ARTS 1810 - Lecture 7.1 [Compatibility Mode]

ARTS 1810 - Lecture 7.1 [Compatibility Mode] - ARTS 1810...

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Unformatted text preview: ARTS 1810 International Relations in the XX century The Cold War in Europe, 1950-62 European Prime and Foreign Ministers signing the Treaty of Rome (1957) Dr Andrea Benvenuti Semester I, 2008 Lecture Plan Focus on Europe Europe Europe remained central theatre in Cold War confrontation The The deepening of CW in Asia had important implications for Europe’s strategic landscape We concentrate on: German German question Europe in the 1950s European European integration We also examine US/USSR foreign and defence policies affecting Europe The deepening of the Cold War in Europe Growing international tensions in 1948-49 1948Establishment Establishment of North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) Establishment Establishment of West Germany (FRG) Korean War Important Important consequences on US FP in Europe West and East Germany Truman stepped up "containment" in Europe Transformation Transformation of NAT into military organisation (NATO) Full Full rehabilitation (i.e. rearmament) of FRG 1 NSC-68 (April 1950) In 1950 Truman orders NSC to review US FP towards USSR USSR as an extremely aggressive power More structured/sustained response NSCNSC-68 recommendations Development Development of a hydrogen bomb The NSC-68 report Expansion Expansion of US and WE conventional forces Mobilization Mobilization of US economic resources Closer Closer bonds between WE states A more “vigorous” policy containment Strengthening of the North Atlantic Treaty In Dec 1950 NAT foreign ministers announced: Creation Creation of an integrated military force Unified Unified command under supreme commander In April 1951 US Senate gives blessing 4 divisions despatched to Europe divisions In Feb 1952 Atlantic Council created: Secretariat Secretariat under Secretary-General Secretary- NATO in the early 1950s Headquarters Headquarters in Paris Next steps: Plans Plans to increase divisions from 14 to 50 Combat Combat readiness improved/steps towards greater integration US US bases in WE (and deployment of ‘nuclear’ bombers) A “change of gear” in Washington Truman’s policy towards WE underwent enormous shift From From promotion of economic recovery/political stability (1947-49) … (1947… To projection of US military power in WE (1950To (195052) An amazing “crescendo” Acheson and Truman NAT NAT (1949) Supreme Supreme command of NATO Furnishing Furnishing weapons/stationing troops in WE/bases The The rehabilitation of West Germany 2 Germany, always Germany … Rearmament had been a thorny issue for a while US-UK saw no point in keeping FRG disarmed USRearmament Rearmament deeply unpopular in France French govt opposed to rearmament Sole Sole concession: creation of a West German state For For France this was already a huge step forward Allies and Germany according to the British Press France sought to draw FRG into WE framework This This would allow containment of FRG by different means Once this process was accomplished, controlled German rearmament could take place The “Schuman Plan” (May 1950) French came up with the “Schuman plan” Pooling Pooling of the coal/steel industries of France and FRG Creation Creation of a common “supranational” authority Executive Executive body Parliamentary Parliamentary assembly Court Court of Justice Foreign Minister Robert Schuman “free “free trade” in coal and steel By By putting German resources under supranational control, France sought to tie FRG to wider WE economic bloc Plan led to European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 Schuman plan was too "supranational" for the British The US and the “Schuman Plan” Truman supported Schuman Plan Since Marshall Plan US had wanted greater WE cooperation Greater Greater WE integration would lead to containment containment of Germany creation creation of strong WE bloc as a bulwark against communism Acheson, Adenauer and Schuman But while important, Schuman plan wasn’t enough for US In Sept 1950 Acheson pleaded WE allies to allow RFG into emerging NATO integrated system 3 The “Pleven Plan” (Oct 1950) It proposed a combined European defence force National battalions to be integrated in European contingents Political control: Council Council of Ministers, Defence Minister, European Assembly Germany to be invited PM Rene’ Pleven (July 1950-March 1951) But But FRG units of the "smallest possible" size It aimed to integrate FRG into wider WE defence structure It was also attempt to control/slow down FRG rearmament EDC failure and its aftermath (1954) EDC failure threw German question back into the melting pot WE WE unity under threat for a while Frantic negotiations FRG allowed: Allies discuss Germany in Paris to to join NATO (1955) to to rearm (12 divisions under NATO command) FRG could possess no WMDs UK UK agreed to maintain 4 divisions on the Continent The European Economic Community (EEC) Rejection of the EDC was a major set-back set- Italy/Benelux Italy/Benelux pushed for further economic integration Aims to create common market and integrate areas such as transport, atomic energy and electricity Prime and Foreign Ministers sign Treaty of Rome (1957) Enthusiasm for integration had cooled in France after 1952 But it was close Franco-German cooperation that saw Francothe project through In 1957 the "Six" established the EEC and Euratom 4 EEC and its significance EEC was an attempt to: Solve Solve German problem once for all Strengthen Strengthen WE in the Cold War EDC had been a highly political project The room in which the EEC was established Western Western Europeans were not ready for it Thus, the only plausible way of securing further "deepening" was through economic integration EEC would become bedrock of WE integration The EEC and its impact EEC EEC turned out to be a successful experiment It It fostered trade among its members It It contributed to their economic growth It It created the basis for further European integration The EEC’s key institutions US welcomed moves towards integration An integrated WE would be strong bulwark against USSR Britain thought the EEC was an over-ambitious overEuropean project Truman and “McCarthyism” Truman’s assertive approach had a domestic dimension too Administration accused of: Having Having “lost China” Being Being soft on communism Republican Senator Joseph McCarthy In 1950 McCarthy launched an anti-Truman campaign anti- He alleged that Administration had been infiltrated by communist elements McCarthy’s “witchMcCarthy’s “witch-hunt” gripped US between 1950 and 1954 5 The Eisenhower Administration (1953-60) Eisenhower/Dulles criticised Truman’s containment for being too passive They stressed need for a “roll-back” of communism “roll- This ambitious plan conflicted with their economic agenda US President Dwight Eisenhower Tax Tax relief, less govt spending, balanced budgets For For Ike US needed to remain economically strong to maintain edge over USSR New approach to national security called “New Look” as a solution Under “New Look” defence to be done more cheaply Eisenhower’s “New Look” Cuts Cuts in conventional forces Greater reliance on Nuclear Nuclear weapons (“more bang for the bucks”) New New delivery systems More reliance on collective defence creation noncreation of non-communist alliances such as SEATO demands demands for increased allied burden-sharing burdenUS Sec. of State John Foster Dulles “New Look” based on assumption that CW would last for many years Hence, Hence, US should be prepared for the “long haul” “Massive retaliation” Inferiority Inferiority in conventional forces to be compensated by nuclear superiority Nuclear Nuclear option to be exploited “instantly, by means and at places of our own choosing” (Dulles) This strategy known as “massive retaliation” Its weaknesses: Untenable Untenable in the long term Thermo nuclear bomb Inflexibility Inflexibility Massive Retaliation Eisenhower Eisenhower did not believe in a “flexible response” Between 1953-55 he doubled US nuclear arsenal 1953- any communist provocation deemed serious enough to warrant military action would face a nuclear response from the US 6 US-USSR nuclear race in the 1950s 1949: USSR detonated first atomic device 1952: 1952: US conducted first thermonuclear test 1953: USSR carried out first thermonuclear test ICBM in flight By 1955: USSR had long-range bombers long- 1957: USSR tested intercontinental missiles (ICBMs) 1957 USSR launched Sputnik, the world's first spacecraft 1959: 1959: US deployed first operational ICBMs Meanwhile in the Soviet bloc … In In 1947 USSR tightened its control over EE In In June 1948 Yugoslavia expelled from Cominform Stalin Stalin demanded total subservience Tito Tito would not be the only target Yugoslav leader Tito In 1948In 1948-49 imposed terror on EE He He wanted to put in place leaders totally loyal and subservient to Moscow As As he had done at home, he masterminded a series of purges Meanwhile in the USSR … Stalin dies in March 1953 Successors sought A less doctrinaire approach to FP less Reduction Reduction of tensions with US ("peaceful coexistence") USSR USSR made a series of conciliatory gestures Desire Desire to see Korean War over Withdrawal Withdrawal of troops from Austria Molotov, Beria and Malenkov with Stalin Return Return of Porkkala to Finland & Port Arthur (Lushun) to China Relations Relations with Yugoslavia improved Factors shaping USSR’s attitude Realisation Realisation that confrontation with “capitalists” could end in mutual destruction Uncertain Uncertain domestic situation demanded stability at international level 7 Changes in Soviet foreign policy after Stalin From 1955 Khrushchev gains ascendancy in Moscow In Feb 1956 he denounced Stalin’s crimes at the XX CP Congress The The leader who had until recently been treated as a godgodlike figure was revealed as a cruel despot In April 1956 he dissolved the Cominform CP General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev His His new approach stimulated some dissent in EE … … and helped to trigger unrest in Poland and Hungary Limits to 'de-Stalinisation' – Hungary 1956 AntiAnti-Stalinist protests in October 1956 HardHard-line leadership forced to resign In Oct Nagy Announced Announced introduction of party politics Demanded Demanded withdrawal of USSR troops Hinted Hinted at Hungary’s withdrawal from Warsaw Pact On 4 Nov USSR sent tanks into Budapest Soviet tanks in Budapest Crisis showed that East-West divisions could not be reversed East- Contrary to the Eisenhower’s pronouncements, there would be no “roll-back” in Eastern Europe “roll- The Hungarian crisis (Daily Mirror, 1956) 8 Conclusion Early 1950s witnessed Greater Greater US involvement in WE Tighter Tighter USSR grip on EE WE embarked on political/economic integration The Khruschevs and US President Eisenhower Late 1950s saw incipient relaxation of tensions Limits to change in Cold War patterns (i.e. Hungary) 9 ...
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This note was uploaded on 07/10/2011 for the course ARTS 1810 taught by Professor Andreabenvenuti during the Three '09 term at University of New South Wales.

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