Distributed-Certificate-Milcom09 - Paper ID # 900041...

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1 of 7 Paper ID # 900041 DISTRIBUTED CERTIFICATE AND APPLICATION ARCHITECTURE FOR VANETs Baber Aslam and Cliff Zou University of Central Florida Orlando, FL ABSTRACT Privacy, authentication, confidentiality and non repudiation are the most desired security attributes for all vehicular ad hoc network (VANET) applications. A lot of solutions have been presented to address these issues. However, they are mostly dependent on centralized certificate architecture and some sort of hardware-based security. These solutions are expensive to carry out and lack the incentive for both users and service providers to deploy, which make them especially difficult to be implemented during the important initial deployment stage of VANET. In this paper, we present a distributed security architecture for VANET that does not rest on expensive security hardware or elaborate security infrastructure. The architecture can be incrementally deployed, facilitating small companies to jump in the VANET business, and can fill the void during the VANET initial deployment phase. Our solution is based on spatial and temporal restricted certificates, which are issued upon user’s request and can be used for various VANET applications. Due to the restricted nature of these certificates, the certificate revocation process is simple and efficient, which solves another drawback of existing solutions. 1. INTRODUCTION All VANET applications either collect or disseminate information from/to vehicles. The authenticity of the information is very important since malicious information may result in loss of life and property. This authenticity of information can be achieved, if some means of liability are introduced. Besides non repudiation; confidentiality, privacy and authentication are the desired security attributes. The best possible solution is to use digital certificates issued to (tied to) a user/provider by a trusted third party. These certificates can then be used to sign the information. Most of the existing solutions use some kind of certificates with a central certificate-issuing/trusted authority [1-7]. The architecture successfully achieves authentication, confidentiality and non repudiation but compromises the privacy since the signed information can be linked to the signer. To provide privacy, the architecture can be extended to use many temporary certificates (or called pseudonyms) instead of one permanent certificate [2, 3]. These pseudonyms can be preloaded in a tamper proof device - TPD [2], issued by an online authority [1, 3] or generated by user himself [4, 5]. The centralized certificate authority (CA) based solutions present a number of challenges which may be difficult to address during the initial deployment stages of VANET. The CAs must be organized in a hierarchical manner for
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Distributed-Certificate-Milcom09 - Paper ID # 900041...

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