of church and state. Nationalism became a central form of identity underpinning state system. Origin of the modern state system. Westphalia ­ II Westphalia ­ II Unlike countries in non­Western world, states of Europe formed as a result of conflict ­ Lustick. More powerful – France, Prussia ­survived. Weaker states – Burgundy, Bavaria ­ absorbed. Made the European state system more stable & enduring than the system in place in Middle East or Africa. Origin of sovereignty. Secularism. Balance of Power. French Revolution & French Revolution & Napoleonic era French Revolution ­ uprising against monarchs & aristocracy ­ response to/development of Westphalia. Revolution aimed to limit role of Church in France. First openly nationalist movement in mod. Europe. Response to threat to revolution by foreign forces. Nationalist symbols ­ impact on rest of Europe. Napoleon accelerated development of modern system. Representation of people/will ­ ruled by own kind. Revolution/Napoleon’s campaigns ­ new warfare. Armies of citizens, not mercenaries – levee en masse. Industrial Revolution Industrial Revolution Shift from agrarian to industrial means of production. Developing change in national wealth & power. Relative power of France began to decline ­ that of Britain & Prussia/Germany began to grow. Waterloo last time UK allied to Germany & beginning of process where Poms became tied to France to maintain balance of power. Impact on travel, economic & political organisation, employment etc. ­ start of globalisation? Basic to current international political economy. Industrial revolution implications for nature of war – greater killing power. Empires and Imperialism Empires and Imperialism European imperialism pursued as if rest of world had no independent existence. Failure of Versailles to recognise racial equality ­ Japan’s hostility to League of Nations. Imperialism motivated by various factors: Wealth (markets, raw materials, outlets for capital); Missionary zeal ­ civilising barbarians; Rhodes: a world dominated by the British would be a better place. Early C20th most of world ruled by Europeans. 2/3 world’s people in Europe/under colonial rule. Implications for 3rd World wealth, political stability. Changing Balance of Power Changing Balance of Power Germany ­ Unity in 1870s, major power, industrial wealth ­ upset balance of power (post 1815). Imperial goals ­ Kaiser’s 1901 call for ‘a place in the sun’. Japan ­ 1868 Meiji Restoration ­ feudal to modern. Population ­ demand for markets + resources ­ imperial ambitions. Joined Euro. system of rivalry. War with Russia ­ encouraged to seek equal status. United States ­ After 1865, politically united & economic integration ­ protection of Royal Navy + resources led to industrialisation & growth. End of Spanish & Portuguese power ­ US developed colonial relationship with Latin America & Philippines. Avoided direct involvement in European affairs. Origins of World War I Origins of World War I 1914, old structures in place but fundamental changes changes to post­1815 balance of power. German imperialism & Euro. eco.­political rivalry. Complicated alliance system. Traditional historians: German aggression. Revisionists: Russian/French obstruction of Germany, led Germany to stage pre­emptive strike; Realists: The collapse of the balance of power. Liberal: Lack of institutions in which to discuss issues. Marxists: Capitalism: conflict about access to markets and resources through imperialism. Post WW I Period Post WW I Period After Germany’s defeat, allies planned to rebuild Europe & re­establish balance of power – c.f. 1815 Concert of Europe ­ Treaty of Versailles, 1919. US (don’t punish Germany, rebuild) ­ France & UK (make Germany pay & prevent resurgence). Wilson ­ 14 points: open diplomacy; limited self­ determination & end imperialism; collective security & establishment of a League of Nations. UK­France tried to save international positions. Germany forced to demilitarise. ‘war­guilt clause’ ­ reparations, esp. France & UK. Surrender territories on borders (Alsace­Lorraine). League of Nations League of Nations Collective security (universal response to aggression). Respect state sovereignty & self­determination. Global movements towards disarmament. Open international discussion and debate. League had early success in conflict resolution: Sweden­ Finland; Germany­Poland; Greece­Bulgaria. Trans­national issues: refugees; slave trade; drugs. Membership: US never, USSR (1934­1939), Germany (1926­33), Italy (left 1937), Japan (1933). Britain & France did little to support the League. Failure of disarmament and of economic sanctions. Impact of Great Depression. The Depression The Depression Economic globalisation v economic nationalism. Internal upheaval, problems with protecting Empire. Challenge to global balance of power – multipolar ­ UK, France, US, Germany, USSR, Japan. Fascism ­ Italy, Germany, Spain, Portugal. UK (Edward VIII, Oswald Mosely, Mitford Sisters). Australia (New Guard – Francis De Groot). USA (Henry Ford, Joe Kennedy, Randolph Hurst, Prescott Bush). Japanese expansion/growing tension with US. Debate about liberalism v. realism. Post WW II Period Post WW II Period 1941 ­ Atlantic Charter ­ self­determination, decolonisation, common security. 1944 – UK/USSR: spheres of influence in Europe. 1945 ­ German occupation, UN, continue alliance. 1945 ­ Soviet occupation of east Europe, agreement on Germany, US­USSR & nukes. Old Europe tried to restore status – failed: UK sought US help in Greece/Iran – France in Indo­China. European power vacuum ­ Truman doctrine. Cold War, emergence of bipolar world. 1948 ­ Decolonisation & human rights. Weapons of Mass Destruction. Reconstruction of losers – Same US policy as in 1919. 1952 ­ European Coal and Steel Community. United Nations United Nations Central goals: Provision & maintenance of internat. peace & security/human rights/rule of law. Capacity to contribute to economic stability and social/HR issues (important post WWII). General Assembly v. Security Council: latter with most control/power. Some early successes in fields of economic & social concerns (ECOSOC, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF). Involvement in the Middle East, Indonesia. Growing paralysis in face of superpower mistrust (veto used 279 times during Cold War) over security issues, increased role/prestige of GA. Even with setbacks, most states committed to UN. English School English School Middle ground between Realism & Liberalism ­ nexus between ‘what is and what ought to be’. There is a society of states ­ shared rules & norms. Rules/norms not fixed ­ may change over time. Order can exist in anarchy – Bull: Anarchical Society. Variants of the English School Pluralism ­ focus on order – int. society based only on mutual recognition of sovereignty (Bull, Jackson). Solidarism ­ focus on justice – int. society can include other norms, such as HR. Criticisms of the English School Rules/norms ­ by most powerful, for most powerful. Underestimates power with focus on norms. Are all actors as reliant on perception of legitimacy? Cold War, Bipolarity, Fear, WMD Cold War, Bipolarity, Fear, WMD Balance of power: similar distribution of power in such a way as to balance against the power of competing bloc – NATO/Warsaw Pact. Bipolarity: two central actors in world politics. Fear: underpinned security dilemma of Cold War Churchill (1946) summarised the feeling of many in his speech at Fulton, Missouri: From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the continent. US Reaction to Cold War US Reaction to Cold War 1947 ­ Truman Doctrine: support free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outward pressures. Kennan (Sources of Soviet Conduct) & inevitability of USSR expansionism. Containment ­ ideas usurped by neo­cons – Nitze. Marshall Plan 1947: US commitment to aid European states in recovery. Legitimise capitalism, weaken appeal of Communism. NATO 1949: Attack on any member = an attack on all. Ultimately, US defence of Western Europe. Point Four Programme 1950: Assistance to impoverished states to counter appeal of Communism. Soviet Union Response Soviet Union Response COMECON 1949: USSR forbade eastern European states to accept Marshall Plan assistance. Drew up ‘equivalent’ economic assistance package in COMECON. Warsaw Pact 1955: USSR equivalent of NATO, precipitated by inclusion of West Germany in NATO. 1948 Berlin Blockade Korean War: 1950­53. Cuban Missile Crisis Cuban Missile Crisis Kennedy ordered blockade (20 October) & announced existence of weapons. Khrushchev saw blockade as sign of weakness & ordered accelerated installation of weapons. US began diplomatic assault on USSR in UN, back­channel negotiations. Eventually 2 messages from USSR. 1st: Will remove missiles if US respect Cuban sovty.. 2nd: & if US remove missiles from Turkey. Role of fear, (mis)perception & risk of nuclear conflict. Nye: Kennedy & Khrushchev feared that rational strategies and careful calculations might spin out of their control. Military power as a source of security or insecurity? Fear & Loathing in Cold War Fear & Loathing in Cold War January, 1950, Hiss guilty of perjury before House of reps. over espionage for USSR. Klaus Fuchs confessed in UK to spying for USSR while working on Manhattan Project. June, Korean War began. July ­ Julius & Ethel Rosenberg charged with transfer of atomic bomb technology to USSR. May, 1951, MacLean & Burgess defected ­ MacLean sent bomb data to USSR during War. Joe McCarthy (Senate Perm. Subcommittee on Investigations) & 1947­54: House Un­American Activities – support from Regan & JFK. Goodnight and Good Luck. Australia’s version Australia’s version 1951, Menzies’ referendum on Communist Party defeated ­ period of concern about commi. threat. April, 1954, Menzies announced defection of Petrov ­ Royal Commission to investigate evidence of espionage from Petrov. Some days ago one Vladimir Mikhailovich Petrov, who had been Third Secretary to the Soviet embassy in Australia since February 1951, voluntarily left his diplomatic employment & made to the Australian Government through the Australian Secretary Intelligence organisation a request for political asylum…The request has been granted ­ R. G. Menzies, 13 April, 1954. Balance of Power Balance of Power relative distribution of power among states into roughly equal shares, such that no one state predominates over others. Realists: balance of power one of best (only) ways of achieving/maintaining int. peace & stability. Cold War balance: alliances, mutual nuclear weapons capacity, bipolarity, similar economic power. Zero­sum game ­ loss/gain for one bloc meant a gain/loss for the other. Super powers ­ poles around which others aligned ­ non­ alignment immoral & untrustworthy. Weaker powers demonised by majors – China, Vietnam & Central American states. Security Dilemma Security Dilemma dynamic in which military development, regardless of intention, creates concern of others at potential aggression, leading to their military development & so on. Based on fear, mistrust & perception ­ Herz. 1940s­late ‘60s, US/USSR military grew exponentially. Realists ­ security dilemma inevitable, as states seek relative power over others & others can’t be trusted. Security dilemma countered by agreements on arms, greater transparency between states. Intelligence used in establishing levels of weapons expenditure, movement of weapons, compliance etc.. Fear based on perceptions of difference, manipulation of difference, history of conflict and animosity. Fostered arms race, lack of understanding. Nuclear Weapons Nuclear Weapons Si vis pacem, para bellum Research 1942 – rumour of German advances. 1945, Hiroshima, Nagasaki. Up to 100,000 people killed Necessary to end War? Saved lives ­ firebombing of Tokyo caused more deaths. Swung Japanese balance of power from militarists who wanted to continue fighting. To forestall surrender to USSR ­ limit Soviet gains. Initially, Truman described bombing as greatest day he had experienced ­ at end of his presidency he said nuclear weapons could not be used by a sane leader. Robert Oppenheimer, Director, Los Alamos Laboratory ­ father of the atomic bomb ­ I am become death, the destroyer of worlds Mutually Assured Destruction Mutually Assured Destruction No. of weapons not as relevant to balance of power. What matters is 2nd strike capability. USSR & US ability to withstand first strike & respond acted as deterrent to use of force in general. Complicated by security dilemma. Possession of nuclear weapons as basis for peace? Davis & Grey ­ the most lethal weapons have little utility for offensive purposes. Arms race continued & proxy wars occurred but direct conflict between US & USSR was avoided. Some argued the more nuclear powers the better. More nuclear states equals more risk? Or nucs. have no real role (Mueller, 1989) Doomsday Clock Doomsday Clock 17 January, 2007, minute hand of Doomsday Clock moved two minutes closer to midnight ­ it is now 5 minutes to midnight. Focus on two sources of catastrophe: perils of 27,000 nuclear weapons & destruction of human habitats from climate change. We stand at brink of a 2nd nuclear age. Not since 1st atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima & Nagasaki has world faced such perilous choices. North Korea's test of a nuclear weapon, Iran's ambitions, renewed emphasis on military utility of nuclear weapons, failure to secure nuclear materials & continued presence of 26,000 nuclear weapons in US & Russia are symptomatic of failure to solve problems posed by most destructive technology on Earth. Détente Relaxation of tension between East and West. Lasted from late 1960s­late 1970s. Origins ­ Cuban Missile Crisis ­ nuclear proliferation ­ cost of arms race & international involvement. Sino­Soviet rift ­ fear associated with MAD, mistrust as breeding near conflict. Nixon’s Guam Doctrine (1970) ­ states had to bear responsibility for their own self defence. 1972: Nixon visited China & USSR, agreements on science, medicine, environment & space projects. 1973: US­Soviet Non­aggression pact ­ avoidance of military conflict and consultation. 1973 Helsinki Final Act: West recognized sovty. of East European satellites in exchange for Soviet HR commitments. ‘Cold War is over’ Progress on agreement on nuclear proliferation. 1968: NPT prevent spread of nuclear weapons beyond those states with current capabilities. SALT – to reduce number of weapons of US, USSR. Emerging nuclear powers rejected NPT. Significant distrust still permeated US­USSR relations. Parallels between détente & Hitler­Stalin pact. Soviet invasion of Afghanistan validated concerns. Reagan’s election signalled return to real politic in dealing with the USSR. US would pursue involvement ‘where necessary’ in 3rd world to prevent spread of communism. Was détente in absence of trust ever going to be successful in ‘taking the edge off’ the Cold War? ...
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