Hovi economic sanctions

Hovi economic sanctions - When Do (Imposed) Economic...

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Sheet1 Page 1 When Do (Imposed) Economic Sanctions Work? Hovi, Jon, 1956Huseby, Robert. Sprinz, Detlef F. World Politics, Volume 57, Number 4, July 2005, pp. 479-499 (Article) Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press DOI: 10.1353/wp.2006.0011 For additional information about this article http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/wp/summary/v057/57.4hovi.html Access Provided by Kinkaid School at 07/26/10 11:51PM GMT A (Stamp comment muse_logo chf 04/26/06 07:50 AM blank) WHEN DO (IMPOSED) ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WORK? By JON HOVI, ROBERT HUSEBY, and DETLEF F. SPRINZ* I. INTRODUCTION D D O economic sanctions work, and if so, when? This question has dominated the sanctions literature for decades. Some authors are moderately optimistic about the effectiveness of sanctions.1 Others concur with the traditional view that only in exceptional cases are sanctions successful.2 Still others emphasize the need to distinguish between (1) cases where sanctions have actually been imposed and (2) cases where sanctions have merely been threatened, arguing that the success rate is significantly higher for the latter category than for the former category.3 They suggest that sanctions, to the extent that they work at all, tend to work primarily at the threat stage. Yet occasionally sanctions do work only after being imposed. In this article we identify two conditions for this to happen. If a threat of sanctions fails, then the sender country must decide whether to execute the threat and actually impose sanctions.4 For policymakers to make an informed decision in such a situation, they need to know whether * We are indebted to Geir B. Asheim, Jeffrey Checkel, Aanund Hylland, Ronald B. Mitchell,
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Sheet1 Page 2 Håvard Strand, and four anonymous reviewers for helpful comments. We also thank Frank Azevedo for excellent editorial assistance. 1 Kimberly Ann Elliott, ‚ The Sanctions Glass: Half Full or Completely Empty?“ International Security 23, no. 1 (1998) Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1990). 2 Johan Galtung, L On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions, with Examples from the Case of Rhodesia,L World Politics 19 (April 1967) International Security 23, no. 1 (1998). 3 Daniel W. Drezner, F The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion,± International Organization 57 (Summer 2003) The Roles of Preferences, Information and Threats,˙ Journal of Politics 66, no. 1 (2004) W. Parker, ± The Problem with Scorecards: How (and How Not) to Measure the Cost-Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions,& Michigan Journal of International Law 21, no. 235 (2000). 4 We adopt the standard terminology whereby the country (or countries) that threatens or imposes sanctions is called “ sender,“ while the country threatened with or suffering sanctions is called ˆ target.² World Politics 57 ( July 2005), 479& 99 W WORLD POLITICS imposed sanctions can be expected to induce the target to yield.5 We
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Hovi economic sanctions - When Do (Imposed) Economic...

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