quiz2 - Quiz 2 Questions ECOS3012 - Strategic Behavior,...

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Unformatted text preview: Quiz 2 Questions ECOS3012 - Strategic Behavior, Semester 1, 2011 Note. • Print out this file. • Work our your solutions to the questions below. • Log back into Blackboard, access Quiz 2 under “Online Quizzes Tab” and click “Submit” to submit your answers . Question 1 Consider a two player strategic form game in which each player knows the payoffs of the other player as well as her own payoffs. a). We may apply the idea of IEDS to this game. b). We may not be able to compute best responses. c). We can apply IEDS only if the payoffs are in fact common-knowledge d). Payoffs as well as the fact that neither player plays a weakly dominated strategy need to be common-knowledge. Question 2 Rationalizability involves a). Successively removing strategies that are “never a best response” b). Successively removing strategies that are “never a best response” c). Both Part (a) and Part (b). d). Neither Part (a) nor Part (b)....
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quiz2 - Quiz 2 Questions ECOS3012 - Strategic Behavior,...

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