PradhanRamya - Complexity analysis of Evolution of Dual...

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l it l i f E l ti f D l Complexity analysis of Evolution of Dual Preference Orderings in Games of International Conflict Ramya Pradhan April 15, 2010
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verview Overview ` Introduction otivation ` Motivation ` Modeling omplexity Analysis ` Complexity Analysis ` Implication of Complexity Analysis eferences ` References
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troduction Introduction ` International Conflict eneral disagreement ` General disagreement ` Conflict – an agent of change ` Models of conflict resolution ` Conflict Game, Deterrence Game ` Conflict Game ` Overarching concept of Deterrence Game o layer sequential game ` Two-player sequential game Source: [1]
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eterrence Game Deterrence Game ` Model of ersuasion and ideology exchange ` persuasion and ideology exchange ` initiation and avoidance of war in international relations ` Decision Tree ` C1, C2, …, Cn – Challenger decision points ` D1, D2, …, Dn– Defender decision point C2 Resist Persist t D2 C1 D1 Acquiesce Capitulate Challenge Do not Do not resist Do not persist Status Quo challenge Source: [1]
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eterrence Game Deterrence Game ` Outcomes: leaf nodes r example ` For example, ` Status Quo (S) – no change ` Acquiesce (A) – defender gives in ` Capitulate (C) – challenger gives in ayoff Matrix: payoff received for decision made ` Payoff Matrix: payoff received for decision made Defender moves 0 – player lost the game/replaced efend o ot Challenger moves 1 – player unchanged 2 – player won the game -- - we do not know as this is an Defend Do not defend Challenge -- A (2,0) Do not C (0,2) S (1,1) game is played indefinitely challenge Source: [1]
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eterrence Game Deterrence Game ` How to play the deterrence game? ach player has a strategy ` Each player has a strategy ` Complete or incomplete information ` With complete information, decision making starts at leaf node (our research) ` Decision tree for our research War ersist D1 C2 h ll Resist Persist Do not it C1 Acquiesce Capitulate Challenge Do not Do not resist persist Status Quo challenge
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eterrence Game Deterrence Game ` Illustration: ` P1’s strategy: A > C > S > W (Challenger) ` P2’s strategy: C > S > A > W (Defender) 2 War Persist 1 D1 C2 Capitulate Challenge Resist Do not Do not persist t C2: Capitulate C1 Status Quo Acquiesce Do not challenge resist ` At C2: Capitulate ` At D1: Capitulate ` At C1: Capitulate utcome: Capitulate Payoffs: Challenger Defender ` Outcome: Capitulate, Payoffs: Challenger – 0, Defender – 2
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PradhanRamya - Complexity analysis of Evolution of Dual...

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