MonitUsingDetectRev1

MonitUsingDetectRev1 - Monitoring Using Detection...

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Unformatted text preview: Monitoring Using Detection Monitoring Using Detection for ENU4930/6937: Elements of Nuclear Safeguards, Non for ENU4930/6937: Elements of Nuclear Safeguards, Non ‐ Proliferation, and Security Proliferation, and Security Presented by Presented by Glenn E. Sjoden, Ph.D., P.E. Glenn E. Sjoden, Ph.D., P.E. Associate Professor and Associate Professor and &L Endowed Term Professor &L Endowed Term Professor ‐‐ ‐‐ 007 2010 007 2010 FP&L Endowed Term Professor FP&L Endowed Term Professor 2007.2010 2007.2010 Florida Institute of Nuclear Florida Institute of Nuclear etection and Security etection and Security Detection and Security Detection and Security Nuclear & Radiological Engineering Nuclear & Radiological Engineering University of Florida University of Florida Overview Overview – Introduction – MC&A and Nuclear Material Assay • NSA Brief ‐ “ eyond Guns, Gates and Guards: An Integrated Approach to Nuclear NNSA Brief Beyond Guns, Gates and Guards: An Integrated Approach to Nuclear Material Security” – Analytical Methods • Fissile Material Detection Methods – U and Pu ountering Illicit Trafficking: IAEA Countering Illicit Trafficking: IAEA – Summary Nuclear Material Control and Accounting Nuclear Material Control and Accounting C&A) C&A) (MC&A) (MC&A) • MC&A are important measures to consider when operating a rge plant large plant • If a plant processes 80 MT of Pu in a year – This amounts to on the order of 10,000 MT of fuel (enough fuel from 70 large power reactors) – If 0.01% is “Material Unaccounted For” (MUF) • Then the MUF mass is 8 kg– 1 SQ of IAEA material! – Physical security measures are important… – Analytica l methods are also fundamental to process control and material accountability IAEA, June 2010 M Detection M Detection esearch esearch SNM Detection SNM Detection Research Research • Perform design and assess performance of detector monitoring systems – Generate modeling tools, ptimize cross sections optimize cross sections, verify source terms – Assess of n, gamma radiation from SNM using 3 ‐ D Transport Simulations esign Passive/Active probe scenarios – Design Passive/Active probe scenarios – Sn and Monte Carlo Models Nuclear Material Control and Accounting Nuclear Material Control and Accounting C&A) C&A) (MC&A) (MC&A) • Physical / Access Protection – Physical Protection: • G 3 =“Gates, Guns, Guards” – Facility Access control using IT Information • Video images: valuable information as soon as the camera captures fraud, attempted theft or injury • Alarms: electronic signals that convey important information about a door opening or temperature dropping • Electronic requests from a card reader: Reported back to the access control server are information the accuracy of which is mission critical to most companies....
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This note was uploaded on 07/28/2011 for the course ENU 4930 taught by Professor Staff during the Summer '08 term at University of Florida.

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MonitUsingDetectRev1 - Monitoring Using Detection...

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