Nye.2007(2) - l 14 CHAPTER 4 The Failure of Collective...

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Unformatted text preview: l 14 CHAPTER 4 The Failure of Collective Security and World War II ileinrichs, Waldo, Jr., Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Entry into World \Var ll (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). Hilderbrand, Klaus, Foreign Policy of the Third Reich, trans. Anthony Pothergill (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973). Hughes, Jeffrey, “The Origins of World War II in Europe: British Deterrence Failure and German Expansionism," in Robert l. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rahh, eds., The Origin and Prevention ofMajor Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 911181—322. lriye, Akita, The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific (London: Longman, 1987). --, Pearl Harbor and the Coming of the Pacific War: A Brief History with Documents and Essays (New York: BedfordlSt. Martin’s, 1999). Jervis, Robert, Richard Ned Lehow, and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985). Kier, Elizabeth, imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997). Lukacs, John, Five Days in London, May 1940 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999). Macmillan, Margaret: Olwen, Paris 191 9: Six Menths That Changed the World (New York: Random, 2002). Middlemas, Keith, The Strategy of Appeasement: The British Government and Germany (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1972). Ross, Graham, The Great Powers and the Decline of the European States System, 1914—1945 (London: Longman, 1983). Stony, Richard, A History of Modern Japan (Baltimore: Penguin, 1960). Utley, Jonathan, Goingr to War with Japan. i937el94l (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1985). Walters, P. P., A History of the League of Nations (London: Oxford University Press, 1952). Wolfers, Arnold, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on lntemtttional Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962). IWAMMELI; - -- .4; u... x ovum ( L. va-f‘finr-I «4:. m am:an Afim’” wmcmm.mwv ,M:.“U::.r,‘u.mm.\:~c v mmmmir «we» .~--~ 'r' m ‘ww “A- v _ ,W.“ ,7... , The Cold War Winston Churchill, Franklin Roosevelt, and Josef Stalin at Yelta 1945 r.- mwaw mmmwmwxms-o. Lil.‘tms‘-1E;A\VE€I'A.-th;tn( t. :m wwaw.m}wh m—vmwhmstsmssm Mums-t haw ~ 7 r a . x cant-Jdammtmmsmvm Given its Violent first half, a most remarkable feature of the second half f 'l ) twentieth century was the absence of World War III. instead there was a ‘ ldo UL period of intense hostility without actual war. The hostility Wits so intense 'wml 3 expected armed conflict between the superpowers. Fighting occurred but '13.” many the peripheries and not directly between the United States and the ,Sovielt‘t slid: 115 l 16 CHAPTER 5 The Cold War The Cold War lasted four decades, from 1947 to 1989. The height of the Cold War was from 1947 to 1963, when there were few serious negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. There were not even any summit meetings between 1945 and 1955. In 1952, George Kennan, the US. ambassador in Moscow, compared his isolation in the American embassy to his experience of being interned during World War 11 in Berlin. The later phases of the Cold War in the 1970s and 19805 were very different. The Americans and Soviets had many contacts, and they constantly negotiated on arms control treaties. The end of the Cold War occurred quite quickly with the change in Soviet policies after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985. Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe collapsed in 19891 and the Seviet Union itself disintegrated in 1991. DETERRENCE AND CONTAINMENT What makes the Cold War exceptional is that it was a period of protracted tension that did not end in a war between the two rival superpowers. A variety of explanav tions for why this was the case will he discussed. Because of its unusual trajectory, the Cold War offers a unique perspective on international relations, and it illuminates the dynamics of two foreign policy choices that were made: the choice to deter and the choice to contain. To deter is to discourage through fear, and although frequently associated with the Cold War, deterrence was not a new concept in international politics. Through out history, countries built armies, formed alliances, and issued threats to deter other countries from attacking. During the Cold War and with the advent of nuclear weapons, the superpowers depended more on discouraging by threat than on denying by defense after an attack occurred. Cold War deterrence was closely tied to the maintenance of large American and Soviet nuclear arsenals, but it was also an extension of balance~ofapower logic. Deterrence by nuclear threat was one way each superpower tried to prevent the other from gaining advantage and hence upsetting the balance of power between them. As we shall see, deterrence often aggravated the tension between the United States and the Seviet Union, and it is not necessarily easy to demonstrate that deterrence worked. There is always the danger of spurious causation. If a professor said her lectures kept elephants out of the classroom, it would be difficult to disprove her claim if no elephants ever came to class. We can test such claims by using counterfactuals: How likely is it that elephants would come to cla5s? The concept of deterrence was linked to the policy of containment. During the Cold War, containment referred to a specific American policy of containing Soviet communism so as to promote a liberal economic and political world order. But like deterrence, containment did not originate with the Cold War, even if the term did. Con taininent has been a primary tool of foreign policy for centuries. In the eighteenth century, the conservative rnonarchical states of Europe attempted to contain the ide~ Ology of liberty and equality espoused by the French Revolution, and even earlier, the Catholic Church in the CountervReformation attempted to contain the spread of the Three Approaches to the Cold War 1 17 Ref ' ' ' ' ' mapprfptronlandfghe ideals pffMartrn Luther. There are different forms of contain . 'can 3e 0 ‘ensive or r e‘ensive it C' ‘ ' ' ‘ ( 1 I , . .. an use military power in the f ' f ' 811131 . I I ‘ - ‘ ‘ > h ‘ L 011.11 0 War 01‘ ca ices, 1ft can use economic power in the form of trading biocs or sanctions and it n - . g . ' V . . . ‘ ‘ {ht {351350; power in the Cfloim of promoting ideas and values. During the Cold War ’ 'et rates waver-e retween an exp" ’ ' , ansrve policy of containin i co ' ‘ t ‘ . ‘ ‘ ‘ . mmunrsm and a more limited policy of containing the Soviet Union. é THREE APPROACHES TO THE COLD WAR Who ‘ ‘ -* ' A ' been t(1)11c ctaulscrf ihchlold War? Almost since it began, those questions have ~ s cc 0 rerce e rate among scholars d ' ' I . an policy makers There are th ‘ ‘ h ‘ _ ‘ I I ‘ I . ree inarnTigchotiljof opinion. nadrtronalrsts, rewszoriists, and postrevisionists. qmsugt trf iponaiists Cgallso léniiwn as the orthodox} argue that the answer to the no w ostarte tie odWai‘is ' " ' r I '7 urte simple: Stalin and 'l > S ' ' At the . I I I ( irc t ovret Union. were end of Worid War 11, American diplomacy was defensive, while the Soviets aggressive an expansrve. The Americans only slowly awoke to the n ' f the Sovret threat. alum 0 state hat evrdcncc do the traditionalists crte? Immediately after the war, the United ' -s was proposing a universal world 0rd“ ' I LI and collective s- * 'l ' ‘ unit- ! ‘ > K ‘ I .ecurity tirough the becmrlzsd NLations. C'lT‘l‘iL Sovrethnron did not take the United Nations very seriously e 1' wante to expant and dominate ’ ’ l l c its own sphere of iii] 1 ' l ‘ Europe After {h I I I ‘ r ucnce in hastern , . e war, the United States demobil' ‘ ' ' ‘ ized its irooas l ' '1 5 ' Union left lar s . . - . l e. a ll! W luerls UL SOVlel . gt armies in lzastern hurope The U " ‘ _ . . nried States recor ‘ Ad 8 ' ' {mm- H r J I > 3 i ‘ t . gnrzc ovret qt Y'elrlslis, fpi ciamplc, when Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill met in February 1945 gm“: Lie miergcans went out of their way to aecommodate Soviet: interests r I , owevei, it not live up to his agreements, particularly by not 'illowi 7 f ‘* electrons in Poland. 7' ml: 1w Soviet expansyonism was further confirmed when the Soviet Union was slow to remove its troops rom northern I" ' " ' ' l l l . ran after the war Evert 11 1 bu. . u p _ I . . 1 ea y trey were removed or only under pressure. In 1948, the communists took over the Czechoslovakian, . A l . ' ‘ r ( Sg :féziintipt.\;hc Sovrei Union blockaded Berlin in 1948 and 1949 trying to s z- a A. .\ -\ ' I l l at: ‘ e t e d cstcrn governments Out. And in 1950, communist North Kore 1’s 1311‘ . .. . ' v ‘ . r E \ even: gifgse 11the harder (into bfiull‘i Korea. According to the traditionalists these - , '( ua y awa 'ene tie nited States t ' ‘ ' I l l o the threat ' ‘ l " ‘ and launched the Cold War. Of bowm cxpamlomsm Th . -. . ., .- - - COld “Ziewuomsts, :hlp ontc primarily in the 1960s and early 19705, believe the r r was cause y merican rather t1 ' ' ' I . ran Sovret ex 3a ‘ " ‘ deuce I 1 — I a . 1 nsronism. Theii evr’ sewer is )thai. at [Ellie end of World War II, the world was not really bipolarw—the wall-311:1??? muilz weaker than the United States, which was strengthened by the to 30 Ina nue ear weapons while the Soviets did not. The Soviet Union lost u 3 mid in: ion pefiple, and industrial production was only half its 1939 level Stalirlr WO Id rirrerican drnbassador 1Aver-ell Harriman in October 1945 that the Soviets u .urn inwar to repair t reir domest' d ' I I w 1c amage. What is more '1 ' ' MS I ’ I _ _ I I , say tie revrsron— , Stalrns external behavior early in the postwar period was quite moderate' In 118 CHAPTER 5 The Cold War China, Stalin tried to restrain Mao Zedong’s communists from taking power; in the Greek civil war, he tried to restrain the Greek communists; and he allowed nonr communist governments to exist in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Finland. Revisionists come in two varieties that stress the first and second levels of explanation. Level one revisionists stress the importance of individuals and claim that Roosevelt's death in April 1945 was a critical event because American policy toward the Soviet Union became harsher after President Harry S. Truman took office. In May 1945, the United States so precipitously cut off the lend’lease prov gram of wartime aid that some ships bound for Soviet ports had to turn around in midocean. At the Potsdam Conference near Berlin in July 1945, Truman tried to intimidate Stalin by mentioning the atomic bomb. In the United States, the Demo— cratic Party gradually shifted from the left and center to the right. In 1948, Truman fired Henry Wallace, his secretary of agriculture, who urged better relations with the Soviets. At the same time, James Forrestal, Truman’s new secretary of defense, was a strong anticommunist. These revisionists say these personnel changes help explain why the United States became so antiaSoviet. The level two revisionists have a different answer. They see the problem not in individuals, but in the nature of US. capitalism. Gabriel and Joyce Kolko and William A. Williams, for example, argue that the American economy required expansionism and that the United States planned to make the world safe, not for democracy, but for capitalism. American economic hegemony could not tolerate any country that might try to organize an autonomous economic area. American leaders feared a repeat of the i930s because without external trade, there would be another Great Depression. According to level two revisionists, the Marshall Plan of aid to Europe was simply a way to expand the American economy. The Soviets were correct to reject it as a threat to their sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. In Williams’s words, Americans always favored an open'door policy in the interna« tional economy because they expected to walk through it. The posrrevisionisrs of the late 1970s and 19805, as exemplified by Yale historian John Lewis Gaddis, have yet another explanation that focuses on the structural level. They argue that the traditionalists and revisionists are both wrong because nobody was to blame for starting the Cold War. It was inevitable, or nearly so, because of the bipolar structure of the postwar balance of power. In 1939 there was a multipolar world with seven major powers, but after the destruction wreaked by World War 11, only two superpowers were left: the United States and the Soviet Union. Bipolarity plus the postwar weakness of the European states created a power vacuum into which the United States and the Soviet Union were drawn. They were bound to come into conflict and, therefore, say the postrevisionists, it is pointless to look for blame. The Soviets and the Americans had different goals at the end of the war. The Soviets wanted tangible possessions—~territory. Americans had intangible or milieu goalswthey were interested in the general context of world politics. Milieu goals clashed with possession goals when the United States promoted the global UN system while the Soviets sought to consolidate their sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. But these differences in style were no reason for Americans to feel sanctirnonious, say Roosevelt’s Policies I 19 the postrevisionists, for the United States benefited from the United Nations and with a majority of allies voting, was not very constrained by it. The Soviets ma frin had a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, but the United States also had a s lien; of influence in the Western Hemisphere and Western Europe. p The United States and the Soviet Union were both bound to expand say the postrevisionists, not because of the economic determinism that the revlisionists stress, but because of the age—old security dilemma of states in an anarchic system Neither the Americans nor the Soviets could allow the other to dominate Iiuro any more than Athens could afford to let the Corinthians gain control of Corc r‘g’s navy. As evidence, postrevisionists cite Stalin’s comment to a Yugoslav ledlder Mrlovan Djilas, in 1945: “This war is not as in the past; whoever occupies a territor ’ also irripuses on it his own social system. Everyone imposes his own system as far a: his army can reach."1 In other words, in an ideological bipolar world a state uses its military forces to impose societies similar to its own in order to enslire its securit‘ Roosevelt had said something similar to Stalin in the fall of 1944: “In this globzlll war there is literally no question, political or military, in which the United States is not interested.”2 Given this bipolar structure, say the postrevisionists a s iral of hostility set in: hard lines in one country bred hard lines in the other. Bdth bldgan to perceive the enemy as analogous to Hitler in the 19303. As perceptions became more rigid, the Cold War deepened. Since the end of the Cold War, a modest flow of documents from formerly inac’ cessibie Soviet archives has given new vigor to the debate over which side star-fed the confrontation. Gaddis, for example, has become increasingly convinced that the USSR was primarily responsible for the onset and the nature of the super ower conflict. He cites the ideological rigidity of Stalin and other Soviet leaders al: well as the Kremlin’s equally rigid commitment to maintaining a formal empii'e in its sphere of influence. Gaddis’s move back toward a traditionalist viewpoint has arv nered a skeptical reception in some scholarly quarters guaranteein that th d -‘ will continue into the foreseeable future. ’ g e 6 am ROOSEVELT’S POLICIES Franklin Roosevelt wanted to avoid the mistakes of World War I so instead of '1 Versailles—like peace, he demanded Germany's unconditional surrender He wanted a liberal trade system to avoid the protectionism that had damaged the “world (econ— omy in the 19305 and contributed to the onset of war. The United States would avoid its tendency toward isolationism that had been so damaging in the71\930s It would join a new and stronger League of Nations in the form of a United Nations with a powerful Security Council. Cordell Hull, U.S. secretary of state during most of the war, was a committed Wilsonian, and public opinion in the United States was strongly in favor of the United Nations. To promote his great design, Ronsevelt needed to maintain bipartisan domestic support for his international position. Externally, he needed to reassure Stalin that his security needs would be met by joining the United Nations. Roosevelt has hedn 12.0 CHAPTER 5 The Coid War accused of a naive approach to postwar planning. His design was not naive, but some of his tactics were. He placed too much faith in the United Nations, overestir mated the iikeiihood of American isolationism, and, most important, under— estimated Stalin. Roosevelt thought he could treat Stalin the way he would treat a fellow American politician, throwing his arm around him, bonding politician to politician. Roosevelt did not fully realize that Stalin, along with his men, was a totaiitarian “who in the name of the people, murdered millions of them; who to defend against Hider, signs a pact with him, divides the spoils of war with him, and like him, expels, exterminates, or enslaves neighboring peoples; who stands aside and fulrni» nates against the democracies as Germany moves west, and then blames them for not helping enough when Hitler moves east.” Roosevelt misinterpreted Stalin, but Roosevelt did not sell out American inter" ests at the Yaha Conference in 1945, as some later claimed. Roosevelt was not naive in all aspects of his policy. He tried to tie economic aid to political concessions by the Soviets, and refused to share the secrets of the atomic bomb with them. He was sim— ply realistic about who would have troops in Eastern Europe at the end of the war, and, therefore, who would have leverage in that region. Roosevelt’s mistakes were in thinking that Stalin saw the world his way, that he understood domestic politics in the United States, and that the same American political skills in which a leader blurred differences and appealed to friendship would work in dealing with Stalin. pawnswsmsm- The President acted as if genuine cooperation as the Americans understood the term were possibie both during and after the war. Roosevelt apparentiy had forgotten, if indeed he ever knew, that in Stalin‘s eyes, he was not all that different from Hitler, both of them being heads of powerful capitaiisr states whose longterm ambitions ciashed with those of the Kremlin. ———-William Taubman, Stalin's American Policy-a hmmmmm.mama..mswmm...mmamas.momma... Mastswmrswr.mm.memesmvmmmwmmmamawi STALIN’S POLICIES Stalin's immediate postwar plans were to tighten domestic control. World War II inflicted tremendous damage on the Soviet Union, not just the terrible losses of life and industry already described, but arise to the ideology of communism. Many in the Soviet Union collaborated with the Germans because of their deep resentment over the harshness of communist ruie. Germany’s invasion seriously weakened Stalin's control. Indeed, Stalin had to increase his appeals to Russian nationalism during the war because the weakened communist ideology was insufficient to motivate his people. Stalin’s isolationist policy at the end of the war was designed to cut off external infiuences from Europe and the United States. Stalin used the United States as an objective enemy, urging the Soviet peopie to tighten down, to pull in, yet developed a new strategy. Phases of the Conflict 121 to mistrust the outsiders. But it. does not follow th that actually developed. Stalin preferred some cooperation, eSpecially if it helped i Eastern Europe and brought: him some econom As a good communist, he believed the United nornic assistance because the capitalist system ha demand at home. Stalin also believed th at Stalin wanted the Cold War I rim pursue his goals in re assistance from the United States. States would have to give him ecov ‘ 1% to eirport capital due to insufficient I ‘ at rn or - ' a " " " ~ capitalist system would come along, and at that time they :1: ISldolf the recovered and be ready to benefit in the inevitable conflict with the ca Jit l't‘u lave In foreign policy terms, Stalin wanted to protect l I l I a MS‘ maintain the gains the Soviet Union had made in pact with Hitler. Stalin also wanted to u'mself at home, as weli as Eastern Europe from the 1939 there is no criSiS. In 1941 q, I. ‘ probe spots, something better done when I _ ' , t ta m told the British foreign minister Anthon Edn that he preferred arrthmetic to algebra; in other words, he wanted a rr'acti ll," 11“ Elfin a tlEeo-retical lrap-pipoach. When Winston Churchili proposed a forum: _ s:war L rvrsron o in'uence in the Balkans, that is some r' ' ' control, some under Soviet control, and others 50—56, StalinC jlzgimils‘h the idea. Some of Stalin’s early caution in supporting communist governmedt - V'L away in China, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary fit quite well with this a" l5 “gin rather than algebraic approach to achieving his objectives. Stalin was a com ' 'r ' ' ‘ f munrst who, although he saw the world Within the framework of communism o ten used pragmatic tactics. l } PHASE-IS OF THE CONFLICT The early stages of the Cold War can be divided into three phases: 1945—1947mthe gradual onset; 194?—-1949—~tl v de l.‘ " ' ' a ' [he [might-OHM COM war! so cc "nation of the Coid War; and 1950~l96ZW Neither Stalin nor Truman was lo ' _ okrng for a cold war. At the e d ' ' ' ll, Truman sent Roosevelt’s former aide, Harry Hopkins, Ln Of W01” Wfll arr‘a ' ' ’ I conpgemcpnts could be worked our. Even after the Potsdam Conference Truman . ' ‘ s ' - ‘ , nine to see Stalin as a moderate. Indeed, as late as 1949, he compared Stalin 1(o hrs Iv(Eld friend Biossgtérrdergast in Kansas Crty. In 1946, George Kennan writing rom oscow as t 1e embassy’s ch ' ’ ' " ' ' l .t . . arge d affaires, was tryrn ' ' ' A I ' p . - 5 I . g to warn American :ccrsrolrci makers abriut SEalrn’s true natrrre and intentions, and Winston Churchill rave a amous speec r in ulton M' “ " ' , rssourr, warning that an “iron cu " ' " ' ‘ ~ ‘ rtarn was fallrn I acr r ‘ ‘ ' ‘ c oss Europe. Whrle Secretary of State ,lames Byrnes was still trying to negotiate i postwar treaty with the Soviets, Truman asked his aide Clark Clifford to 'J ' ' report on what the Soviets were really planning. Clifford talked with plipzlle people and concluded that Kennan was right: the Soviets were roinratvauew 0d whenever they found an inexpensive opportunity. When Trurnin tier: exlpal1= report in December 1946, however, he told Clifford he did not want itsv widely known, for he was still trying to follow Roosevelt’s great design and had not to Moscow to see if some 122 CHAPTER 5 The Cold War Six issues contributed to eventual change of American strategy and the onset of the Cold War. One was Soviet actions in Poland and Eastern Europe. Poland, of course, had been one of the precipitating causes of World War 1i, and Americans believed that Stalin broke a clear commitment to hold free elections in Poland after the war. l'iowever, it was not clear what Stalin had agreed to do. When Stalin and Roosevelt met at Tehran in 1943, Roosevelt raised the Polish issue, but he appealed to Stalin in the context of the 1944 American election: He had an election coming up, there were many Polish’American voters, and he needed to tell them there would be elections in Poland after the war. Stalin, who never worried about elections in the Soviet Union, did not take Roosevelt's concerns seriously. The February 1945 Yaita agreement was aiso somewhat ambiguous, and Stalin stretched the meaning as far as he could by setting up a puppet government in Warsaw after Soviet troops had driven out the Germans. The Americans felt cheated, bui: Stalin felt the Americans would adjust to the reality that Soviet troops had liberated Poiand. In May 1945, the lend—lease aid program was abruptly stopped, and the economic. relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union became strained. The precipitous termination of lendvlease was to some extent a bureaucratic mistake, but the overall situation was not improved when in February 1946 the United States refused Soviet requests for loans. The Soviets interpreted those acts as economic leverage for hostile purposes. Germany was a third problem. At the Yalta meeting, the Americans and the Soviets agreed that Germany should pay $20 billion in reparations, with haif going to the Soviet Union. The details of how and when the payments woriid be made were not worked out at Yalta, although both sides agreed they would be negotiated later. At the Potsdam meeting in July 1945, the Soviets demanded their $10 billion; furthermore, they wanted it from the western zones of Germany that the Americans, British, and French had occupied. Harry Truman, worried about how Germany wouid be reconstructed, said that if the Soviets wanted to take $10 billion out of Germany, they should take it out of the eastern zone they occupied; if there was anything ieft over after the reconstruction of the western side of Germany, he would lei: the Soviets know. Thus began a series of divisions between the Americans and the Soviets about how to reconstruct Germany. The Americans, along with the British and French, created a single currency in the western zones, starting the process of West German integration, which in turn caused the Soviets to tighten control of the eastern zone of Germany. East Asia was aiso an issue. The Soviets were neutral in the Pacific until the last week of the war. Then the Soviets declared war on }apan, seizing Manchuria anti four islands from the north of japan. At Potsdam, the Soviets asked for an occupa— tion zone in Japan, like the American occupation zone in Germany. Truman’s response was, in effect, that the Soviets arrived at the party late, so no zone. From an American point of view, this seemed perfectly reasonable, but: the situation reminded the Soviets of Eastern Europe, where the Americans wanted free elections and influence, but the Soviet armies had arrived there first. So the Soviets saw the Far Eastern situation as analogous to Eastern Europe, while the Americans saw it as one more example of the Soviets pressing for their own expansion. Phases of the Conflict 12.3 A fifth issue was the atomic bomb. Roosevelt had decided not to share the sec of the atomic bomb with the Soviet Union. Most historians now agree that T' in dropped the bomb at Hiroshima and Nagasaki primarily to bring a quick end 1tumlm war With Japan, not to intimidate the Soviet Union, as some revisionists (1) He claimed. But he did expect the bomb to have some political effects. At the Pot dive meeting when Truman told Stalin that America had an atomic bomb Sstrl'm remained poker faced and seemingly unimpressed. Of course Stalin alread kid‘m about it from his own spies, but: his equaniinity was a bit of a felt to the Al Y" null In 1946, when the United States set forth the Baruch Plan for UN control ofellcll:n: weapons, Stalin rejected it because he wanted to build his own bomb As he nuc'ml bombunder international control would still be an American bomb for osalv itha Americans knew how to build it. Stalin believed it would be far better f 'nSy t' security to have their own (which they eventually exploded in 1949} 01 own The sixth issue concerned countries in the eastern Mediterranean and ti M'd dle East, where the British had been influential before World War 11 After ti: 1 several things occurred. First, the Soviets refused to remove their troops from e ill-ll, erirlran in March 1946. The United States supported Iran in a debate witht'mui" United Nations. The Soviets eventually moved, but not without a gtfod deal “f Sm ter'ness over the event. The Soviet Union also began to put pressure on Tu 'ko neighbor to the south, at the same time that the communists seemed to be wiey" I“ the crvrl war in Greece. Once again, the West believed the Soviets were ex willng These SiXfilSSUeS were real, though some misperceptions were involved ill a1 n g. all of them. Could they have been solved by negotiation and appeasement? W10 OIsl appeasement have worked? Probably not. Kennan argued that: Stalin was intentLl E probing any soft spots. Appeasement would have been interpreted as a slift s not soil inl’lde more probing. In June 1946, Maxim Litvinov, the former Sovietlfo '1: minister, warned an American counterpart against any concessions because [1 rélgn‘ cause of the tension was “the ideological conception prevailing here that chill:PL bethen Communist and capitalist worlds is inevitable.” Concessions wouid me llt iead to the West's being faced, after a more or less short time with the next r"? of derriands."5 Appeasement probably would not have worked, but harder b el‘leb mg might have limited some of the events that led to the onsei of thd Cold WgailnA tactical appeal to Stalin’s pragmatism from a firmer American position ius agiii'll ingness to negotiate, might have worked out better in that early pepriod frdiri 1945—1947. The second phase, the declaration of the Cold War from 19474949 foil d from the problems in Greece and Turkey (Figure 5.1). Britain severe] we'lk- l: World War 11, felt it could no longer provide security in the elastern Myedife Sm Y The. United States had to decide whether to let a vacuum deveio 1 or touanlan' ElgfillshéDOWErfby pl'OViéiing assistance to Greece and Turkey. This invblved a giggle r e rea rorn tra itional American forei n 7 ' . ' ‘ u American public opinion would support such indiftllCThiil:Eilsilfisfdhilthu? tllaa tronism would be the mainstay of America’s postwar foreign policy rli‘umal1 Isl: ad Senator Arthur Vandenberg, the Republican leader from Michi ah wh tl1 3‘5 Senate would go along with aiding Greece and Turkey. VandenSerg said3 Note how the leadership of the \‘Vcst changed. ' Potsdam 1945 i in Europe of the superpowers, Summer 1945. .. This map shows the meeting General election in Britain, 1945, saw defeat :itain and United States sent ofChurchiil. Attica became Premier. aid to Greece and Turkey, in. the hope that communism would not give Russia direct access to the take over these countries and thus Mediterranean Sea. ofRussia until his Stalin was dictator dcathin 1953. Roosevelt cued 1945, Truman became US. P csident B 'Ailsahm ' communist, he refused to be dictated to by Stalin. I A o. L 'I .H 0 =3 is g i: - cox m I'9 a“; a Q32? 5;: _: 233 as m " 0‘ $52 I: B -~§"" vs ,3 55} L-3— 13% E :g E3 U 0 no DU ‘:>‘ U Iggifi Pg 35:. o g} H 22:3:3 fi£<§ H6 til—l L '5 U) u: 13 E g as 2' c U: ‘E'fi'fifi g? " mints N.“ 5mm ' NEE L3 *OO' “Lug” 13s .2..- .agn v 2‘ Q $28.5 95,: .UEE mwfig 3”“ viii 5-"3 as; sass if. away“ EVER? “at: E>‘BE 2‘2 8533:». '53-” gob 24:00 1'. meuu 11.5; :5» 0mm l 58*” “Si is“ its n ,{E Enqfig Egg 8&3 {3.410494 a rim E‘fix. s. Egg Ugl$ :1 UEEE ‘33“: {Egg g l" 0"” 1"“ - _ n, ;.P 124 Phases of the Conflict 125 would have to “scare the hell out of them” to get congressional support for this break in traditional American policy. Thus when Truman explained the policy change, he did not talk about the need to maintain a balance of power in the east— ern Mediterranean by providing aid to Greece and Turkey. Instead, he talked about the need to protect free people everywhere. This moralistic, ideologicai explanation for American assistance became known as the Truman Doctrine. George Kennan, by then back in the State Department, objected to this ideo— logical approach to formulating foreign policy, arguing that it was too open-ended and wouid get the United States into trouble. Indeed, there were enormous ambigu» ities in the policy of containment that flowed from the Truman Doctrine. Was the United States interested in containing Soviet power or communist ideology? At the beginning, containing Soviet power and containing communist ideology seemed to be the same, but later in the Cold War when the communist movement split, the ambiguities became important. Was Truman wrong to exaggerate the sense of threat and the ideologicai rationale for the policy change? Some observers feel it is harder to change public opinion in democracies than it is to change policies in totalitarian countries. They argue that exaggeration speeds up the process of change in democracies. It is necessary to tug harder on the reins when trying to turn an unruly team of horses. Regardless of whether the exaggeration was necessary, it heiped change the nature of the Cold War. In June 1947, Secretary of State George Marshali announced a plan for eco— nomic aid to Europe. The initiai proposal of the Marshall Plan invited the Soviet Union and the Eastern Europeans to join if they wished, but Stalin put strong pres— sure on the Eastern Europeans not to do so. Stalin saw the Marshall Plan not as American generosity, but as an economic battering ram to destroy his security bar» tier in Eastern Europe. When Czechoslovakia indicated it would iikc US. aid, Stalin tightened the screws in Eastern Europe, and the communists took. full pOWer in CzechOsiovakia in February i948. Truman heard echoes of the 19303 in these events. He began to worry that Stalin would become another Hitler. The United States advanced plans for West German currency reform; Staiin replied with the Berlin blockade. The United States answered with an airlift and began plans for the North Atlantic Treaty Orgm nizarion (NATO). Hostility began to escalate in a tit—fontar fashion. The most rigid phase of the Cold War occurred after two shocks in 1949: the Soviet Union exploded an atomic bomb, much sooner than some American leaders thought they could, and the Chinese Communist Party took control of mainland China, forcing the Nationalists to retreat to the isiand of Taiwan. The alarm in Washington was iliustrated by a secret government document, Nationai Security Councii DoCument 68 (NSC'68), which forecast a Soviet attack in four to five years as part of a plan for global domination. NSC—68 called for a vast increase in the US. defense expenditure. Beset by budget problems, President Truman resisted NSC’68 until j‘une 1950, when North Korea’s troops crossed the border into South Korea. The effect of the Korean War was like pouring gasoline onto a modest fire. It confirmed ali the worst Western suspicions about Stalin’s expansionist ambitions and led to a huge increase in the American defense budget, which Truman had 126 CHAPTERS The Cold War gwxb-VMIJMNi-Wlwaflxébflwdtxw: sums“.i.uismsmammummmw. ' The purpose of NSC—68 was to so bludgeon the mass mind of "top government” that not only could the President make a decision but that the decision could be carried out. Even so, it is doubtful whether anything like what happened in the next few years could have i been done had not the Russians been stupid enough to have instigated the attack against E South Korea and opened the "hate America" campaign. j Mewmmmmsm, “AN/"WWW,chmanhunt/Minus“ maywnmmummmmw» mgmpmmwug r wSecretm-y of State Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation5 nemwnuoemmmwwanna-marwa Urxeiuwawl-NYJAH'AANN'KQN waninvfiwzuchJ-‘a an“snag-adamna-MVnI-YvamVJAvwa-v:rz'tt m-JKEW/ztmzmam‘vsrm . “fiauawmuvn 27.1: (i resisted up to that point. Why did Stalin permit North Korea to invade South Korea? Khrushchev gives an explanation in his memoirs: Kim Il Sung, the North Korean leader, pressed Staiin for the opportunity to unify the peninsula. The United States had said Korea was outside its defense perimeter; Secretary of State Dean Acheson had articulated this position and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had planned accordingly. To Stalin, Korea looked like a soft spot. But when North Korea actually crossed into South Korea, Truman responded in an axiomatic rather than a calculating way: Truman remembered Hitler moving into the Rhineland and recailed the axiom that aggression must be resisted everywhere. Caicuiated plans about defense perimeters were overshadowed by the historical analogies triggered by North Korea’s invasion. The United States was able to mobilize the UN Security Council to endorse collective security (which was possible because the Soviet Union was then boycotting the Security Council) and sent troops to Korea under the UN flag to push the communists back above the thirty'eighth parallel that bisected the Korean peninsula. At first, North Korea’s armies swept down the peninsula almost to the tip. In September 1950, however, an American amphibious landing at lnchon, haifway up the peninsula, routed the North Koreans. Had the United States stopped there, it could have claimed vicrory by restoring the preinvasion status quo, but Truman suc— combed to domestic pressures to pursue the retreating communist troops north of the thirty'eighth parallel. As the Americans approached the Yalu River, which divides Korea from China, the Chinese communists intervened, pushing the UN troops back to the middle of the peninsula. There the battle stalemated bloodily for three years until a truce was signed in 1953. The United States had become embroiled with China, and communism appeared to be monolithic. At home, the frustrating war led to domestic division and the rise of McCarthyism, named after the harsh and poorly founded accusations of domestic communist subversion made by Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin. The Cold War blocs tightened and communication nearly ceased. INEVITABILITY? Was the onset of the Cold War inevitable? The postrevisionists are correct if we relax the interpretation of inevitability to mean “highly probable.“ The bipoiar structure made it iikely that both sides would be sucked into a power vacuum in Europe and find it diffir Inevitabiliiy? 12 7 USSR. [:3 Countries under communist eonrroi by 1949 Events in East Asia. 19454949 Soviet troops Manchuria invade) 1945 ‘ ‘I UN Forces in Korea 32 countries sent aid to South Korea during 1950—1953. The first 16 to respond were: 1 USA. 2 Australia 3 Canada 4 S. Africa 5 New Zealand 6 France 7 Colombia ll Ethiopia 9 Greece 10 Thailand 11 Belgium 12 United Kingdom 13 Turkey 14 Philippines 15 Luxembourg 16 Holland Surrender of Japan, August 1945 Victory of Chinese communists in 1949 American troops com S Korea MANCHURIA MANCI-‘IURIA Chinese 5th Field Army Yalu River Yaiu River / ../ «.7 ea us. X Certs Chinese 4th Field Army UN inndin :, Sepl. 195 War in Korea 06f. l950w l953 l'MleAllcy" L5 The Static War, 1951—1953 % Farrliesr advance of Chinese communist troops, 1950-4951 War in Korea '2: to Oct. l950 Area of S. Korea captured by com- munists in 1950 FIGURE 5.2 The Early Days of the Cold War in Asia cultto disengage. The intense ideological climate hampered the Working of the United Nations, restricted clear communication, and contributed to the immoderate rocess of the international system. Under such systemic conditions, conflicts would h'ipve ar' - over the six issues iust identified, or some others, and proven difficult to resolve 15m 128 CHAPTER 5 The Cold War The postrevisionists rely too heavily, however, on systemic explanation. Perhaps some Cold War was inevitable, but its depth was not. After all, there were different phases of the hostility, and since the bipolarity of the system did not change until 1989, structural explanations cannot explain the different phases or depth of the hostility. That is where individuals and domestic politics matter—Roosevelt and Truman, Stalin and Khrushchev. Domestic politics have to be considered to fully understand the extent of the Cold War. The revisionists are right to focus on domes tic questions, but they are wrong to focus so strongly on economic determinism. More important was the role of ideology and exaggeration in domestic politics. Stalin used ideology because of Soviet domestic problems after the war, and Truman exaggerated the nature of the communist threat in order to rally support for changing American foreign policy. The use of 1930s analogies helped reinforce rigidity on both sides. ironically, alternative strategies at different times might have alleviated the depths of hostility. For example, if the United States had followed Kennan’s advice and responded more firmly in 19454941 and had tried more pragmatic negotiation and communication from l947wl950, Cold War tensions might not have mounted to the extent they did in the early 19503. LEVELS OF ANALYSIS The origins of the Cold War can be described in terms of the different images or levv els of analysis as illustrated in Figure 5.3. in the nineteenth. century, Alexis de Tocqueville (1805—1859) predicted that Russia and the United States were bound to become two great continental'scale giants in the world. Realists might thus prediCt that these two would become locked in some form of conflict. And of course, in 1917, the Boishevik Revolution added an ideological layer to the conflict. When Woodrow Wilson first heard of the Russian Revolution, he congratulated the Russian people for their democratic spirit. But it did not take long before the Americans were accusing the Bolsheviks of regicide, expropriation, and cooperation with Germany in World War I. The United States added a small contingent: of troops to an Allied intervention, allegedly to keep the Russians in the war against Germany, but the Soviets saw it as an attempt to strangle communism in its cradle. Despite these differences, the United States and the Soviet Union avoided serious conflict in the interwar period and became allies in the early 19405. The bipolariry that followed the col’ lapse of all the other great powers in World War II and the resulting power vac, uum changed the relationship. Earlier there had been distrust between the two countries, but they distrusted each other at a distance. Before World War II they could avoid each other, but after 1945 they were face to face, Europe was divided, and deep conflict began after 1947. Some people wonder whether the bipolar structure had to have this effect. After all, the Soviet Union was a land; based power, while the United States was a maritime power; why could there not have been a division of labor between the bear and the whale, each staying in its own domain? Levels of Analysis 129 IMAGE 2 wk Domestic Soviet Union IMAGE 1 weakened by war Individual Ti liter . . g . Stalin's ideological M nmnoia controls 1 I 'l'ruman's fear ofU.S. isolationism Exaggerated rhetoric World War » Bipolarity lI Reduced communication Ideological process IMAGE 3 systemic Cold \Nar BUT: unlike 1914. no spark ..s, of war Small states under close rein PlGURE 5.3 Causes of the Cold War Few alliance shifts and less uncertainty The answer is that the key stakes in world politics, the countries that could ti 1 the balance of power, were located on the peripheries of the Soviet Union partictf: larly Europe and Japan. As George Kennan described the situation after’the war there were four great areas of technological and industrial creativity which if the, were allied one way or the other, could tip the global balance of power, Thos: were the United States, the Soviet Union, Europe, and Japan. The fact that‘Furo‘e and Japan became allied with the United States against the Soviet Union was [if profound importance. Systemic explanations predicted conflict, not how deep it would go (Figure 5 3) For that we need to go beyond systems explanations to look at the societal and individ: ual levels of analysis and constructivist explanations. At the societal level the two countries were very different from each other. A thumbnail sketch of the Soviet Union’s political culture and its expression in foreign policy showed two roots Russian and communist. Constructivists point out that the Russian political culture emphasized absolutisrn rather than dernoeracy, a desire for a strong leader, fear of anarchy (Russia been a large unwieldy empire, and the fear that anarchy and dissent could lead to dismtegration was very real), fear of invasion (Russia was a geographically vulnerable landhased power that had invaded and been invaded by its neighbors throughout the centuries), a worry or shame about bacl<wardness (ever since Peter the Great Russians had been trying to prove their vitality in international competition) and secrec (a desire to hide the seamy side of Russian life). In addition, the communist systeifi treated class rather than individual rights as the basis for justice. The proper role for 130 CHAPTER 5 The Cold War a person or for a society was to lead the proletariat or working class toward dominance because this was supposed to be the course of history. The ideological overlay gave an additional outward thrust to traditional Russian imperialism and resulted in a secret and tightly held foreign policy process. It is inter” esting to note the strengths and weaknesses of that process. The strengths were evident in 1939 when Stalin was able to quickly sign the nonaggression pact with Hitler. Public opinion did not constrain him, and he did not have to worry about a bureaucracy holding him back. He was free to rush into the pact with Hitler while the British and French were still dithering about whether or not to deal with him. The opposite side of the same coin became evident in 1941, however, when Hitler attacked the Soviet Union. Stalin was unable to believe Hitler would do such a thing and went into a deep depression for more than a week. The result was disastrous for Soviet defenses in the early phases of the war. In contrast, the American political culture emphasized liberal democracy, pluv ralism, and fragmentation of power. Instead of shame of backwardness, the United States took pride in its technology and expanding economy. Instead of a fear of invasion, for much of its history, the United States had been able to isolate itself between two oceans (and behind the British navy) while it invaded its weaker neighbors. In terms of secrecy, the United States was so open that governmental documents often reached the press within a matter of days and weeks. Instead of a class basis for conceptions of justice, there was a strong emphasis on individual justice. The foreign policy that resulted from this political culture was moralistic, public, and tended to oscillate between inward and outward orientation. The result was that the American foreign policy process was often inconsistent and incoherr ent in many of its surface aspects. But there was also an opposite side to this coin. The strengths of openness and pluralism often protected the United States from deeper mistakes. Thus it is not surprising that these two societies, so differently organized and with such different foreign policy processes, would confuse each other. We saw examples of that in the way both Roosevelt and Truman dealt with Stalin in the 1940s. It was difficult for the Americans to understand the Soviet Union during the Cold War because the Soviet Union was like a black box. American leaders could see what went in and what came out of the box, but not what happened inside. The Americans confused the Soviets as well. The Americans were like a white noise machine that produced so much background noise that it was difficult to hear the true signals clearly. There were too many people saying too many things. Thus the Soviets were often confused about what the Americans really wanted. US. AND SOVIET GOALS IN THE COLD WAR The Soviets were often accused of being expansionist, of being a revolutionary power rather than a status quo power. The Soviet Union also tended to want tangi' ble or possession goals such as territory, whereas the Americans tended to want intangible or milieu goals—«——vvays of establishing the general setting of international Containment 131 politics. We can see this in the demands that Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt brought to the bargaining table at Yalta. Stalin had very clear objectives at Yalta: Germany and Poland. Churchill wanted the restoration of France to help balance Soviet power in case the Americans went home. Roosevelt wanted the United Nations and an open international economic system. These goals were very differ- ent in their tangihility. In some ways, Stalin‘s postwar goals were classic Russian imperialist goals; he wanted to keep the gains he had made in the treaty with Hitler. His wish list would have been familiar to Peter the Great. Some Americans thought the Soviets were as expansionist as Hitler in desiring world domination. Others said the Soviets were basically security oriented; their expansion was defensive. There were at least two ways in which Soviet expansionv ism was not like Hitler’s. First, it was not bellicist; the Soviets did not want war. When Hitler invaded Poland, he worried he would be offered another Munich instead of the war he wanted for the glory of fascism. Another difference was that the Soviet Union was cautiously opportunistic, not recklessly adventuresome. Adventutism was seen as a sin against communism because it might disrupt the pre’ dicted course of history. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union was never as belli' cist or as reckless as Hitler was. Nonetheless, there are problems in portraying Soviet behavior as purely defen— sive. As we know from the Peloponnesian War, it is very hard in a bipolar world to distinguish offense from defense. Certain actions may have defensive motives but may look very threatening to the other side. Moreover, there is a long tradition of defensive expansion, or imperialism. For example, in the nineteenth century, Britain originally went into Egypt to protect the sea routes to India. After it took Egypt, it thought it had to take the Sudan to protect Egypt, and then it had to take Uganda to protect the Sudan. After it took Uganda, Britain had to take Kenya to build a railway to protect Uganda. The appetite grows with the eating as the secu' rity dilemma is used to justify further and further expansion. Soviet communism added an ideological motive of freeing working classes in all areas of the world, which further legitimized expansion. In short, the Soviet Union was expansionist during the Cold War, but cautiously and opportunistically so. CONTAINMENT What about US. goals? During the Cold War, the US. government wanted to con, tain the Soviet Union. Yet the policy of containment involved two large ambiguir ties. One was the question of the ends: whether to contain Soviet power or to contain communism. The second was a question of means: whether to spend resources to prevent any expansion of Soviet power or just in certain key areas that seemed critical to the balance of power. Those two ambiguities in the ends and means of containment were hotly debated in the period before the Korean War. George Kennan dissented from the rather expansive version of containment that Truman proclaimed. Kennan’s idea of containment was akin to classical diplomacy. It involved fewer military means and was more selective. A good example was 132 CHAPTER 5 The Cold War 3‘. It would be an exaggeration to say that Ame can behavior unassisted and alone couid exercise a power of life and death over the Communist movement and bring about the ‘ early fall of Soviet power in Russia. But the United States has it in its power to increase enormously the strains under which Soviet policy must operate, to force upon the Kremiin ' a far greater degree ofmoderation and circumspeetion than it has had to observe in recent E years, and in this way to promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the breakup or the gradual meilowing of Soviet power. E -—George Kantian, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct"? 3er w Marduk» shat-rmme st:wavy»:-r-naw-«tcmawxw. gamma-aw sm- nmwnmxwxmemmmzmmmm A (>A'<'.>.‘>:.¢r.'1.'1# Yugoslavia, which had a communist totalitarian government under Josip Tito.‘ In 1948, Tito split with Staiin over Soviet efforts to control Yugoslavia's foreign policy, including its support for the Greek communists. According to an ideologically driven containment policy, the United States should not help Yugoslavia because it was communist. But in a containment policy driven by balance-ofvpower considera tions, the United States should help Yugoslavia as a means of weakening Soviet power. That, in fact, is what the United States did. it provided military aid to a totalitarian communist government despite the fact that the Truman Doctrine proclaimed the goal of defending free peoples everywhere. The United States did this for balance'of-power reasons, and the policy put a big dent in Soviet power in Europe. After the Korean War, however, Kennan‘s approach to containment lost grOund. Then it looked as though the NSC—68 predictions of Soviet expansionism had been justified. Communism seemed monolithic after the Chinese entered the Korean War, and the rhetoric of containment emphasized the ideological goal of preventing the spread of communism. In this context, the United States made the costly mistake of becoming involved in Vietnam’s civil war. For nearly two decades (19554973), the United States tried to prevent: communist control of Vietnam, at a cost of 58,000 American lives, more than a million Vietnamese lives, $600 billion, and domestic turmoil that undercut support for the policy of containment itself. In addition to containing comn'iunism in South Vietnam, the United States feared that a defeat might weaken the credibility of its glohai military commitments, and thus containment in other parts of the world. ironically, after the US. defeat and withdrawal from Vietnam in 1975, nationalist rivalries among the communist coun: tries in Asia proved to be an effective force for maintaining the balance of power in the region. THE REST OF THE COLD WAR in 1952, Dwight Eisenhower was elected president on a campaign pledge to end the Korean War and to roil back communism. The Republican Party argued that con! tainment was a cowardly accommodation to communism. The right approach was The Rest of the Cold War 133 to roll back communism. Within six months, hoWever, it became clear that rolling back communism was too risky in terms of precipitating nuclear war. After Stalin died in 1953, the frozen relations of the Cold War thawed slightly. In 1955, there was a U.S.-Soviet summit in Geneva anti both sides agreed to the establishment of Austria as a neutral state. in 1956, Khrushchev gave a secret. speech exposing Stalin’s crimes to the Twentieth Party Congress of the Soviet Union. The secret leaked out and contributed to a period of disarray in the Soviet sphere in Eastern Europe. Hungary attempted to revolt, but the Soviets intervened militarily to keep it within the communist camp. Khrushchev decided he needed to get the Americans out of Berlin and reach a final settlement of World War [I so he could consolidate the Soviet hold on Eastern Europe and begin to take advantage of the decoionization occurring in the Third World. But Khrushchev's style and efforts to negotiate with the United States wore reminiscent of the Kaiser’s style in trying to force the British to bargain before l9l4, full of blaster and deception. Efforts to make the United States come to terms had the opposite effect. Khrushchev failed in the Berlin crisis of 19584961 and again in the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. As we see later, the Soviet Union and the United States came so close to the nuclear brink during the Cuban Missile Crisis that they scared each other into a new phase in their relationship. From 1963 to 1978, there was a graduai detente, or relaxation of tensions. In the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, arms controi negotiations produced the Limited Test Ban Treaty that limited atmospheric nuclear tests in 1963 and the Nuciear Non—Proliferation Treaty in 1968. Trade began to grow gradually, and detente seemed to be expanding. The Vietnam War diverted US. attention more to the threat from Chinese communism. From 1969 to 1974, the Nixon administration used derente as a means to pur— sue the goals of containment. After the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviets launched a major miiitary buildup and gained parity in nuclear weapons. The Vietnam War led to the American pubiic’s disillusionment with Cold War interventions. Nixon’s strategy was (1) to negotiate a strategic arms control treaty with the Soviet Union to cap each nation’s nuclear arsenal at relative parity; (2) to open diplomatic reia- tions with China and thus create a threevway balance of power in Asia (rather than pushing the Soviets and the Chinese together); (3) to increase trade so there would be carrots as well as sticks in the U.S.—Soviet relationship; and (4) to use “linkage” to tie the various parts of poiicy together. The high point of detente occurred in 1972 and i973, but it did not last very long. The Middle East War of 1973 and Soviet assistance to anti’Western move- ments in Africa led to bad feelings about who misled whom. American domestic politics contributed to the decline of detente when American legislators such as Senator Henry Jackson tried to link trade with the Soviet Union to human rights iSsues, such as the treatment of Soviet Jews, rather than to behavior in balance of power terms. in 1975, when Portugal decolonized Angoia and Mozambique, the Soviet Union transported Cuban troops to help keep communist/oriented governv ments in power there. By the 1976 presidential campaign, President Gerald Ford never used the word déiente. l'iis successor, Jimmy Carter, tried to continue detente 134 CHAPTER 5 The Cold War with the Soviet Union during his first two years in office, but the Soviet Union and Cuba became invoived in the Ethiopian civii war, the Soviets continued their defense buildup, and in December 1979 the Soviet Union delivered the coup de grace to détente by invading Afghanistan. Why was there a resurgence in the level of hostility? One argument is that detente was always oversold, that too much was expected of it. More to the point is that there were three trends in the 1970s that undercut it. One was the Soviet military buildup, in which the Soviets increased their defense spending by nearly 4 percent annually and introduced new heavy missiles that particularly worried American defense pianners. Second was the Soviet interventions in Angola, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan. The Soviets thought that these military actions were justified by what they called the changing “correlation of forces” in history, their belief that history was moving in the directions that Marxism-Leninism predicted. Third were changes in American domestic politics, a rightward trend that tore apart the coalition supporting the Democratic Party. The result of the interaction of Soviet acts and US. political trends confirmed the view that the Cold War perv sisted, that détente could not last. However, the renewed hostility in the 19805 was not a return to the Cold War of the 19505. There was a return to the rhetoric of the 1950s, but actions were quite different. Even though President Ronald Reagan talked about the Soviet Union as an “evil empire,” he pursued arms control agree, ments. There was increased trade, particularly in grain, and there were constant contacts between Americans and Soviets. The superpowers even evolved certain rules of prudence in their behavior toward each other: no direct wars, no nuclear use, and discussions of arms and the control of nuclear weapons. It was a different kind of Cold War in the 198st than in the 19505. THE END OF THE COLD WAR When did the Coid War end? Because the origins of the Cold War were very heavy ily related to the division of Europe by the United States and the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War might be dated by when the division ended in 1989. When the Soviet Union did not use force to support the communist government in East Germany and the Beriin Wall was pierced by jubilant crowds in November 1989, the Cold War could be said to be over. But why did it end? One argument is that containment worked. George Kennan argued right after World War II that if the United States could prevent the Soviet Union from expanding, there would be no successes to feed the ideology, and grade ally Soviet communism would mellow. New ideas would arise, people would realize that communism was not the wave of the future, that history was not on its side. in some larger respect, Kennan was right. American military power helped deter Soviet expansion while the soft power of American culture, values, and ideas eroded communist ideology. But the puzzle of timing remains: Why 1989? Why did it last four decades? Why did it take so long to mellow? Alternatively, why didn't it last another ten years? Containment worked, but that does not give the full answer. The End of the Cold War 135 Another explanation is “imperiai overstretch.” The Yale historian Paul Kennedy has argued that empires overexpand until that overexpansion saps the empire’s internal strength. With more than a quarter of its economy devoted to defense and foreign affairs (compared to 6 percent for the United States in the 19805), the Soviet Union was overstretched. But Kennedy went on to say that none of the overexpanded multinational empires in history ever retreated to their own ethnic base until they had been defeated or weakened in a great potver war. The Soviet Union, however, was not defeated or weakened in a great power war. A third explanation is that the US. military buildup in the 19805 forced the Soviets to sun render in the Cold War. There is some truth to that insofar as President Ronald Reagan’s poiicies dramatized the extent to which the Soviets were imperially over— stretched, but it does not really answer the basic question. After all, earlier periods of American military buildup did not have that effect. Why 1989? We must iook for deeper causes, because to think that American rhetoric and policy in the 1980s were the prime cause of the Seviet Union’s decline may be simiiar to the rooster who thought that his crowing before dawn caused the sun to come up—-—another example of the fallacy of spurious causation. We can gain more exact insights into the timing of the end of the Cold War by looking at our three types of causes: precipitating, intermediate, and deep. The most important precipitating cause of the end of the Cold War was an individual, Mikhail Gorbachev. He wanted to reform communism, not replace it. However, the reform snowballed into a revolution driven from below rather than controlled from above. In both his domestic and foreign policy, Gorbachev launched a number of actions that acceierated both the existing Soviet deciine and the end of the Cold War. When he first came to power in 1985, Gorbachev tried to discipline the Soviet peopie as a way to Overcome the existing economic stagnation. When discipline was not enough to soive the probiem, he launched the idea of perestroilcti, or “restructur— ing,” but he was unable to restructure from the top because the Soviet bureaucrats kept thwarting his orders. To light a fire under the bureaucrats, he used a strategy of glasnost, or open discussion and democratization. Gorbachev believed that airing people’s discontent with the way the system was working would put pressure on the bureaucrats and help perestroika work. But once glasnost and democratization let people say what they were thinking, and vote on it, many people said, “We want out. There is no new form of Soviet citizen. This is an imperial dynasty, and we do not belong in this empire.” Gorbachev unleashed the disintegration of the Soviet Union, which became increasingly evident after the failed coup by hardaliners in August 1991. By December 1991, the Soviet Union ceased to exist. Gorbachev’s foreign policy, which he cailed “new thinking,” also contributed to the end of the Cold War. This policy had two very important elements. One was changing ideas that constructivists emphasize, such as the concept of common secuc rity in which the classical security dilemma is escaped by ioining together to provide security. Gorbachev and the people around him said that in a world of increasing interdependence, security was a non—zerorsum game, and all c0uld benefit through cooperation. The existence of the nuclear threat meant all could perish together if the competition got out of hand. Rather than try to build as many nuclear weapons 136 CHAPTER 5 The Cold War Bush, Reagan, and Gorbachev in New York, 1987 as possible, Gorbachev proclaimed a doctrine of “sufficiency,” holding a minimal number for protection. The other dimension of Gorbachev’s foreign policy change was his view that expansionism is usually more costly than beneficial. The Soviet control over an empire in Eastern Europe was costing too much and providing too little benefit, and the invasion of Afghanistan had been a costly disaster. It was no longer necessary to impose a communist social system as a way to ensure security on Soviet borders. Thus by the summer of 1989, the Eastern Europeans were given more degrees ‘of freedom. Hungary allowed East Germans to escape through its territory into Austria. This exodus of East Germans put enormous pressure on the East German government. Additionally, Eastern European governments no longer had the nerve (or Soviet backing) to put down demonstrations. In November, the Berlin Wall was pierced a dramatic conclusion to a crescendo of events occurring over a very short period. We can argue that these events stemmed from Gorbachev’s iniscalculations. He thought communism could be repaired, but in fact, in trying to repair it, he punched a hole in it. And like a hole in a dam, the pent-up pressures began to escape, rapidly increasing the opening and causing the entire system to collapse. That still leaves the question, “Why 1989.7 Why under this leader?” To some extent, Gorbachev was an accident of history. in the early 1980s, three old Soviet leaders died, one soon after the other. It was not until 1985 that the younger genep ation, the people who had come up under Khrushchev, the sovcalled generation of 1956, had their chance. But if the members of the Communist Party Poiithuro had _ chosen one of Gorbachev’s hardvline competitors in 1985, it is quite plausible that The End of the Cold War 137 the declining Soviet Union could have held on for another decade. It did not have to collapse so quickly. Gorbachev’s personality explains much of the timing. As for the intermediate causes, Kennan and Kennedy are both on target. Two important: intermediate causes were soft power of liberal ideas, emphasized in con« structivist explanations, and imperial overstretch, emphasized by realists. The ideas of openness and democracy and new thinking that Gorbachev used were Western ideas that had been adopted by the generation of 1956. One of the key architects of perestroika and glasnost, Aleksandr Yakovlev, had been an exchange student in the United States and was attracted to American theories of pluralism. The growth of transnational communications and contacts pierced the iron Curtain and helped spread Western popular culture and liberal ideas. The demonstrated effect of West— ern economic success gave them additional appeal. While hard military power deterred Soviet expansionism, soft power ate away the belief in communism behind the Iron Curtain. When the Berlin Wall finally fell in 1989, it did not succumb to an artillery barrage, but to an onslaught of civilian hammers and bulldozers. I As for imperial over-stretch, the enormous Soviet defense budget began to affect other aspects of Soviet soeiety. Health care declined and the mortality rate in the Soviet Union increased (the only developed country where that occurred). Eventuv ally even the military became aware of the tremendous burden caused by imperial overstretch. In 1984, Marshall Ogarkov, the Soviet chief of staff, realized the Soviet Union needed a better civilian economic base and more access to Western trade and technology. But during the period of stagnation, the old leaders were unwilling to listen and Ogarkov was removed from his post. Thus the intermediate causes of soft power and imperial overstretch are important, though ultimately we must deal with the deep causes, which were the decline of communist ideology (a constructivist explanation) and the failure of the Soviet economy (a realist explanation). Communism’s loss of legitimacy over the postwar period was quite dramatic. In the early period, immediately after 1945, communism was widely attractive. Many communists had led the resistance against fascism in Europe, and many people believed that communism was the wave of the future. The Soviet Union gained a great deal of soft power from their communist ideology but they squandered it. Soviet soft power was progressively undercut by the de—Stalinizarion in 1956 that exposed his crimes; by the represr sions in Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and in Poland in 1981; and by the growing transnational communication of liberal ideas. Although in theory communism aimed to instill a system of class justice, Lenin‘s heirs maintained domestic power through a brutal state security system involving reform camps, gulags, broad censorship, and the use of informants. The net effect of these repres’ sive measures on the Russian people was a general loss of faith in the system as voiced in the underground protest literature and the rising tide of dissent advanced by human rights activists. Behind this, there was also decline in the Soviet economy, reflecting the dimin— ished ability of the Soviet central planning system to respond to change in the world economy. Stalin had created a system of centralized economic direction that emphasized heavy metal and smokestack industries. it was very inflexiblewall 138 CHAPTER 5 The Cold War . mammwmmmmawwsw mamW.mm.MWWWWMWWWWWMum.. ., In contrast to the way most history is written, Cold War historians through the end of the 19805 were working within rather than after the event they were trying to describe. We l had no way of knowing the final outcome, and we could determine the motivations of E only some—by no means all—of the major players. . . . We know now, to coin a phrase. ' Or, at least, we know a good deal more than we once did. We will never have the full story: we don’t have that for any historical event, no matter how far back in the past. l'lis— torians can no more reconstruct what actually happened than maps can replicate what is really there. But we can represent the past, just as cartographers approximate terrain. And the end of the Cold War and at least the partial opening of documents from the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China, the fit between our representations and the reality they describe has become a iot closer than it once was. E enjoin: L, Garldis, “The New Cold War l'h'stmy”5 NE : W».vm'aw:.:4.wwuvymmmaaamzmwnxuwanw; “Max'wa mmmumawarm“gamma-mtwomumam.Mm.»mmvawwmammsmmmwmmmm thumbs and no fingers—«and tended to stockpile labor rather than transfer it to growing service industries. As the economist joseph Schumpeter pointed out, capitalism is creative destruction, a way of responding flexibly to major waves of technological change. At the end of the twentieth century, the major technological change of the third industrial revolution was the growing role of information as the scarcest resource in an economy. The Soviet system was particularly inept at handling information. The deep secrecy of its political system meant that the flow of information was slow and cumbersome. Soviet goods and services could not keep up to world standards. There was a great deal of turmoii in the world economy at the end of the twentieth century, but the Western economies using market systems were able to transfer labor to services, to reorganize their heavy industries, and to switch to computers. The Soviet Union could not keep up with the changes. For instance, when Gorbachev came to power in 1985, there were 50,000 personal computers in the Soviet Union; in the United States there were 30 miliion. Four years later, there were about 400,000 personal com, puters in the Soviet Union, and 40 million in the United States. Market~oriented economies and democracies proved more flexible in responding to technological change than the centralized Soviet system that Stalin created for the smokestack era of the 1930s. According to one Soviet economist. by the late 1980s, only 8 percent of Soviet industry was competitive at world standards. It is difficult to remain a superv power when 92 percent of industry is subpar. The end of the Cold War was one of the great transforming events of the twcna tieth century. it was equivalent to World War II in its effects on the structure of the international system, but. it occurred without war. In the next chapters, we turn to what this may mean for international politics in the future. Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia has undergone a significant transformation. Renouncing the planned economy of the Soviet state, pose—Cold War Russia tentatively embarked on a path of democratization and economic liberal ' ization. That road has been fraught with peril, however. Foliowing the advice of the international Monetary Fund, the Russian government at first embraced economi The Role of Nuclear Weapons 139 “shock therapy” as a way of making the transition from economic autocracy to liberal democracy. Yet shock therapy so disrupted Russian society that it was quickly shelved in favor of a more gradualist approach. As the economic situation deteriorated 0 Russian nationalism was rejuvenated. ’ Theorists such as Michael Doyle, hypothesizing that liberal democracies do not fight wars with one another, have concluded that if Russia makes a successfui transition to democracy, it will bode well for international peace. It remains to be seen whether Russian foreign policy will fit the model of the tlemocratic peace, or whether a resur~ gence of Russian authoritarianism and nationalism wiil challenge the United States and Western Europe. Regardless of what the future holds. one major puzzle remains. just as important as the question of why the Cold War ended is the question of why it did not turn hot. Why did the Cold War last so long without a “hot war” erupting between the two superpowers. Why did it not turn into World War III? THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS Some analysts believe that advanced developed societies learned from the lessons of {World War l‘and World War II and simply outgrew war. Others believe that the long peace” in the second half of the twentieth century stemmed from the limited expansionist goals of the superpowers. Still others credit what they consider the inherent stability of pure bipolarity in which two states (not two tight alliances) are dominant. But for most analysts, the largest part of the answer lies in the special nature of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence. Physics and Politics The enormous destructive power of nuclear weapons is almost beyond compte' hension. A megaron nuclear explosion can create temperatures of 100 million degrees Celsiuswfour to five times the temperature in the center of the sun. The bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945 was relatively small, about the equivalent of 15,000 tons of TNT. Today’s missiles can carry 100 times that explonve pOWer or more. in fact, all the explosive power used in World War 11 could fit in one - 3amegaton bomb, and that one bomb could fit in the nose cone of one large inter— continental missile. By the 19805, the United States and the Soviet Union together had more than 50,000 nuclear weapons. Some physical effects of nuclear explosions are uncertain. For example, the the— cry of nuclear winter holds that a nuclear war would create so much carbon and dust in the atmosphere that it would block sunlight, preventing plants from conducting photosynthesis and leading to the end of life as we know it. A National Academy of Scrences study reported that nuclear winter is possible, but highly uncertain. Much would depend on whether the weapons were aimed at cities rather than at other t' weapons. Burning cities would cause smoke with a high carbon content that would . bloek sunlight, but it is uncertain how long the smoke would stay aloft. if the bombs 140 CHAPTER 5 The Cold War exploded in the Northern Hemisphere, would the smoke travel to the Southern Hemisphere? Some skeptics argued the worst result would not be nuclear winter, but nuciear autumnma faint consolation. The certainty is that a large-scale nuclear war would destroy civilization as we know it, at least in the Northern Hemisphere. In their 1983 report on nuclear weapons, the American Catholic bishops engaged in only slight hyperbole when they said, “We are the first generation since Genesis with the capability of destroying God’s creation.”9 Nuclear weapons changed the nature of warfare, but they did not change the basic way in which the world is organized. The world of anarchic states with no higher government above them continued in the nuclear age. In 1946, when the United States proposed the Baruch Plan to establish international control of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union viewed it as just another American plot. After this failure, Albert Einstein lamented that everything changed except our thinking. Perhaps apocryphally, he is supposed to have said that “physics is easier than politics.” There are both military and political reasons why nuclear weapons did not have a more dramatic effect right after 1945. For one thing, the early atomic weapon did not do significantly more damage than the most deadly uses of mass conventional weapons. The firebombing of the German city of Dresden in 1945 killed more people than the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima. Though one atomic weapon did the work of a entire air attack using conventional bombs, at first there were not that many nuclear weapons in the US. arsenal. The United States had only 2 in 1947, and 50 in 1948. Many military planners thought atomic bombs were not totally different, just extensions of conventional war are. The emerging U.S.’Soviet rivalry also slowed change in poiitical thinking. The Soviet Union mistrusted the United Nations and saw it as too reliant on the United States. The United States could not coerce the Soviets into cooperation because Europe was a hostage between the Soviets and the Americans. If the United States threatened nuciear attack, the Soviets could threaten to invade Europe with conventional forces. The result was a stalemate. The revolutionary physical effects of nuclear technology were initially not enough to change the ways states behaved in an anarchic system. The second stage of the nuclear revolution occurred in 1952 when the hydrogen bomb was first tested. l-lydrogen bombs rely on the fusion energy released when atoms are fused into one, instead of split apart as in the early fission bombs. The H—bomb vastly increased the amount of destruction possible with a single weapon. The largest human—made explosion on the earth’s surface occurred in 1961 when the Soviet Union exploded a 60rmegaton hydrogen bomb, 20 times all the explosive power used in World War 11. Ironicaliy, the more important change that accompanied the development of the Habomb was miniaturization. Fusion made it possible to deliver enormous amounts of destructive power in very small packages. The systems built to deliver the early atomic bombs got bigger and bigger as the bombs increased in size and required more space as the bombs increased in size. The B~36 bomber was a huge eight—engine airr plane with one big cavity to hold one bomb. A hydrogen bomb, on the other hand, could put the same potential destruction in a much smaller package. Once that The Role of Nuclear Weapons 141 destructive power was mounted in the nose cone of a ballistic missile, an interconti’ nental nuclear war could occur with only 30 minutes’ warninrr, compared to the eight hours it took a B»36 to fly the same distance. D I The increased destructiveness of hydrogen bombs also dramatized the conse— quences of nuclear war. No longer could warfare he considered merely an extension of politics by other means. Kari von Clausewitz (17804831), a nineteenthrcentury Prussian general and military strategist, said war is a political act, and therefore absolute war is an absurdity. The enormous destructive power of nuclear Weapons meant there was now a disproportion between the military means and virtually all the political ends a country might seek. This disjunction between ends and means caused a paralysis in the use of the ultimate force in most situations. Nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945, thus the view that nuclear weaponry is musclevbound. It is just too powerful, too disproportionate. l The Isl—bomb had five significant political effects, even though it did not reor- ganize the anarchic way in which the world goes about its business. First it revived the concept of limited war. The first half of the twentieth century saw a change from the limited wars of the nineteenth century to the two world wars which took tens of millions of lives. At midcentury, analysts were referring to the twentieth century as “the century of total war.” But war in the second half of the century was more like the old wars of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries- for instance though the Korean and Vietnam wars each COst more than 55,000 Amer-lead deaths, they remained limited in scope and scale. in Vietnam and Afghanistan the United States and the Soviet Union each accepted defeat rather than use fheir ultimate weapon. Second, crises replaced central war as the moments of truth. In the past war was the time when all the cards were face up on the table. But in the nuclear, age war is too devastating and the old moments of truth are too dangerous. During thd Cold War, the Beriin crisis, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Middle East crises of the early 19705 played the functional equivalent of war, a time to see the true cor-re, latron of forces in military power. Third, nuclear weapons made deterrence (discourv agement by fear) the key strategy. It was now critical to organize military might to produce fear in advance so attack would be deterred. In World War II, the United States relied on its ability to mobilize and gradually build a war machine after the war started, but that mobilization approach no longer worked when a nuclear war could be over in a matter of hours. I A fourth political effect was the development of a de facto regime of superpower prudence. The two superpowers, despite their bitter ideological differences developed one key common interest: avoiding nuclear war. During the Cold War, ihe United States and the Soviet Union engaged in proxy or indirect peripheral wars but in no case did the two nations go head to head. In addition, the two sides developed spheres of influence. While the Americans talked about rolling back communism in Eastern Europe in the 19505, in practice, when the Hungarians revolted against their Soviet rulers in 1956, the United States did not rush in to help them for fear of nuclear war. Similarly, with the exception of Cuba, the Soviets were relatively careful about incurv srons into the Western Hemisphere. Both countries adhered to a developing norm of 142 CHAPTER 5 The Cold War nonuse of nuclear weapons. Finally, the superpowers learned to communicate. After the Cuban Missile Crisis, Washington and Moscow developed “hotlines” to allow instant communication between the Soviet and American leaders. Technology made it easier to cooperate in times of crisis by making communication between leaders in the bipolar system more flexible and personal. Simultaneously, the codification of a number of arms control treaties, starting with the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963, and frequent arms control negotiations became a way to discuss stability in the nuclear system. Fifth, nuclear weapons in general and the I‘l'bomb in particular were seen by most officials as unusable in time of war. it was not purely a matter of the destructive potential of the H»bomb. There was a stigma attached to the use of nuclear weaponry that simply did not apply to conventional weaponry. By the late 19603, in fact, engia neers and scientists had managed to shrink the payload of nuclear weapons so that some nuclear weapons could have been used by the United States in Vietnam and the Gulf War or by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan without causing the type of unjustifiable damage of an I-l—bomb. Yet both Americans and Russians refrained from using smaller—payload nuclear weapons and opted instead for destructive tools such as napalm, incendiary bombs, and assorted conventional weapons. In part, it was feared that using any nuclear weapon, no matter how similar to conventional weapons, would open the window to using all nuclear weapons, and that risk was unaccept- able. There was yet another dimension. Ever since the first bomb was dropped by the United States on Hiroshima, there was a lingering sense that nuclear weapons were immoral, that they went beyond the realm of what was acceptable in war. Though that normative restraint is hard to measure, it clearly suffused the debates over nuclear weapons and was one reason for the unwillingness of states to use them. Balance of Terror Nuclear weapons produced a peculiar form of the balance of power that was some, times called the “balance of terror.” Tests of strength were more psychological than physical. Both sides followed a policy of preventing preponderance by the other, but the result was different from previous systems. Unlike the nineteenth'century balance—ofvpower system in which five great powers shifted alliances, the Cold War balance was very clearly organized around two very large states, each capable of destroying the other in an instant. The problems raised by the classical security dilemma were not ended by the terror of nuclear weapons, but the superpowers acted prudently despite their ideo' logical differences. Their prudence was similar to the effects of the constant comr munications that occurred in managing the multipolar nii‘reteenth’century balance of power. At the same time, the superpowers tried to caiculate balances of force, just as in the days when statesmen compared provinces, infantry, and artillery. The nuclear balance of terror coincided with a period of bipoiarity. Some neoreal— ists such as Kenneth Waltz define bipolarity as situations in which two large states have nearly all the power, but that type of pure bipolarity is rare. More often bipolarity has occurred in history when alliances tighten so much that flexibility is lost, as happened The Role of Nuclear Weapons 143 in the Peloponnesian War. Even though they were independent states, the alliances around Athens and around Sparta coalesced tightly into a bipolar situation. Similarly, on the eve of World War I the alliance systems became tightly bound into hipolarity. ‘ Waltz argues that bipolarity is a particularly stable type of system because it sim’ plifies communication and calCulations. On the other hand, bipolar systems lack flexibility and magnify the importance of marginal conflicts such as the Vietnam War. The conventional wisdom in the past was that bipolarity either erodes or explodes. if so, why did bipolarity not explode after World War II? Perhaps the prudence produced by nuclear weapons provided the answer, and the stability that Waitz attrilr uted to pure bipolarity was really the result of the bomb. The very terror of nuclear weapons may have helped produce stability through the “crystal ball effect.” Imagine that in August 1914 the Kaiser, the Czar, and the Emperor of Austria'Hungary looked into a crystal ball and saw a picture of 1918. They would have seen that they had lost their thrones, their empires had been dismembered, and millions of their people had been killed. Would they still have gone to war in 1914? Probably not. Knowledge of the physical effects of nuclear weapons may be similar to the effect of giving leaders in the post»1945 period a crystal ball. Because few political goals would be proportionate to such destruction, they would not want to take great tislts. Of course, crystal balls can be shattered by accidents and by miscalculations, but the analogy suggests why the combination of bipolarity and nuclear weapons produced the longest period of peace between the central powers since the beginning of the modern state system. (The previous record was 1871—1914.) Problems of Nuclear Deterrence Nuclear deterrence is a subset of general deterrence, but the peculiar qualities of nuclear weapons changed how the superpowers approached international relations during the Cold War. Nuclear deterrence encourages the reasoning, “If you attack me, i may not be able to prevent your attack, but i can retaliate so powerfully that you will not want to attack in the first place." Nuclear weapons thus put a new twist: on an old concept. pvt When President Kennedy made the first decision to increase significantly the American military presence in 196243, . . . he had in mind two things: What would have happened if Khrushchev had not believed him in the Berlin crisis of 1961—62., and what would have happened if Khrushchev did not believe Kennedy in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962? 1 think we made a mistake in concluding that the Chinese would probably not intervene in the Korean War in 1950, and that influenced the American decision not to invade North n Vietnam. The military said they did not think China would come in, but if it did, it would lead to nuclear war, and that decided that. w~Secretary of State Dean Rusldo imminmxmHammerstrewn»:m-«mmrwmcmmmmweLuatrmuxwmmnmwacmaz-aumwmvmwmwwmm - W * Macrame,“ WA. - - -, é 144 CHAPTER 5 The Cold War One way to assess the efficacy of nuclear deterrence is by counterfactual analy- sis. How likely was it that the Cold War would have turned hot in the absence of nuclear weapons? The political scientist: John Mueller argues that nuclear weapons were irrelevant, that they were no more than the rooster crowing. He argues that the peoples of Europe had been turning away from war as a policy instrument ever since the horrors of World War i. The cause of peace was the increased recognition of the horror of war, at least in the developed world. According to Mueller, Hitler was an aberration, a rare person who had not learned the lessons of World War I and was still willing to go to war. After World War II, the general revulsion toward war returned more strongly than before. Most analysts, however, believe nuclear weapons had a lot to do with avoiding World War III. Crises over Berlin, Cuba, and perhaps the Middle East might have spiraled out of control without the prudence instilled by the crystal ball effect of nuclear weapons. That raises a number of questions. One is, “What deters?” Effective deterrence requires both the capability to do damage and a credible threat that the weapons will be used. Credibility depends on the stakes involved in a conflict. For example, an American threat to bomb Moscow in retaliation for a nuclear attack was probably credible. But suppose the United States had threatened to bomb Moscow in 1980 if the Soviets did not withdraw their troops from Afghanistan. The United States certainly had the capability, but the threat would not have been credible because the stakes were too low, and the Soviets could easily have threatened in return to bomb Washington. So deterrence is related not just to capability, but also to credibility. That problem of credibility leads to a distinction between deterring threats against one's homeland and extending deterrence to cover an ally. For example, the United States could not stop the Soviet Union from invading Afghanistan by nuclear deterrence, but for the four decades of the Cold War it threatened to use nuclear weapons if the Soviet: Union invaded the NATO countries of Western Europe. Thus to look for the effects of nuclear weapons in extending deterrence and averting war, we must look at major crises in which the stakes are high. Can history answer these questions about the effect of nuclear weapons? Not completely, but it can help. From 1945 to 1949, the United States alone had nuciear weapons, but did not use them. So there was some seif'restraint even before mutual nuclear deterrence. Part of the reason was small arsenals, a lack of understanding of these new weapons, and the American fear that the Soviets would capture all of Europe with their massive conventional forces. By the 19505, both the United States and the Soviet Union had nuclear weapons, and American leaders considered their use in several crises. Nuclear weapons were not used in the Korean War, or in 1954 and 1958 when the Chinese communists mobilized forces to invade the Nationalist’held island of Taiwan. Presidents Truman and Eisenhower vetoed the use of nuclear weapons for several reasons. In the Korean War, it was not clear that dropping a nuclear weapon would stop the Chinese, and the United States was concerned about the Soviet response. There was always the danger that the threats might escalate and the Soviets might use a nuclear weapon to help their Chinese ally. So even though the Americans had superiority in the number of nuclear weapons, there was the danger of heading to a larger war involving more than Korea and China. The Role of Nuclear Weapons 145 In addition, ethics and public opinion played a role. in the 1950s, US. governv ment estimates of the number of citizens who would be killed by a nuclear attack were so high that the idea was put aside. President Eisenhower, when asked about using nuclear weapons, said, “We can’t use those awful things against Asians for the second time in less than ten years. My God!“ Even though the United States had more nuclear weapons than the Soviet Union in the 19505, a combination of factors persuaded the Americans not to use them. The Cuban Missile Crisis The key case in nuclear deterrence in the Cold War was the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. This 13—day period was probably the CIOsest call in the nuclear age to a set of events that could have led to nuclear war. If a total outsider, a “man from Mars,” had looked at the situation, he would have seen that the United States had a 17vto«i superiority in nuclear weaponry. We now know the Soviets had only about 20 nuclear Weapons on intercontinental missiles that could have reached the United States, but President Kennedy did not know it at the time. Why then didn’t the United States try to preempt a Soviet first strike by attacking Soviet missile sites, which were then relatively vulnerable? The answer was that if even one or two of the Soviet missiles had escaped and been fired at an American city, that risk was enough to deter a US. first strike. In addition, both Kennedy and 3% By mid—October 1962, the Cold War had intensified in unforeseen ways. Cuba, which had long been a virtual colony of the United States, had recently moved into the Soviet orbit. In late September US. newspapers had beng reporting shipments of Soviet Weapons to . t . _ :- Cuba. Presrdent John I“. Kennedy told the American public that, to the best of his under— g i standing, these weapons were defensive, not offensive. Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev had given him absolute assurances that this was the case. “Were it to be otherwise,” Kennedy said, "the gravest issues would arise.” Shortly before 9:00 AM. on Tuesday, October 16, Kennedy‘s Assistant for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, brought to his bedroom photographs showing that the “gravest issues” had indeed arisen. Taken from very high altitude by a U—2 reconnaissance plane, these photographs showed the Soviets in Cuba setting up nuclear—armed ballistic missiles targeted on cities in the continental United States. For Kennedy, the presence of these missiles was intolerable. So was the fact that Khrushchev had lied to him. For the next 13 days, Kennedy and a circle of advisers debated how to cope with the challenge. They knew that one possible outcome was nuclear war, and during their discussions Kennedy's civil defense expert offered the chill— ing information that the US. population was f righteningly vulnerable. ——Enrest May and Philip Zeiilrow, The Kennedy Tapes” E Wm swusuwamawmmmz magnum““mm-mumimam:uemrmmrnmmmxsm .m wzzwwnrehwmmoamn p‘ASn-‘(rflnhfl‘ia'wma‘w JIr;ra.mbT»ww:WvMW-mmw a mm-mmmcame‘eerem-mmmmmxmwam 146 CHAPTER 5 The Coid War Khrushchev feared that rationai strategies and careful calculations might spin out of their control. Khrushchev came up with a nice metaphor for this in one of his letters to Kennedy: “Be careful as we both tug at the ends of the rope in which we have tied the knot of war.”13 At a conference in Florida 25 years after the event, Americans who had been involved in President Kennedy’s Executive Committee of the Nationai Security Council met with scholars to try to reconstruct the Cuban Missile Crisis. One of the most striking differences among the participants was how much each individ— uai had been wiliing to take risks. That in turn depended on how likely each rheught were the prospects of nuclear war. Robert McNamara, Kennedy’s secre' tary of defense, became more cautious as the crisis unfolded. At the time, he thought the probability of nuclear war in the Cuban Missile Crisis might be one chance out of fifty (though later he rated the risks much higher after he learned in the 19905 that the Soviets had already delivered nuclear weapons to Cuba). Douglas Dillon, who was the secretary of the treasury, said he thought the risks of nuclear war were about zero. He did not see how the situation could possibly progress to nuclear war anti as a result was willing to push the Soviets harder and to take more risks than McNamara was. General Maxwell Tayiot, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also thought the risk of nuciear war was low, and he com: plained that the United States let the Soviet Union off too easily in the Cuban Missile Crisis. He argued that Kennedy could have pushed much harder and should have demanded the removal of Cuba's president, Fidel Castro. General Taylor said, “I was so sure we had 'em over a barrel, 1 never worried much about the final outcome?” But the risks of losing control weighed heavily on President Kennedy, who took a very cautious position, indeed, more prudent than some of his advisers would have liked. The moral of the story is that a iittle nuclear detera rence goes a long way. It is clear that nuclear deterrence made a difference in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Nonetheless, there are stili ambiguities about the missile crisis that make it diffi' cult to attribute the whole outcome to the nuclear component. The public consensus was that the United States won. But the question of how much the United States won and why it won is overdetermined. There are at least three possible explanations. One view is that because the United States had more nuclear weapons than the Soviet Union, the Soviets gave in. A second explanation adds the importance of the relative stakes of the two superpowers in the crisis. Cuba was in America’s backyard, but a distant gamble for the Soviets. Therefore, Americans not only had a higher stake in Cuba than the Soviets, but could also bring a third factor to bear: conventionai forces. An American naval blockade and the possibility of an American invasion of Cuba also played a role. The psychological burden was on the Soviets because higher stakes and readily availabie conventional forces gave the Americans more credibility in their deterrent position. Finally, although the Cuban Missiie Crisis is called an American victory, it was aiso a compromise. The Americans had three options in the Cuban Missile Crisis. " One was a shootout, that is, to bomb the missile sites; the second was a squeeze ~ out by blockading Cuba to persuade the Soviets to take the missiles out; the third The Roie of Nuclear Weapons 147 Kennedy and Khruschev meeting in Vienna in 1961 sligplult‘bylofftfiringéo tfiadeEsomething the Soviets wanted, such as removai of - issr es rom ur ey. or a long time, the Jartic' ' " ' ' about the buyout aspects of the soiution, but subseqluent tllmllll1 quiet American promise to remove its obsolete missiles from Turke b‘lablc1 more important than was thought at the time. We can concludld thatpriO l *y deterrence mattered in the crisis and that the nuclear dimension certainl 1f'uc in Kennedys thinking. On the other hand, the number of Weapons was les: tan . ' ‘ ‘ ' ' 'w e t Itfwas not the ratio of nuclear eapons that mattered so much as the fear th’lt . M . ( ven a cw nuclear weapons could wreak such devastation. 148 CHAPTERS The Cold War Moral Issues ' ' A ' ' old After the Cuban Missile Crisis there was a relative (35mg (if tcllie tcniilzig if;in ' ' ' ‘tum ' ' res and the Sovret mom a s . Warm-almost as if the United Sta . I ‘ unlcai of a ciiff looked over, and pulied back. In 1963, a hoctlline allowmg direct: eggpryiuniting , ' ‘ ntro re ' ' ' 01 Moscow was installe , an arms co tion between Washington an d 1 p U h d St E 5 would ' > e t it: nite .a e ' ‘ .ts was Signed, Kennedy announc A I atmospheric nuclear tes I ‘ me mlaxation of ten, ‘ ' ' ‘ a " ' Soviet Union, and there was so be Willing to trade more With the I j ‘ had With the Vietnam ' ' A i Os the United States was prcoceupi SlOIl. Through the late 196 , f 1 at war mmmed after a ' trol efforts. Intense fear 0 nuc e , War, yet there were still arms con | . u h. l'ttle mid war” from ‘ ' ' fghanistan in 1979. During t e i I the SoViet Union invaded A .h I became pamcumrly ' ' ' limitation talks stalled, i etoric 1980 to 1985, strategic aims dcreasec] on bOth ' ' ' d the number of nuclear weapons u 'rsh and military budgets an ‘ s ' _ 8 Sides ,President Ronald Reagan talked about nuclear war fighting, and peace gioup pressed for a freeze and ultimate abolition of nuclear W82;130ni:. d baSic question. “IS ' ' ' ' ty many peope as e a . . I in the climate of heightened anXie , I I _ I {mam nuclear deterrence moral?" As we saw earlier, just gayftgiefory argues 111:3:{féarded ' ' ' ' ‘ v ' A usua y ' ' ‘ 3 king moial judgments. e e ense is conditions must be met in ma h. *1 l m is {Du ht am equafly ' ' = ans and consequences by w it i a w g ‘ as a JUSL cause, hm Elk me ' ' ' b d' " ’shed from combatants; ' ' civihans must e isiingui I iiri ortant. In terms of the means, _ I I I I k n of in ltJerms of consequences. there has to be some proportionality, some relationsl p e ends and the means. I : ‘ r h I I OW' th Could nuclear war possibly fit the just war model? Technically, 11.300196 ised ield nuclear weapons such as artillery shells and depth eligiges 011311.03“ mand . 7 ‘ C :gainst radar systems, submarines, ships at L:ea, or deepbun etrggcipéinoncombap ' ‘ A discriminate etween com atan s bunkers. In that case, we could f h J ‘ d 1 J. 6 could " ' " ' . stoppe ticie, w i ' ' -‘ Lively limited. If the ig ting ‘ ants and keep the effects rcla . I‘ I I I IWOUId it fit nuclear weapons within just war theory. But would fighting stop there 01 . mmmmmmnmwmmwmm W m, m ‘WWAWnW ' ‘T In 1962 President Kennedy insisted that eachfliersberk of bljoiiizryallosictiylrét: read Barbara Tuchman's The Guns of August. e on is '1 ‘ I I y ’ kl ' ' ' ' i I. Tl = i b by quoting Bismaic s Balhil‘llglja’I-OUTEHTLESDIIC highway - ' ‘ ' - .—-f 11 ' i - assassination on une , . o > [Sililldke 13:13:23 idifiEld, by Stirbian = '..' "t cor . Tieflbliggof state tried to puli back, but theSSEIZTTIK::8:[Si'::llfdjdthi:ndfj11:6l914 conversation betweendtlwo German ' ' ‘ ' ' ' “ 'd' l' ?’ E1] iis successor Hfiflfnlfrlfv: “fiftieth? cohstant danger of . , misealculation. I I b :5 mRobert McNamara, Blundermg into Disaster . .. . ,wmwmm‘ “mm”, .. . vgmxmummwwmsmwmmmmmw . .. .. wwmmumwmvmm a moral and a realist dimension. Th shared not just by states th weapons, but even by states that continue to have t .. France, and Russia. Chemical and biological The Role of Nuclear Weapons 149 escalate? Escalation is the great risk, lives or the fate of the earth? During the Cold War, some peopie answered, “It's better to be Red than dead.” But that may have been the wrong way to pose the might ask: is it ever justifiable to run a small risk of a large calamity? During the Cuban Missile Crisis, John Kennedy was reputed to have said he thought the chances of conventional fighting were perhaps one in three. And there was some smaller risk of nuclear escal ation. Was he justified in taking such a risk? We can ask the counterfactual: if Kennedy had not been willing to take the risk in Cuba, would Khrushchev have tried something even more dangerous? What if a Soviet success had led to a later nuclear crisis or an even lai 'ger conventional war, for example, over Berlin or the Panama Canal? Nuclear weapons probably played a significant roi from turning hot. During the 19803, th said that nuclear deterrence could be for what could be worth a hundred million question. Alternatively, we e in preventing the Cold War e American Association of Catholic Bishops justified on a conditional basis as a tolerable interim measure until something better was developed. But how long is the interim? So long as nuclear knowledge exists, some degree of nuclear deterrence will exist. Although the weapons produced prudence during the Cold War, complacency is a danger. it took the United States and the Soviet Union some time to learn how to control nuclear weapons, and it is far from clear that such control systems will exist among new aspirants to nuclear status such as North Korea and Iran. Moreover, terrorist groups might have no use for controls. Concern about the proliferation of nuclear We states have signed the Nuclear Non—Pro! exploded weapons in 1998, and countries such as Iraq, Iran, Libya, and North Korea pursued nuclear weapons despite having signed the treaty. Aiso of concern is the spread of unconventional arsenals such as biological and chemical weapons; Libya and Iraq, for example, constructed chemical weapons facilities, and Iraq used them in its war with Iran (19804988). After the Gulf War in 1991, UN inspectors uncovered and destroyed major Iraqi nuclear, grams. The fear that such programs could b of the Iraq War in 2003. Newspaper accounts of the former Soviet Union and into the in that these weapons can still cause tension and bring nations to the brink of war. In 2004, it was disclosed that a Pakistani nuclear scientist, A. Q. Khan, had sold nuclear secrets to a number of countries, including Libya, Iran, and North Korea. Moreover, the reports that terrorist groups such as the japanese Aum Shinrikyo cult and Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda network were investigating the production of nuclear and biological weapons indicate that they may someday become available to nonstate actors as well. The continued international wort apons continues. While 189 iferation Treaty, india and Pakistan biological, and chemical weapons pro- e reconstituted was one of the causes of nuclear material making its way out ternational black market demonstrate y about weapons of mass destruction has both e moral opprobrium against nuciear weapons is at do not have the capacity or desire to make such hem, such as the United States, weapons have been condemned since 150 CHAPTER 5 The Cold War Chronology: The Cold War Years 151 World War I, when the use of mustard gas led to widespread outcries in both Allied and Axis countries. The realist dimension is simple: Weapons of mass destruction August USSR explodes first A'bomb September Federal Repubiic of Germany created carrY great “5k 0f escalatlon and enormous petentlal for deVaStatlon' Whenel’er October People’s Republic of China proclaimed; German People‘s Republic proclaimed these weapons are present, the dynamics of conflict change. Weak states With 1950 nuclear or unconventional weapons are better able to threaten strong states, while , , . . I I 1| I February Sino-Sov1et pact signed in Moscow strong states With these weapons can more effectively threaten and deter adver’ A til NSC 68 d f. d saries. At the same time, the risk that these devices will be used if a crisis spins out p _ ’ _ m K of control raises the level of tension, whether it is between the United States and June Begmmng 01‘ Korean war 1952 First U.S. Hvbomb expioded; Eisenhower elected president; Dulles becomes North Korea or between India and Pakistan. And the threat of use by terrorists adds a chilling dimension in which deterrence is not a sufficient response. The Cold War secretary Of State may be over, but the era of nuclear and unconventional weapons is not. 1953 March Death of Stalin June East Berlin uprising CHRONOLOGY: Tue COLD WAR YEARS July Armistice in Korea 1943 Tehran meeting between Stalin, Churchiil, and Roosevelt August First Soviet H'bomb test 1944 September Khrushchev becomes that secretary of Soviet Communist Party July Bretton Woods Conference: Creation of International Monetary Fund and 1954' Chinese bombardment Of QuemOY 311d Mats” World Bank 1955 West Germany admitted to NATO; Warsaw Pact signed; Austrian State August Duinbarton Oaks Conference: Creation of United Nations Treaty signed; Austria neutralized October Moscow meeting between Churchill and Stalin: Spheres of influence plan for 1956 the Balkans February Khrushchev denounces Stalin at Twentieth Party Congress 1945 June Poznan uprising in Poland February Yalta Conference between Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt October Start of Hungarian uprising Apr” Roosevelt dies November USSR intervenes in Budapest May Germany surrenders 1957 April—June San Francisco Conference—UN Organization Charter August Launching of first Soviet ICBM July First test of Abomb; Potsdam Conference: Truman, Churchilif'Attlee, Stalin October Sputnik satellite launchea August Hiroshima and Nagasaki destroyed by A—bombs; USSR enters war in Asia; 1958 Japan surrenders February Launching of first US. satellite 1946 Churchill's Iron Curtain speech; resumption of Greek civil war August China threatens Taiwan 1947 1959 March Truman {Doctrine announced January Victory of Fidel Castro in Cuba june Marshall Plan announced September Khrushchev visits United States October Creation of Cominform by Moscow 1960 1948 February First French Arbomb test February Coup by Czech Communist Party May American U'Z shot dowu over USSR; Paris summit fails March Partial blockade of Berlin begins 1961 June Berlin airlift begins; Yugoslavia ousted from Cominforin April Failure of Bay of pigs landing in Cuba November Truman reelected president June Khrushchev and Kennedy meet in Vienna 1949 August Building of the Berlin Wall April North Atlantic Treaty signed in Washington October Incidents at Checkpoint Charlie in Berlin; tensions increase May End of the Berlin blockade 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis 152 CHAPTER 5 The Cold War 1963 June October November 1964 August October November 1966 March April 1967 January June I968 January July August November December 1969 1970 February April 1971 1972 February May 1973 January May September October 1974 Kennedy visits Berlin, declares “lcli bin em Berliner" ("I am a Berliner") as a gesture of solidarity Kennedy signs Limited Test Ban Treaty; USSR, United States, and United Kingdom outlaw tests in the atmosphere, underwater, and in space Kennedy assassinated; Johnson sworn into office Tonkin Gulf Act passes Congress, escalating U.S. involvement in Vietnam Khrushchev ousted, replaced by Brezhnev and Kosygin China detonates first atomic bomb Attti7Vietnam War rallies held in United States and Europe Beginning of Chinese. Cultural Revolution United States, USSR, and 60 other nations agree to Outer Space Treaty limiting military uses of space China explodes first Isl—bomb Prague Spring reforms begin in Czechoslovakia; Tet Offensive in Vietnam Treaty on the Nonproliferation ofNuclear Weapons (NPT) by United States, USSR, and 58 other countries Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia Nixon elected president US. forces reach peak of 535,000 in Vietnam Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) begin between United States and USSR Paris Peace Talks begin between United States and North Vietnam US. troops invade Cambodia; Four US. college students killed by National Guardsmen at Kent State University at antiwar rally People’s Republic of China joins United Nations Nixon visits China SALT I signed, freezing number of lCBMs and SLBMs in place for five years Paris Accords establish ceasefire and political settlement of Vietnam War East and West Germany establish formal diplomatic relations Chilean socialist government of Salvador Allende overthrown in U.S.—bacl<ed military coup Yom Kippur War between israel and Arab states; United States and USSR nearly drawn into conflict; Arab oil embargo against the United States that lasts until March 1974 Nixon resigns over Watergate; Gerald Ford sworn in as president 1975 April July 1976 1979 January June July December 1980 1981 January December 1982 1983 March November 1985 1986 October November 1987 1988 April June August November 1989 June November Chronology: T he Cold War Years I53 United States leaves Vietnam after fall of Saigon US. and Soviet astronauts link up in space; United States and USSR Sign Helsinki Accords, pledging acceptance of European borders and protection for human rights Jimmy Carter elected president United States and People's Republic of China establish full diplomatic relations SALT ii agreement limiting long’range missiles and bombers signed by Carter and Brezhnev Sandinista forces overthrow Somoza dictatorship in Nicaragua USSR invades Afghanistan; United States imposes sanctions and intention to boycott Moscow Olympics Carter Doctrine states that Persian Gulf is a vital U.S. interest Lech Walesa leads Polish Solidarity union in illegal strike; Ronald Reagan inaugurated; US. hostages released from Iran Martial law imposed in Poland Reagan outlines Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) to reduce lCBMs and number of strategic nuclear weapons on both sides Reagan proposes Strategic Defense Initiative {SDI}, popularly called "Star Wars,” to develop missile defense technology United States begins deployment of INF Pershing II missiles in West Germany Mikhail Gorbachev becomes Soviet General Secretary; Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) open in Geneva, based on START model At Reykjavik Summit Reagan refuses Gorbachev’s proposal to make significant arms reductions if United States gives up SDI Secret funding of Nicaraguan contras through arms sales to Iran becomes public At Washington Summit Reagan and Gorbachev agree to eliminate INF and work toward completing a START agreement USSR agrees to withdraw from Afghanistan by February 1989 Gorbachev tells Communist Party leaders that elements of communist doctrine must change Cuba withdraws troops from Angola George H.Wi Bush elected president Chinese army assaults prodemocracy demonstrators in Tiananmen Square Berlin Wall falls; thousands of East Germans cross to Western side 154 CHAPTER 5 The Cold War 1990 May—June Washington Summit between Bush and Gorbachev October Germany reunifies into one nation November Treaty of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe cuts size of land armies December Lech Walesa elected president of Poland 1991 July Bush and Gorbachev sign START, pledge to destroy thousands of nuclear weapons August Coup against Gorbachev fails, but power flows to Russian President Boris Yeltsin September All SAC bombers, tankers, and Minuteman ll lCBMs taken off alert Soviet Union dissolves; United States recognizes Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Ukraine December STUDY QUESTIONS 3. When did the Cold War begin? When did it end? Why? What do reaiist, liberal, and con’ structivist approaches contribute to your answers? 2. Was the Cold War inevitable? If so, why and when? If not, when and how could it have been avoided? 3. Why were leaders unable to restore a concert system after World War B? What sort of syst tern evolved? 4. How important were first and second image considerations in the development of the Cold War? What were the views of American and European leaders on the Soviet Union and its interna— tional ambitions? What were Soviet views of the United States and the rest of the West? 5. Some historians argue that the real question is not why the Cold War occurred, but why it did not escalate into a “hot” war. Do you agree? \Vhy didn’t a hot war begin? 6. What is containment? How did this American policy emerge, and how was it implemented? What were Soviet responses? 7. How are nuclear weapons different from conventional weapons? Has the advent of nuclear weapons fundamentally cl'ianged the way nations behave? 8. Is Mueller correct that nuclear weapons are not the cause of the obsolescence of major wars among developed states? What other factors does he consider? 9. ls nuciear deterrence morally defensible? Or, in the words of one theorist, is it morally anal- ogous to tying infants to the front bumpers of automobiles to prevent traffic accidents on Memorial Day? Might some strategies of deterrence he more ethical than others? 10. What is the relation of nuclear weapons to international relations apart from nuclear deter» ronce? How useful are they? 11. Why did the Cold War end? What roles did hard and soft power play? NOTES 1. Milovan Djilas, Conversations With Stalin, trans. Michael B. Petrovich (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1962), p. H4. 2. Ralph B. Levering, The Cold War, l945el972 (Arlington Heights, 11.: Harlan Davidson, 1982),p.15. 3. William Taubman, Stalin's American Policy (New York: Norton, 1982), p. 36. Further Readings l 55 4. Levering, The Cold War, p. 37. 5. lbid., p. 131. 6. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: Norton, 1969) p 375 7. George Kennan, “The Sources ofSoviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs 25:4 (July 1947) p 581 8. John L. Gaddis, "Th NA r ‘ ' ' ' : ” " ' ' 5:5 Gum I998). e ca Cold War Iilstory, Foreign Policy Research institute Footnotes 9. United States Catholic Conference, "The C Response,” Origins 13% (May 19, 1983), p. 1. 10. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, The New York Times, April 30 1985 p 6 11. Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow, eds, The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban M' 'l ‘ 1997)! P‘ 1. on a Crisis (Cambridge MA: Belknap Gt Harvard University Press, 12. Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhowar (New York: Simon St Schuster 1983) p 184 13. Ronald R. Hope ed Soviet Views on ) v ’ . , ., . the Cuban Missile Crisis: M t? d 14 I 0?ng ArialySis (Washington, DC: University Press of America. ly pRZad . Blight and David Welch, On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reex ' i 'l ‘ on c Crisis (New York: Hill & Wang, 1989), p. 80. mmm “a (man 15. Robert McNamara Blunderln ' ' r ., gmtoDisastJ-fi ' ‘ “ (New York: Pantheon, 1986), p. 14. u ummng the P hailenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our ily in Foreign irst Century of the Nuclear Age SELECTED READINGS 1. Kennan, George F., “The SourCe‘ f8 ‘7 ' " 7 pp‘ 566582. s o ov1ct Conduct, l~ 2. Schlesinger, Arthur, ‘. “Tl ' ‘ ' ' " 196?). pp. 22—53. J) , 1e Origins of the Cold War, Foreign Affairs 46:} (October . Yergin, Daniel, The Shattered Peace (Boston: l-loughton Mifflin 1977) pp 69~86 4. Gaddis, John L, l? ‘ ' l ' ‘ ' Chaps- 6 and 7' toxin, tic Soviet Uiiion, and the United States (New York: Wiley, 1978), oreigii Affairs 25:4 (July 1947), 5. Mueller, John, “The Essential lrrelevance of Noel Sghgol’olitical Effects of Nuclear Weapons, 6. 1 " s 3" ~ Khogiigiiegli gill-(i-LLEhDIE'lé {if ilforza and the Vietnam Decision of 1965 " in George . , 111p“.eEOC,CS.,L ' ' ' "', ' 7 CW0: westvmw’ 1991)) pp. 302649. earning in US. and Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder, 7. Gaddis, John Lewis, We Now Know: Rethinking University Press, 1997). ” ear Weapons,” and Jervis, Robert, international Security 13:2 (Fall 1988) pp. Cold War History (New York: Oxford FURTHER READINGS Allan CharlesT “Extended Conie ‘ ,I H ., I ntionalD t=' -‘ i: ' 7‘ ‘ Fire? Washington Quarterly 17:3 (Summel‘3 L COM and 0m Of the NUClem- Allison, Graham, and Philip Zelikow, Essence of h . 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1999). Beschloss, Michael, The Conquerors (New York: Simon (3:. Schuster 2002) Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis 156 CHAPTER 5 The Cold War Blight, James G., and David A. Welch, On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Hill & Wang, 1989). Bundy, McGeorge, Danger and Survival (New York: Random, i988). Dallek, Robert, An Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy, l 9l 7wl 963 (Boston: Little, Brown, 2003). Fursenko, Aleksandr. and Timothy Naftali, "One Hell of a Gamble ": Khrushchev, Castro 6? Kennedy. I958—l964 (New York: Norton, 1997). Gaddis, John, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin, 2006). , Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982). Gray, Colin 8., Weapons Don't Make War: Policy, Strategy. and Military Technology (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993). Herring, George 0, America’s Langest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1 950~75 , 3rd ed. (New York: McGraw—l'lill, 1996). Kagan, Donald, On the Origins of War (New York: Doubleday, 1995). Kennan, George F., Memoirs (1925—1950) (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967). Kennedy, Robert, Thirteen Days (New York: Norton, 1968). Kolko, Gabriel, and Joyce Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945—l954 (New York: Harper St Row, 1972). Lafeher, Walter, America, Russia, and the Cold War 1945—1996 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1997). Larson, Deborah W., Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation (Princeton, NJ: Prince, ton University Press, 1985). Lehow, Richard Ned, and Thomas Risse—Kappen, eds, international Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995). Legvold, Robert, “Soviet Learning in the 19805,” in George W. ilreslauer and Philip Tetloclc, eds, Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreigm Policy (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991), pp. 684432. Mandelhaum, Michael, The Nuclear Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). Mastny, Vojtech, Russia’s Road to the Cold War: Diplomacy, Warfare, and the Politics of Gamma nisrn, 194lel945 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979). May, Ernest K, and Philip D. Zelikow, eds, The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis (Cambridge, MA: Belknap & Harvard University Press, 199?). Nye, J. S., “N uclear Learning and US/Soviet Security Regimes,” lntemational Organization 41:3 (Summer 1987). Remniclc, David, Lenin's Tomb: The Last Days ofthe Soviet Empire (New York: Random, 1993). Taubman, William, Khrushchev: The Man and His Era (New York: Norton, 2003). , Stalin’s American Policy: From Entente to Détente to Cold War (New York: Norton, 2982). Williams, William, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (Cleveland: World, 1959). Wohlforth, William C., ecl., Witnesses to the End. of the Cold War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996). Yergin, Daniel, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State (Boston: l-loughton MiFflin, 1977). adhsvaI-h-(hmwmtbdlm-HA logo, 0 mm a‘.(‘-& I M mm" w. myu‘nm answers-'1‘ a A v A an»... at ' “Adm '1 353w) .. i.- 14 h'\ n . z .4 Mn“ : Intervention, Institutions, and Regional and Ethnic Conflicts UN General Assembly meeting I‘rmwn‘rMV—‘nwafll'fi'AvAK-la Iwrmrw‘,‘~vb.¢.~s_‘rfiv\5u “(a-'I‘Nifi “ . um I»: A a #va ....a 4. A me~ WM 414*: a: c' r *9»; a...“ m mm mm; J w,”- \ a\vw,e-'\_M' ‘u/«rflm‘ mm...»- i~ m . a»... . mm m Kflt“ L4: m uteri Major war became less likely after the end of the Cold War but to ional ' i domestic conflicts persist and there will always be pressures forhutsidegst t and mternational institutions to intervene. Of the 111 conflicts that occurred Eves in the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the new century 95 wer‘=U:W'C€ln intrastate (civil wars) and another 9 were intrastate with foreign lilterveraliio:1.Pltl’l:1': 157 .):£t.\'rL:4M1>!;.\rnt.nr.-WJM ...
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