ARTS 1810 - Lecture 9 (Tuesday lecture) [Compa

ARTS 1810 - Lecture 9 (Tuesday lecture) [Compa - ARTS 1810...

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Unformatted text preview: ARTS 1810 International Relations in the XX century From Cold War to Détente, 1962-79 US President Kennedy with Soviet leader Khrushchev Dr Andrea Benvenuti Semester I, 2009 Lecture Plan “Peaceful co-existence” co- The limits of peaceful co-existence coCuban Cuban missile crisis Vietnam Vietnam War Rise and fall of “Détente” “Détente” “Détente” “Détente” seemed to usher in new era “Détente” “Détente” was short-lived shortRole Role of China Brezhnev and Nixon in the 1970s Soviet intervention in Afghanistan produced a new phase in Cold War “Peaceful co-existence” In early 1950s USSR-US had tense relations USSR- With “peaceful co-existence” Khrushchev wanted to: codivert divert resources from Soviet war machine improve improve economy & socialism at home Moscow Moscow needed stability at international level Eisenhower (1953Eisenhower (1953-60) aware of costs of confrontation “New “New Look” & “more bang for the bucks” “Massive “Massive Retaliation” Khrushchev with Eisenhower Shrinking nuclear edge convinced US Admin to reach an accommodation 1 The limits of “peaceful co-existence” US suspicious about Soviet motives USSR USSR was altering tactics, not fundamental goals Soviet emphasis on co-existence did represent coimportant change USSR did not seek confrontation, but didn’t abandon “competition” Superpower competition in the Third World Nowhere was this more evident than in the Third World Cultivation of non-aligned countries allowed USSR to: nonbreak break Western encirclement regain regain initiative increase increase influence The Soviet “appeal” USSR had a number of advantages over the West in the Third World Third World’s perceptions: Lingering antiLingering anti-colonial sentiment DeepDeep-seated resentment towards the West Desire Desire for economic development Khrushchev with Tito USSR’s model of development seen as successful European imperialism was perceived in Third World as more tyrannical The end of “peaceful co-existence” “Peaceful co-existence” did not last long co- US-USSR summits produced no results US- Khrushchev wanted better relations with US But this clashed with his “diplomatic offensive” in Third World Khrushchev’s diplomatic style did not help either Khrushchev with new US President JFK New president Kennedy could not afford to be seen as too “soft” US-USSR relations experienced serious crisis over Cuba US- 2 Cuban missile crisis (Oct. 1962) US attempts to destabilize Castro’s regime Castro looked to USSR for support In October, U-2 spy planes detected Soviet ballistic Umissile With warheads less than 100 miles from US, USSR could strike without warning On On 22 Oct 1962 Kennedy announced blockade against ships bound for Cuba Castro and Khrushchev embrace at the UN … and demanded the removal of the missiles from Cuba The consequences of the Cuban crisis on the USSR Khrushchev's reckless gamble cost him dearly In 1964 Brezhnev forced him to resign While not a Stalinist, Brezhnev reversed Khrushchev’s reforms Khrushchev and the new rising star at the Kremlin Brezhnev accelerated USSR nuclear build-up buildAim Aim was to reach parity with US He He wanted to avoid confronting US from a position of “strategic” weakness Consequences of the Cuban crisis on the US Cuban crisis hardened JFK's resolve to confront communist powers in Third World He saw Soviet diplomatic offensive there with concern He saw it as an attempt to shift CW confrontation to Third World Soviet Soviet had changed tactics, not strategy Kennedy and the Indochinese problem Unless US responded to communist initiatives, its credibility would be damaged Pro-US South Vietnam and Laos threatened by guerrillas ProIncreasing Increasing communist ascendancy in Indonesia SEA SEA allies increasingly doubtful of US reliability Vietnam became the major test of Kennedy's resolve 3 A looming crisis in Vietnam Eisenhower never supported the 1954 “Geneva settlement” US feared that USSR/PRC would never stand by agreement Hence, Hence, national elections never took place: Ho Ho Chi Minh consolidated his rule in the North The The US supported Ngo Dinh Diem in the South Eisenhower began to pour aid/military personnel into SV Kennedy Kennedy Admin divided between: those those who wished to confine US involvement to an advisory role those those who favoured the introduction of combat forces A divided Vietnam When Kennedy died, no combat forces had yet been deployed The US and the Vietnam problem In 1965 Johnson sent first combat troops to SV (100,000) He rejected expansion of war into NV, Laos Cambodia The The China factor The The USSR factor International International factor Domestic Domestic factor Under Johnson US efforts in SV reached an impasse Under Nixon US looked for a way out Lyndon Johnson Two Two factors pushed Nixon to reassess US policy War War looked unwinnable War War as serious drain on US resources The “Nixon-Kissinger plan” The American aim was to disengage from Vietnam But Nixon & Kissinger wanted to: prevent prevent USSR/PRC from making it harder for US in Vietnam prevent prevent USSR from gaining ascendancy after US pullout During 1960s USSR-PRC rift had worsened USSRIn In 1969 tensions boiled over into violent border clashes Nixon and NSA Henry Kissinger USSR USSR amassed 40,000 troops along common border In In Sept 1969 Moscow & Beijing ended crisis, but mistrust remained high This presented US with a great strategic opportunity 4 Mao with Khrushchev The Sino-Soviet split USSRUSSR-PRC relations deteriorated in the late 1950s In 1957 almost all Soviet credit to China ceased PRC PRC required to pay cash for Soviet goods Chairman Mao with Soviet leader Khrushchev In 1959 USSR reneged on agreement to supply nuclear technology In 1960 all Soviet technical advisers left China The causes of the Sino-Soviet split Ideological Ideological differences Mao Mao disapproved of Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization decampaign Mao Mao disliked Khrushchev’s condemnation of Stalin’s cult of personality Source: New Statesman, 1962 Contrasting Contrasting foreign policies objectives USSR USSR had no incentive to build up a China over which it had little influence China’s China’s bid for Third World leadership annoyed USSR USSR’s USSR’s attempt to improve relations with US annoyed PRC The “opening to China” Nixon & Kissinger would not let it pass In In July 1971 Kissinger secretly travelled to China In In Feb 1972 Nixon visited China “Opening to China” allowed US to play PRC against USSR By By “opening to China” Nixon aimed to: Neutralise Neutralise USSR/PRC support for NV Put Put pressure on NV to negotiate Reduce Reduce US commitments in Asia Split Split the communist camp further Keep Keep USSR in check Nixon on the Great Wall Negotiate détente Negotiate détente with USSR Contain Contain rising cost of US-USSR nuclear build-up USbuild- “Opening to China” marked a revolution in US FP 5 Détente as seen from Moscow Moscow's aim was to prevent formation of antiantiSoviet alliance It did not want US to get too close with China For For Moscow détente meant: détente recognition recognition of strategic parity with US Nixon with Brezhnev co-responsibility for managing world affairs coRecognition Recognition of USSR’s control over Eastern Europe Détente also seen as offering path to avoid threat of serious confrontation with West … … while keeping alive hopes for the advancement of world communism China and “triangular diplomacy” China tried to play US/USSR against each other PRC wanted US support against Soviet “hegemony” Chinese believed that Soviet threat was increasing Thus PRC allied with least threatening superpower Nixon with Mao But But Mao complained that the US was “climbing on China’s shoulders to reach Moscow” SALT I (1972) Strategic Arms Limitation Talks I US-USSR nuclear deal US- Cap on ABMs (200 for both US and USSR) Cap on ICBMs (1054 for US and 1618 for USSR) One of détente’s most important outcomes détente’s In May 1972 the US and USSR signed “Salt I” Cap on SLBMs (656 for US and 740 for USSR) Cap on Strategic Bombers (455 for US and 140 for USSR) It was designed to limit: antianti-ballistic missiles (ABMs) offensive offensive strategic missiles (and bombers) SALT I did not reduce nuclear arsenals! 6 Towards a settlement in Vietnam “Opening to China” and détente forced Hanoi to negotiate In Jan 1973 a final deal was reached in Paris US US would withdraw all its forces Future Future of SV to be settled on the basis of free elections In 1975 NV and SV resumed war and Saigon fell Kissinger and NV negotiator Le Duc Tho Vietnam Vietnam reunited in 1976 The “Vietnam syndrome” The “Vietnam Syndrome” Humiliating defeat in Vietnam caused a loss of pride It also provoked agonising reappraisal US US paid a high political and economic cost for the war DoubleDouble-digit inflation and mounting federal deficit Nixon leaves the White House in 1974 Popular Popular distrust in competence and honesty of US leaders End End to bipartisan consensus to foreign interventions in name of democracy Hence, reluctance to intervene abroad “Vietnam “Vietnam Syndrome” or “neo-isolationism” “neo- Détente and its discontents But détente increasingly unpopular in US Conservatives Conservatives argued that, by sticking to it, US allowed USSR to pursue expansionist policies Liberals Liberals saw efforts to reach understanding with USSR as immoral Moscow did its fair share to undermine détente détente Soviet activism in Africa seen by Cummings It expanded its influence in Africa USSR USSR wanted to exploit “Vietnam syndrome” If If US had increased its influence in Mideast, why couldn’t Moscow do the same elsewhere? 7 From détente to the “Second Cold War” USSR intervention in Afghanistan in Dec 1979 This This ended détente … … and ushered in a new era of confrontation and between US and USSR It was the beginning of what has been called the ‘Second Cold War’ Ronald Reagan with Jimmy Carter Relations between superpowers too competitive for enduring peace Reagan would lead US through Second CW 8 ...
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This note was uploaded on 07/10/2011 for the course ARTS 1810 taught by Professor Andreabenvenuti during the Three '09 term at University of New South Wales.

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