199627073-Civ-Digests.pdf - Civil Procedure Digest Group(Dean Mawis 2012-2013 RULE 1 Sections 1 to 6 G.R No 133000 October 2 2001 PATRICIA NATCHER vs

199627073-Civ-Digests.pdf - Civil Procedure Digest...

This preview shows page 1 out of 333 pages.

Unformatted text preview: Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013 RULE 1, Sections 1 to 6 G.R. No. 133000 October 2, 2001 PATRICIA NATCHER vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals. Respondents, Sps. Graciano Del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra (Graciano and Graciana, LOL), were registered owners of a parcel of land located in Manila. o When Graciana died, her husband Graciano and their 6 children entered into an extrajudicial settlement, dividing among themselves the land owned by Graciano and Graciana. o Heirs executed and forged an ―Agreement of Consolidation-Subdivision of Real Property with Waiver of Rights‖ where they subdivided among themselves the properties already given. o Graciano married petitioner Patrician Natcher. Then Graciano sold his part of the property to Patricia Natcher. o Later, Graciano died. His heirs being Patricia Natcher and the 6 children. Civil Case was filed in the RTC of Manila. Wherein the private respondents (6 children) alleged that upon the death of Graciano, Patricia Natcher through fraud, misrepresentation and forgery acquired the property by making it appear that Graciano executed a Deed of Sale in favor of her. o Natcher averred she was legally married to Graciano making her a compulsory heir. She further alleged that during Graciano‘s lifetime, he already distributed, in advance, properties to his children, hence, respondents may not anymore claim against the estate of Graciano. o RTC said: The Deed of Sale in favor of Natcher is null and void. Delos Trinos, Mendoza, Petrache, Puyat, Salvador, Sombilon On appeal, the Court of Appeals: reversed and set aside the lower court‘s decision. o It is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate. The lower court went beyond its jurisdiction when it performed the acts that is proper only in a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person. o What the lower court should have done was to rule on the validity of the sale and leave the issue on advancement to be resolved in a separate proceeding instituted for that purpose. Aggrieved, petitioner filed this petition under Rule 45 in the Supreme Court, assailing the CA‘s decision for being contrary to law and the facts of the case. RULING: The Supreme Court agrees with the Court of Appeals. The petition bears no merit. Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action and special proceedings, in this wise: "XXX a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. "A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are government by the rules for ordinary civil actions, subject to specific rules prescribed for a special civil action. "XXX "c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact." 1 Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013 There lies a marked distinction between an action and a special proceeding. An action is a formal demand of one's right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies according to definite established rules. The term "special proceeding" may be defined as an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are required unless the statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings, the remedy is granted generally upon an application or motion." court so as to validly pass upon the question of advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner Natcher. According to American Jurisprudence: "It may accordingly be stated generally that actions include those proceedings which are instituted and prosecuted according to the ordinary rules and provisions relating to actions at law or suits in equity, and that special proceedings include those proceedings which are not ordinary in this sense, but is instituted and prosecuted according to some special mode as in the case of proceedings commenced without summons and prosecuted without regular pleadings, which are characteristics of ordinary actions. XXX A special proceeding must therefore be in the nature of a distinct and independent proceeding for particular relief, such as may be instituted independently of a pending action, by petition or motion upon notice." Facts: The trial court failed to observe established rules of procedure governing the settlement of the estate of Graciano Del Rosario. Hence, the decision of the CA is affirmed. Hernandez vs Rural Bank 81 SCRA 75 Spouses Hernandez obtained a loan secured by real estate from Rural Bank (1961) a sum of 6ooo payable on 1962 - 3 months after they loan the bank became distresses and later was suspended to operate by Monetary Boars in its resolution No. 928 The bank filed with CFI Manila a complaint for seeking to restraint the implementation of the Resolution Hernandez before the expiration of the term of loan went to bank and offered payment by means of check drawn against the bank by depositor San Pablo Colleges payable to Hernandez -payment was not consummated and check was dishonored because the banks operations was suspended - Hernandez after several requests to offer payment finally mailed the same check he presented to the bank and request to cancel the loan Monetary Board decided to liquidate the bank. Meanwhile, CFI Manila rendered decision restraining the enforcement of MB Resolution 928 and required the bank to undertake reorganization and curtail its operation Central Bank (CB) appealed the decision before SC Sc reversed the decision of CFI manila and dismissed the complaint for injunction CB filed a petition before CFI MANILA for liquidation of bank and it was granted Applying these principles, matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court. Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to advancement made or alleged to have been made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding. The Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to render an adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real property in favor of herein petitioner Natcher. The RTC of Manila Branch 55 was not properly constituted as a probate Delos Trinos, Mendoza, Petrache, Puyat, Salvador, Sombilon 2 Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013 - Among the receivables of bank was the account of Hernandez Hernadez went to bank requested to cancel the mortgage and claimed that he already paid it CB claimed that no payment was made because the check cannot be honored because the bank was already closed when it received the check and advised to settle it in cash Hernandez disregarded it and filed separate action in CFI Lipa to compel the bank to accept the check and cancel the mortgage and ask for damages. CB filed motion to dismiss contending: that the venue is improper because the encumbered property was situated in QC thus the case should be filed in QC since bank is under liquidation his assets are under custodial egis and may be reached only by motion or petition in CFI MANILA (the liquidation Court) MD was denied CFI LIPA ordered the bank to accept the check and pay the damages Rural Bank went to SC to appeal the decision arguing that: Venue is improper CFI MANILA has Jurisdiction over the claim RULING: VENUE ISSUE: the complaint of cancellation of real estate mortgage is a personal action because the mortgagee has not foreclosed the mortgage. (Rule 4 of ROC Sec2 (a)). When the action is personal plaintiff may file the action in his residence or defendant‘s residents at the election of plaintiff. (Rule 4 of ROC Sec2 (b)). HOWEVER in this case BATANGAS was the domicile of Hernandez and their actual residence is in QC. The term resides in Rule mentioned refers to place of actual residence not domicile. SEPARATE ACTION FILED ISSUE: It is not maintainable because it is provided that ―if there is judicial liquidation of an insolvent bank all claims against the bank should be filed in the liquidation proceedings‖. Judicial Delos Trinos, Mendoza, Petrache, Puyat, Salvador, Sombilon liquidation is intended to prevent multiplicity of actions against the insolvent. In this case Hernandez files a separate action in CFI LIPA and not in the liquidation bank which is CFI MANILA. THEREFORE, Venue is improper and the separate action filed therein is not allowed and the REMEDY available for Hernandez was to intervene in the Liquidation Proceedings in CFI MANILA. * Sorry can‘t really see the connection of this case with Rule 1. This case is about jurisdiction. G.R. No. L-49475 September 28, 1993 JORGE C. PADERANGA, petitioner, vs. Hon. DIMALANES B. BUISSAN, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte, Branch III and ELUMBA INDUSTRIES COMPANY, represented by its General Manager, JOSE J. ELUMBA,respondents. Facts: Petitioner PADERANGA and private respondent ELUMBA entered into an oral contract of lease for an indefinite period (P150.00 per month) of a commercial space in Ozamiz City. P subdivided the leased premises into two (2) by constructing a partition wall in between. He then took possession of the other half, allegedly with Jose Elumbra‘s consent. CFI of Zamboanga del Norte based in Dipolog City R instituted an action for damages and prayed for the fixing of the period of lease at five (5) years. P moved for its dismissal 3 Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013 action was a real action, jurisdiction is with the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental stationed in Ozamiz City where the property in question was situated. Motion to Dismiss DENIED (case merely involved the enforcement of the contract of lease, and while affecting a portion of real property, there was no question of ownership raised hence, venue was properly laid P filed MOR but was also Denied SC - P filed petition for prohibition PADERANGA - inasmuch as ELUMBA seeks to recover possession of the portion surrendered to P, being a real action, venue is laid in the court having jurisdiction over the territory in which the property lies. ELUMBA - present action is chiefly for damages arising from an alleged breach in the lease contract; hence, the issue of recovery of possession is merely incidental. ISSUE: WON CFI of Zamboanga del Norte based in Dipolog City has jurisdiction over the case HELD: NO. While it may be that the instant complaint does not explicitly pray for recovery of possession, such is the necessary consequence thereof. The instant action therefore does not operate to efface the fundamental and prime objective of the nature of the case which is to recover the one-half portion repossessed by the lessor, herein petitioner. Indeed, where the ultimate purpose of an action involves title to or seeks recovery of possession, partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property, such an action must be deemed a real action and must perforce be commenced and tried in the province where the property or any part thereof lies (Ozamiz City) Delos Trinos, Mendoza, Petrache, Puyat, Salvador, Sombilon Petition for Prohibition is GRANTED. Erminita Munoz v. Victoriano Yabut Petition for review on certiorari of the decisions and resolutions of the CA. The subject is a house and lot sold Munoz which she sold to her sister Emilia Ching, who in turn sold it to the Go spouses. When the Go spouses defaulted on their loan to BPI the property was foreclosed. BPI won as the highest bidder at the auction and the property was sold to the Chan spouses. Munoz registered her adverse claim and filed a complaint with the RTC for annulment of a deed of absolute sale, cancellation of TCT in the spouses Go‘s names and for revival of the TCT under her name. She also caused the annotation of a lis pendens. The RTC granted Go‘s motion for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and Munoz was driven out of the property. Munoz, meanwhile, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA assailing the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction granted by the RTC, but it was dismissed. The RTC rendered its judgment against Emilia Ching and the Go spouses. It found that Munoz‘s signature and the absolute deed of sale was forged. Munoz never sold the subject property to her sister and that the Go spouses were not innocent purchasers for value. The sale was null and void. Emilia Ching appealed the decision, but the appellate court not only affirmed the decision of the RTC, it ordered the spouses Go and their successors in interest to vacate the premises. After the RTC filed a writ of execution implementing its judgment, the spouses Chan came forward and filed an urgent motion to stop the execution against them. They asserted ownership and possession on the basis of a clean title registered in their names, also contending that the final judgment cannot be executed against them as they were not parties to the case and that they purchased the property from BPI without any defects to the title. 4 Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013 Munoz discovered the cancellation of her adverse claim and notice of lis pendens, plus the subsequent events that led to transfer and registration from Go, to BPI then to the Chans. It was denied by the RTC. The photocopy of BPI‘s TCT could hardly be regarded as proof that Munoz‘s adverse claim and notice of lis pendens were missing from the original, also pointing out that the registration in the day book is what serves as sufficient notice to the world. There was no more need to annotate the title. They were deemed to have taken the property subject to the final outcome of the present dispute. The RTC then issued an alias writ of execution and the subject property was taken from the spouses and returned to Munoz. Their motion for reconsideration was denied. Munoz then instituted a complaint for forcible entry with a prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction alleging that with the aid of armed men, Chan and Atty. Yabut forcibly ousted Munoz of possession. They claim Chan to be the true owner that his possession was never interrupted, and the men were there to attend services at the Buddhist Temple on the fourth floor of the building on the property. Munoz‘s claim of forcible entry should be dismissed for lack of merit and legal basis. The MeTC granted Munoz‘s petition and restored possession to her. Yabut and Chan questioned the MeTC‘s decision through a petition for certiorari with a prayer for a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC. They asserted that they were not bound by the final judgment between Go and Munoz. Munoz on the other hand argued that the MeTC order was an interlocutory order, and is thus a prohibited pleading under the rules of summary procedure. The RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the implementation of the MeTC order. The RTC found that the MeTC had committed grave abuse of discretion for not dismissing the complaint for forcible entry on the ground of ―lis pendens‖ as the issue to who had a better right to possession between Chan and Munoz was the subject of a pending proceeding. The RTC dismissed the ejectment suit. Delos Trinos, Mendoza, Petrache, Puyat, Salvador, Sombilon Munoz appealed to the CA, but the CA sustained the RTC orders holding that the Chan‘s right to due process was vitiated by impleading them only at the execution stage of the civil case. The order of the RTC in the civil case was null and void, and considering they are strangers to the case and they are innocent purchasers for value. Thereafter Munoz filed a motion for contempt with the RTC against the Chan spouses and Atty. Yabut. Munoz also filed a Motion for an alias writ of execution and application for surrender of the owner‘s duplicate TCT, in which she prayed to direct the RD not only to cancel the TCT of Go, but all documents declared null and void, and to restore her TCT free from all liens and encumbrances. In its order the RTC denied Munoz‘s motion for contempt, but ordering an alias writ of execution to deliver the property to Munoz, ordering Go to vacate. It also ordered the RD to cancel from the records all documents determined void and to restore Munoz‘s TCT. Unrelenting Munoz filed a motion for clarificatory order, pointing out that the spouses Chan are the present occupants and that the property could not be delivered unless the spouses Chan are evicted. The motion was denied reiterating the rule that once a judgment has become final only clerical errors may be corrected. Munoz elevated the complaint to the SC, but it was remanded to the CA in observance of the hierarchy. The CA dismissed Munoz‘s petition agreeing with the RTC that the Chan spouses could not be covered by the writ of execution considering they were not impleaded in the civil case. Munoz claims that the decision in the civil case binds not only Ching, the Go spouses and BPI, but their successors in interest, assigns or persons acting on their behalf, hence they cannot be considered as innocent purchasers for value. Ruling The SC denies Munoz‘s petition for contempt and motion for clarificatory order seeking that the Chan‘s be executed against because the prior civil case against Go is an action for reconveyance which is an action in 5 Civil Procedure Digest Group (Dean Mawis) 2012-2013 personam. Since the Chan‘s and BPI were not impleaded as parties, the effect of the judgment cannot bind or be extended to them by simply issuing alias writs of execution. No man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by any judgment rendered to the court. o Although the titles of Ching and Go were deemed void, there was no similar determination as to the titles that BPI and Chan had. Munoz cannot collateraly attack the title that the Chans have; they must be given their day in court in a proceeding designated for that purpose. G.R. No. 152272 March 5, 2012 JUANA COMPLEX I HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioners, vs. FIL-ESTATE LAND, INC., Respondents Facts: On January 20, 1999, Petitioner (JCHA), together with individual residents of Juana Complex I and other neighboring subdivisions (collectively referred as JCHA, et. al.), instituted a complaint for damages in the RTC of Binan, Laguna, in its own behalf and as a class suit representing the regular commuters and motorists of Juana Complex I and neighboring subdivisions who were deprived of the use of La Paz Road, against Fil-Estate Land, Inc. (FilEstate). o The complaint alleged that JCHA, et al. were regular commuters and motorists who constantly travelled towards the direction of Manila and Calamba, used the entry and exit toll gates of South Luzon Expressway (SLEX) by passing through right-of-way public road known as La Paz Road. o They had been using La Paz Road for more than 10 years. o That in August 1998, Fil-estate excavated, broke and deliberately ruined La Paz Road that led to SLEX so JCHA, et al. would not be able to pass through the said road; Delos Trinos, Mendoza, Petrache, Puyat, Salvador, Sombilon That La Paz Road was restored by the residents to make it passable but Fil-estate excavated the road again. o The act of Fil-estate in excavating La Paz Road caused damage, prejudice, inconvenience, annoyance, and loss of precious hours to them, to the commuters...
View Full Document

  • Left Quote Icon

    Student Picture

  • Left Quote Icon

    Student Picture

  • Left Quote Icon

    Student Picture