Unformatted text preview: Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013
RULE 1, Sections 1 to 6 G.R. No. 133000 October 2, 2001
PATRICIA NATCHER
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45,
assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals. Respondents, Sps. Graciano Del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra
(Graciano and Graciana, LOL), were registered owners of a parcel
of land located in Manila.
o When Graciana died, her husband Graciano and their 6
children entered into an extrajudicial settlement, dividing
among themselves the land owned by Graciano and
Graciana.
o Heirs executed and forged an ―Agreement of
Consolidation-Subdivision of Real Property with Waiver of
Rights‖ where they subdivided among themselves the
properties already given.
o Graciano married petitioner Patrician Natcher. Then
Graciano sold his part of the property to Patricia Natcher.
o Later, Graciano died. His heirs being Patricia Natcher and
the 6 children. Civil Case was filed in the RTC of Manila. Wherein the private
respondents (6 children) alleged that upon the death of Graciano,
Patricia Natcher through fraud, misrepresentation and forgery
acquired the property by making it appear that Graciano executed a
Deed of Sale in favor of her.
o Natcher averred she was legally married to Graciano
making her a compulsory heir. She further alleged that
during Graciano‘s lifetime, he already distributed, in
advance, properties to his children, hence, respondents
may not anymore claim against the estate of Graciano.
o RTC said: The Deed of Sale in favor of Natcher is null and
void. Delos Trinos, Mendoza, Petrache, Puyat, Salvador, Sombilon On appeal, the Court of Appeals: reversed and set aside the
lower court‘s decision.
o It is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to
make a just and legal distribution of the estate. The lower
court went beyond its jurisdiction when it performed the
acts that is proper only in a special proceeding for the
settlement of estate of a deceased person.
o What the lower court should have done was to rule on the
validity of the sale and leave the issue on advancement to
be resolved in a separate proceeding instituted for that
purpose.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed this petition under Rule 45 in the
Supreme Court, assailing the CA‘s decision for being contrary to
law and the facts of the case. RULING:
The Supreme Court agrees with the Court of Appeals. The petition
bears no merit. Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action
and special proceedings, in this wise:
"XXX a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of
a wrong.
"A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are
government by the rules for ordinary civil actions, subject to specific
rules prescribed for a special civil action.
"XXX
"c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right or a particular fact." 1 Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013
There lies a marked distinction between an action and a special proceeding.
An action is a formal demand of one's right in a court of justice in the
manner prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the method of
applying legal remedies according to definite established rules. The
term "special proceeding" may be defined as an application or
proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular
fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are required
unless the statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings, the
remedy is granted generally upon an application or motion." court so as to validly pass upon the question of advancement made by
the decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner
Natcher. According to American Jurisprudence:
"It may accordingly be stated generally that actions include those
proceedings which are instituted and prosecuted according to the
ordinary rules and provisions relating to actions at law or suits in equity,
and that special proceedings include those proceedings which are not
ordinary in this sense, but is instituted and prosecuted according to
some special mode as in the case of proceedings commenced without
summons and prosecuted without regular pleadings, which are
characteristics of ordinary actions. XXX A special proceeding must therefore
be in the nature of a distinct and independent proceeding for particular relief,
such as may be instituted independently of a pending action, by petition or
motion upon notice." Facts: The trial court failed to observe established rules of procedure governing the
settlement of the estate of Graciano Del Rosario. Hence, the decision of
the CA is affirmed.
Hernandez vs Rural Bank 81 SCRA 75 Spouses Hernandez obtained a loan secured by real estate from
Rural Bank (1961) a sum of 6ooo payable on 1962
- 3 months after they loan the bank became distresses
and later was suspended to operate by Monetary Boars in
its resolution No. 928 The bank filed with CFI Manila a complaint for seeking to restraint
the implementation of the Resolution
Hernandez before the expiration of the term of loan went to bank
and offered payment by means of check drawn against the bank by
depositor San Pablo Colleges payable to Hernandez
-payment was not consummated and check was
dishonored because the banks operations was suspended
- Hernandez after several requests to offer payment finally
mailed the same check he presented to the bank and
request to cancel the loan
Monetary Board decided to liquidate the bank.
Meanwhile, CFI Manila rendered decision restraining the
enforcement of MB Resolution 928 and required the bank to
undertake reorganization and curtail its operation
Central Bank (CB) appealed the decision before SC
Sc reversed the decision of CFI manila and dismissed
the complaint for injunction
CB filed a petition before CFI MANILA for liquidation of bank
and it was granted Applying these principles, matters relating to settlement of the estate of a
deceased person such as advancement of property made by the decedent,
partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires
the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.
Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to
advancement made or alleged to have been made by the deceased to any
heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the
estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be
binding.
The Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction,
is devoid of authority to render an adjudication and resolve the issue of
advancement of the real property in favor of herein petitioner Natcher. The
RTC of Manila Branch 55 was not properly constituted as a probate Delos Trinos, Mendoza, Petrache, Puyat, Salvador, Sombilon 2 Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013
- Among the receivables of bank was the account of
Hernandez
Hernadez went to bank requested to cancel the
mortgage and claimed that he already paid it
CB claimed that no payment was made because the
check cannot be honored because the bank was
already closed when it received the check and
advised to settle it in cash
Hernandez disregarded it and filed separate action in CFI Lipa to
compel the bank to accept the check and cancel the mortgage
and ask for damages.
CB filed motion to dismiss contending:
that the venue is improper because the
encumbered property was situated in QC thus
the case should be filed in QC
since bank is under liquidation his assets are
under custodial egis and may be reached only
by motion or petition in CFI MANILA (the
liquidation Court)
MD was denied
CFI LIPA ordered the bank to accept the check and pay the
damages
Rural Bank went to SC to appeal the decision arguing that:
Venue is improper
CFI MANILA has Jurisdiction over the claim RULING: VENUE ISSUE: the complaint of cancellation of real estate
mortgage is a personal action because the mortgagee has not foreclosed
the mortgage. (Rule 4 of ROC Sec2 (a)). When the action is personal
plaintiff may file the action in his residence or defendant‘s residents at the
election of plaintiff. (Rule 4 of ROC Sec2 (b)). HOWEVER in this case
BATANGAS was the domicile of Hernandez and their actual residence is in
QC. The term resides in Rule mentioned refers to place of actual residence
not domicile.
SEPARATE ACTION FILED ISSUE: It is not maintainable because it is
provided that ―if there is judicial liquidation of an insolvent bank all claims
against the bank should be filed in the liquidation proceedings‖. Judicial Delos Trinos, Mendoza, Petrache, Puyat, Salvador, Sombilon liquidation is intended to prevent multiplicity of actions against the insolvent.
In this case Hernandez files a separate action in CFI LIPA and not in the
liquidation bank which is CFI MANILA.
THEREFORE, Venue is improper and the separate action filed therein is not
allowed and the REMEDY available for Hernandez was to intervene in the
Liquidation Proceedings in CFI MANILA.
* Sorry can‘t really see the connection of this case with Rule 1. This
case is about jurisdiction.
G.R. No. L-49475 September 28, 1993
JORGE
C.
PADERANGA, petitioner,
vs.
Hon. DIMALANES B. BUISSAN, Presiding Judge, Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga del Norte, Branch III and ELUMBA INDUSTRIES
COMPANY, represented by its General Manager, JOSE J.
ELUMBA,respondents. Facts:
Petitioner PADERANGA and private respondent ELUMBA entered into an
oral contract of lease for an indefinite period (P150.00 per month) of a
commercial space in Ozamiz City.
P subdivided the leased premises into two (2) by constructing a partition wall
in between. He then took possession of the other half, allegedly with Jose
Elumbra‘s consent. CFI of Zamboanga del Norte based in Dipolog City R instituted an action for damages and prayed for the fixing of the
period of lease at five (5) years. P moved for its dismissal 3 Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013 action was a real action, jurisdiction is with the Court of
First Instance of Misamis Occidental stationed in Ozamiz
City where the property in question was situated.
Motion to Dismiss DENIED (case merely involved the enforcement
of the contract of lease, and while affecting a portion of real
property, there was no question of ownership raised hence, venue
was properly laid
P filed MOR but was also Denied SC - P filed petition for prohibition PADERANGA - inasmuch as ELUMBA seeks to recover possession of the
portion surrendered to P, being a real action, venue is laid in the court
having jurisdiction over the territory in which the property lies.
ELUMBA - present action is chiefly for damages arising from an alleged
breach in the lease contract; hence, the issue of recovery of possession is
merely incidental.
ISSUE: WON CFI of Zamboanga del Norte based in Dipolog City has
jurisdiction over the case
HELD: NO.
While it may be that the instant complaint does not explicitly pray for
recovery of possession, such is the necessary consequence thereof. The
instant action therefore does not operate to efface the fundamental and
prime objective of the nature of the case which is to recover the one-half
portion repossessed by the lessor, herein petitioner. Indeed, where the
ultimate purpose of an action involves title to or seeks recovery of
possession, partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real
property, such an action must be deemed a real action and must perforce
be commenced and tried in the province where the property or any part
thereof lies (Ozamiz City) Delos Trinos, Mendoza, Petrache, Puyat, Salvador, Sombilon Petition for Prohibition is GRANTED.
Erminita Munoz v. Victoriano Yabut
Petition for review on certiorari of the decisions and resolutions of the CA.
The subject is a house and lot sold Munoz which she sold to her sister
Emilia Ching, who in turn sold it to the Go spouses. When the Go spouses
defaulted on their loan to BPI the property was foreclosed. BPI won as the
highest bidder at the auction and the property was sold to the Chan
spouses.
Munoz registered her adverse claim and filed a complaint with the RTC for
annulment of a deed of absolute sale, cancellation of TCT in the spouses
Go‘s names and for revival of the TCT under her name. She also caused the
annotation of a lis pendens.
The RTC granted Go‘s motion for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
and Munoz was driven out of the property. Munoz, meanwhile, filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA assailing the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction granted by the RTC, but it was dismissed.
The RTC rendered its judgment against Emilia Ching and the Go spouses. It
found that Munoz‘s signature and the absolute deed of sale was forged.
Munoz never sold the subject property to her sister and that the Go spouses
were not innocent purchasers for value. The sale was null and void.
Emilia Ching appealed the decision, but the appellate court not only affirmed
the decision of the RTC, it ordered the spouses Go and their successors in
interest to vacate the premises.
After the RTC filed a writ of execution implementing its judgment, the
spouses Chan came forward and filed an urgent motion to stop the
execution against them. They asserted ownership and possession on the
basis of a clean title registered in their names, also contending that the final
judgment cannot be executed against them as they were not parties to the
case and that they purchased the property from BPI without any defects to
the title. 4 Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013
Munoz discovered the cancellation of her adverse claim and notice of lis
pendens, plus the subsequent events that led to transfer and registration
from Go, to BPI then to the Chans.
It was denied by the RTC. The photocopy of BPI‘s TCT could hardly be
regarded as proof that Munoz‘s adverse claim and notice of lis pendens
were missing from the original, also pointing out that the registration in the
day book is what serves as sufficient notice to the world. There was no more
need to annotate the title. They were deemed to have taken the property
subject to the final outcome of the present dispute.
The RTC then issued an alias writ of execution and the subject property was
taken from the spouses and returned to Munoz. Their motion for
reconsideration was denied.
Munoz then instituted a complaint for forcible entry with a prayer for
preliminary mandatory injunction alleging that with the aid of armed men,
Chan and Atty. Yabut forcibly ousted Munoz of possession.
They claim Chan to be the true owner that his possession was never
interrupted, and the men were there to attend services at the Buddhist
Temple on the fourth floor of the building on the property. Munoz‘s claim of
forcible entry should be dismissed for lack of merit and legal basis.
The MeTC granted Munoz‘s petition and restored possession to her.
Yabut and Chan questioned the MeTC‘s decision through a petition for
certiorari with a prayer for a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction before the
RTC. They asserted that they were not bound by the final judgment between
Go and Munoz. Munoz on the other hand argued that the MeTC order was
an interlocutory order, and is thus a prohibited pleading under the rules of
summary procedure. The RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction to
enjoin the implementation of the MeTC order.
The RTC found that the MeTC had committed grave abuse of discretion for
not dismissing the complaint for forcible entry on the ground of ―lis pendens‖
as the issue to who had a better right to possession between Chan and
Munoz was the subject of a pending proceeding. The RTC dismissed the
ejectment suit. Delos Trinos, Mendoza, Petrache, Puyat, Salvador, Sombilon Munoz appealed to the CA, but the CA sustained the RTC orders holding
that the Chan‘s right to due process was vitiated by impleading them only at
the execution stage of the civil case. The order of the RTC in the civil case
was null and void, and considering they are strangers to the case and they
are innocent purchasers for value.
Thereafter Munoz filed a motion for contempt with the RTC against the Chan
spouses and Atty. Yabut. Munoz also filed a Motion for an alias writ of
execution and application for surrender of the owner‘s duplicate TCT, in
which she prayed to direct the RD not only to cancel the TCT of Go, but all
documents declared null and void, and to restore her TCT free from all liens
and encumbrances.
In its order the RTC denied Munoz‘s motion for contempt, but ordering an
alias writ of execution to deliver the property to Munoz, ordering Go to
vacate. It also ordered the RD to cancel from the records all documents
determined void and to restore Munoz‘s TCT.
Unrelenting Munoz filed a motion for clarificatory order, pointing out that the
spouses Chan are the present occupants and that the property could not be
delivered unless the spouses Chan are evicted. The motion was denied
reiterating the rule that once a judgment has become final only clerical errors
may be corrected.
Munoz elevated the complaint to the SC, but it was remanded to the CA in
observance of the hierarchy. The CA dismissed Munoz‘s petition agreeing
with the RTC that the Chan spouses could not be covered by the writ of
execution considering they were not impleaded in the civil case.
Munoz claims that the decision in the civil case binds not only Ching, the Go
spouses and BPI, but their successors in interest, assigns or persons acting
on their behalf, hence they cannot be considered as innocent purchasers for
value.
Ruling
The SC denies Munoz‘s petition for contempt and motion for clarificatory
order seeking that the Chan‘s be executed against because the prior civil
case against Go is an action for reconveyance which is an action in 5 Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013
personam. Since the Chan‘s and BPI were not impleaded as parties, the
effect of the judgment cannot bind or be extended to them by simply issuing
alias writs of execution. No man shall be affected by any proceeding to
which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by any
judgment rendered to the court. o Although the titles of Ching and Go were deemed void, there was no similar
determination as to the titles that BPI and Chan had. Munoz cannot
collateraly attack the title that the Chans have; they must be given their day
in court in a proceeding designated for that purpose.
G.R. No. 152272 March 5, 2012
JUANA COMPLEX I HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
FIL-ESTATE LAND, INC., Respondents
Facts: On January 20, 1999, Petitioner (JCHA), together with individual
residents of Juana Complex I and other neighboring subdivisions
(collectively referred as JCHA, et. al.), instituted a complaint for
damages in the RTC of Binan, Laguna, in its own behalf and as a
class suit representing the regular commuters and motorists of
Juana Complex I and neighboring subdivisions who were deprived
of the use of La Paz Road, against Fil-Estate Land, Inc. (FilEstate).
o The complaint alleged that JCHA, et al. were regular
commuters and motorists who constantly travelled towards
the direction of Manila and Calamba, used the entry and
exit toll gates of South Luzon Expressway (SLEX) by
passing through right-of-way public road known as La Paz
Road.
o They had been using La Paz Road for more than 10
years.
o That in August 1998, Fil-estate excavated, broke and
deliberately ruined La Paz Road that led to SLEX so
JCHA, et al. would not be able to pass through the said
road; Delos Trinos, Mendoza, Petrache, Puyat, Salvador, Sombilon That La Paz Road was restored by the residents to make
it passable but Fil-estate excavated the road again.
o The act of Fil-estate in excavating La Paz Road caused
damage, prejudice, inconvenience, annoyance, and loss
of precious hours to them, to the commuters...
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