ch10 - Price Competition Chapter 10: Price Competition 1...

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Chapter 10: Price Competition 1 Price Competition
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Chapter 10: Price Competition 2 Introduction In a wide variety of markets firms compete in prices Internet access Restaurants Consultants Financial services With monopoly setting price or quantity first makes no difference In oligopoly it matters a great deal nature of price competition is much more aggressive the quantity competition
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Chapter 10: Price Competition 3 Price Competition: Bertrand In the Cournot model price is set by some market clearing mechanism An alternative approach is to assume that firms compete in prices: this is the approach taken by Bertrand Leads to dramatically different results Take a simple example two firms producing an identical product (spring water?) firms choose the prices at which they sell their products each firm has constant marginal cost of c inverse demand is P = A – B.Q direct demand is Q = a b.P with a = A/B and b= 1 /B
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Chapter 10: Price Competition 4 Bertrand competition We need the derived demand for each firm demand conditional upon the price charged by the other firm Take firm 2. Assume that firm 1 has set a price of p 1 – if firm 2 sets a price greater than p 1 she will sell nothing – if firm 2 sets a price less than p 1 she gets the whole market – if firm 2 sets a price of exactly p 1 consumers are indifferent between the two firms: the market is shared, presumably 50:50 So we have the derived demand for firm 2 – q 2 = 0 if p 2 > p 1 – q 2 = ( a – bp 2 )/2 if p 2 = p 1 – q 2 = a – bp 2 if p 2 < p 1
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Chapter 10: Price Competition 5 Bertrand competition 2 This can be illustrated as follows: Demand is discontinuous p 2 q 2 p 1 a a - bp 1 ( a - bp 1 )/2 There is a jump at p 2 = p 1 The discontinuity in demand carries over to profit
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Chapter 10: Price Competition 6 Bertrand competition 3 Firm 2’s profit is: π 2 (p 1, , p 2 ) = 0 if p 2 > p 1 π 2 (p 1, , p 2 ) = (p 2 - c)(a - bp 2 ) if p 2 < p 1 π 2 (p 1, , p 2 ) = (p 2 - c)(a - bp 2 )/2 if p 2 = p 1 Clearly this depends on p 1 . Suppose first that firm 1 sets a “very high” price: greater than the monopoly price of p M = (a +c)/2b For whatever reason!
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Chapter 10: Price Competition 7 Bertrand competition 4 With p 1 > (a + c)/2b, Firm 2’s profit looks like this: Firm 2’s Price Firm 2’s Profit c (a+c)/2b p 1 p 2 < p 1 p 2 = p 1 p 2 > p 1 What price should firm 2 set? The monopoly price What if firm 1 prices at (a + c)/2b? So firm 2 should just undercut p 1 a bit and get almost all the monopoly profit Firm 2 will only earn a positive profit by cutting its price to (a + c)/2b or less At p2 = p1 firm 2 gets half of the monopoly profit
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Chapter 10: Price Competition 8 Bertrand competition 5 Now suppose that firm 1 sets a price less than (a + c)/2b Firm 2’s Price Firm 2’s Profit c (a+c)/2b p 1 p 2 < p 1 p 2 = p 1 p 2 > p 1 Firm 2’s profit looks like this: What price should firm 2 set now? As long as p
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This note was uploaded on 08/08/2011 for the course EC 170 taught by Professor Menegotto during the Fall '08 term at Tufts.

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ch10 - Price Competition Chapter 10: Price Competition 1...

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