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Nye.2007(2) - l 14 CHAPTER 4 The Failure of Collective...

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Unformatted text preview: l 14 CHAPTER 4 The Failure of Collective Security and World War II ileinrichs, Waldo, Jr., Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Entry into World \Var ll (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). Hilderbrand, Klaus, Foreign Policy of the Third Reich, trans. Anthony Pothergill (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973). Hughes, Jeffrey, “The Origins of World War II in Europe: British Deterrence Failure and German Expansionism," in Robert l. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rahh, eds., The Origin and Prevention ofMajor Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 911181—322. lriye, Akita, The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific (London: Longman, 1987). --, Pearl Harbor and the Coming of the Pacific War: A Brief History with Documents and Essays (New York: BedfordlSt. Martin’s, 1999). Jervis, Robert, Richard Ned Lehow, and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985). Kier, Elizabeth, imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997). Lukacs, John, Five Days in London, May 1940 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999). Macmillan, Margaret: Olwen, Paris 191 9: Six Menths That Changed the World (New York: Random, 2002). Middlemas, Keith, The Strategy of Appeasement: The British Government and Germany (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1972). Ross, Graham, The Great Powers and the Decline of the European States System, 1914—1945 (London: Longman, 1983). Stony, Richard, A History of Modern Japan (Baltimore: Penguin, 1960). Utley, Jonathan, Goingr to War with Japan. i937el94l (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1985). Walters, P. P., A History of the League of Nations (London: Oxford University Press, 1952). Wolfers, Arnold, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on lntemtttional Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962). IWAMMELI; - -- .4; u... x ovum ( L. va-f‘finr-I «4:. m am:an Afim’” wmcmm.mwv ,M:.“U::.r,‘u.mm.\:~c v mmmmir «we» .~--~ 'r' m ‘ww “A- v _ ,W.“ ,7... , The Cold War Winston Churchill, Franklin Roosevelt, and Josef Stalin at Yelta 1945 r.- mwaw mmmwmwxms-o. Lil.‘tms‘-1E;A\VE€I'A.-th;tn( t. :m wwaw.m}wh m—vmwhmstsmssm Mums-t haw ~ 7 r a . x cant-Jdammtmmsmvm Given its Violent first half, a most remarkable feature of the second half f 'l ) twentieth century was the absence of World War III. instead there was a ‘ ldo UL period of intense hostility without actual war. The hostility Wits so intense 'wml 3 expected armed conflict between the superpowers. Fighting occurred but '13.” many the peripheries and not directly between the United States and the ,Sovielt‘t slid: 115 l 16 CHAPTER 5 The Cold War The Cold War lasted four decades, from 1947 to 1989. The height of the Cold War was from 1947 to 1963, when there were few serious negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. There were not even any summit meetings between 1945 and 1955. In 1952, George Kennan, the US. ambassador in Moscow, compared his isolation in the American embassy to his experience of being interned during World War 11 in Berlin. The later phases of the Cold War in the 1970s and 19805 were very different. The Americans and Soviets had many contacts, and they constantly negotiated on arms control treaties. The end of the Cold War occurred quite quickly with the change in Soviet policies after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985. Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe collapsed in 19891 and the Seviet Union itself disintegrated in 1991. DETERRENCE AND CONTAINMENT What makes the Cold War exceptional is that it was a period of protracted tension that did not end in a war between the two rival superpowers. A variety of explanav tions for why this was the case will he discussed. Because of its unusual trajectory, the Cold War offers a unique perspective on international relations, and it illuminates the dynamics of two foreign policy choices that were made: the choice to deter and the choice to contain. To deter is to discourage through fear, and although frequently associated with the Cold War, deterrence was not a new concept in international politics. Through out history, countries built armies, formed alliances, and issued threats to deter other countries from attacking. During the Cold War and with the advent of nuclear weapons, the superpowers depended more on discouraging by threat than on denying by defense after an attack occurred. Cold War deterrence was closely tied to the maintenance of large American and Soviet nuclear arsenals, but it was also an extension of balance~ofapower logic. Deterrence by nuclear threat was one way each superpower tried to prevent the other from gaining advantage and hence upsetting the balance of power between them. As we shall see, deterrence often aggravated the tension between the United States and the Seviet Union, and it is not necessarily easy to demonstrate that deterrence worked. There is always the danger of spurious causation. If a professor said her lectures kept elephants out of the classroom, it would be difficult to disprove her claim if no elephants ever came to class. We can test such claims by using counterfactuals: How likely is it that elephants would come to cla5s? The concept of deterrence was linked to the policy of containment. During the Cold War, containment referred to a specific American policy of containing Soviet communism so as to promote a liberal economic and political world order. But like deterrence, containment did not originate with the Cold War, even if the term did. Con taininent has been a primary tool of foreign policy for centuries. In the eighteenth century, the conservative rnonarchical states of Europe attempted to contain the ide~ Ology of liberty and equality espoused by the French Revolution, and even earlier, the Catholic Church in the CountervReformation attempted to contain the spread of the Three Approaches to the Cold War 1 17 Ref ' ' ' ' ' mapprfptronlandfghe ideals pffMartrn Luther. There are different forms of contain . 'can 3e 0 ‘ensive or r e‘ensive it C' ‘ ' ' ‘ ( 1 I , . .. an use military power in the f ' f ' 811131 . I I ‘ - ‘ ‘ > h ‘ L 011.11 0 War 01‘ ca ices, 1ft can use economic power in the form of trading biocs or sanctions and it n - . g . ' V . . . ‘ ‘ {ht {351350; power in the Cfloim of promoting ideas and values. During the Cold War ’ 'et rates waver-e retween an exp" ’ ' , ansrve policy of containin i co ' ‘ t ‘ . ‘ ‘ ‘ . mmunrsm and a more limited policy of containing the Soviet Union. é THREE APPROACHES TO THE COLD WAR Who ‘ ‘ -* ' A ' been t(1)11c ctaulscrf ihchlold War? Almost since it began, those questions have ~ s cc 0 rerce e rate among scholars d ' ' I . an policy makers There are th ‘ ‘ h ‘ _ ‘ I I ‘ I . ree inarnTigchotiljof opinion. nadrtronalrsts, rewszoriists, and postrevisionists. qmsugt trf iponaiists Cgallso léniiwn as the orthodox} argue that the answer to the no w ostarte tie odWai‘is ' " ' r I '7 urte simple: Stalin and 'l > S ' ' At the . I I I ( irc t ovret Union. were end of Worid War 11, American diplomacy was defensive, while the Soviets aggressive an expansrve. The Americans only slowly awoke to the n ' f the Sovret threat. alum 0 state hat evrdcncc do the traditionalists crte? Immediately after the war, the United ' -s was proposing a universal world 0rd“ ' I LI and collective s- * 'l ' ‘ unit- ! ‘ > K ‘ I .ecurity tirough the becmrlzsd NLations. C'lT‘l‘iL Sovrethnron did not take the United Nations very seriously e 1' wante to expant and dominate ’ ’ l l c its own sphere of iii] 1 ' l ‘ Europe After {h I I I ‘ r ucnce in hastern , . e war, the United States demobil' ‘ ' ' ‘ ized its irooas l ' '1 5 ' Union left lar s . . - . l e. a ll! W luerls UL SOVlel . gt armies in lzastern hurope The U " ‘ _ . . nried States recor ‘ Ad 8 ' ' {mm- H r J I > 3 i ‘ t . gnrzc ovret qt Y'elrlslis, fpi ciamplc, when Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill met in February 1945 gm“: Lie miergcans went out of their way to aecommodate Soviet: interests r I , owevei, it not live up to his agreements, particularly by not 'illowi 7 f ‘* electrons in Poland. 7' ml: 1w Soviet expansyonism was further confirmed when the Soviet Union was slow to remove its troops rom northern I" ' " ' ' l l l . ran after the war Evert 11 1 bu. . u p _ I . . 1 ea y trey were removed or only under pressure. In 1948, the communists took over the Czechoslovakian, . A l . ' ‘ r ( Sg :féziintipt.\;hc Sovrei Union blockaded Berlin in 1948 and 1949 trying to s z- a A. .\ -\ ' I l l at: ‘ e t e d cstcrn governments Out. And in 1950, communist North Kore 1’s 1311‘ . .. . ' v ‘ . r E \ even: gifgse 11the harder (into bfiull‘i Korea. According to the traditionalists these - , '( ua y awa 'ene tie nited States t ' ‘ ' I l l o the threat ' ‘ l " ‘ and launched the Cold War. Of bowm cxpamlomsm Th . -. . ., .- - - COld “Ziewuomsts, :hlp ontc primarily in the 1960s and early 19705, believe the r r was cause y merican rather t1 ' ' ' I . ran Sovret ex 3a ‘ " ‘ deuce I 1 — I a . 1 nsronism. Theii evr’ sewer is )thai. at [Ellie end of World War II, the world was not really bipolarw—the wall-311:1??? muilz weaker than the United States, which was strengthened by the to 30 Ina nue ear weapons while the Soviets did not. The Soviet Union lost u 3 mid in: ion pefiple, and industrial production was only half its 1939 level Stalirlr WO Id rirrerican drnbassador 1Aver-ell Harriman in October 1945 that the Soviets u .urn inwar to repair t reir domest' d ' I I w 1c amage. What is more '1 ' ' MS I ’ I _ _ I I , say tie revrsron— , Stalrns external behavior early in the postwar period was quite moderate' In 118 CHAPTER 5 The Cold War China, Stalin tried to restrain Mao Zedong’s communists from taking power; in the Greek civil war, he tried to restrain the Greek communists; and he allowed nonr communist governments to exist in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Finland. Revisionists come in two varieties that stress the first and second levels of explanation. Level one revisionists stress the importance of individuals and claim that Roosevelt's death in April 1945 was a critical event because American policy toward the Soviet Union became harsher after President Harry S. Truman took office. In May 1945, the United States so precipitously cut off the lend’lease prov gram of wartime aid that some ships bound for Soviet ports had to turn around in midocean. At the Potsdam Conference near Berlin in July 1945, Truman tried to intimidate Stalin by mentioning the atomic bomb. In the United States, the Demo— cratic Party gradually shifted from the left and center to the right. In 1948, Truman fired Henry Wallace, his secretary of agriculture, who urged better relations with the Soviets. At the same time, James Forrestal, Truman’s new secretary of defense, was a strong anticommunist. These revisionists say these personnel changes help explain why the United States became so antiaSoviet. The level two revisionists have a different answer. They see the problem not in individuals, but in the nature of US. capitalism. Gabriel and Joyce Kolko and William A. Williams, for example, argue that the American economy required expansionism and that the United States planned to make the world safe, not for democracy, but for capitalism. American economic hegemony could not tolerate any country that might try to organize an autonomous economic area. American leaders feared a repeat of the i930s because without external trade, there would be another Great Depression. According to level two revisionists, the Marshall Plan of aid to Europe was simply a way to expand the American economy. The Soviets were correct to reject it as a threat to their sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. In Williams’s words, Americans always favored an open'door policy in the interna« tional economy because they expected to walk through it. The posrrevisionisrs of the late 1970s and 19805, as exemplified by Yale historian John Lewis Gaddis, have yet another explanation that focuses on the structural level. They argue that the traditionalists and revisionists are both wrong because nobody was to blame for starting the Cold War. It was inevitable, or nearly so, because of the bipolar structure of the postwar balance of power. In 1939 there was a multipolar world with seven major powers, but after the destruction wreaked by World War 11, only two superpowers were left: the United States and the Soviet Union. Bipolarity plus the postwar weakness of the European states created a power vacuum into which the United States and the Soviet Union were drawn. They were bound to come into conflict and, therefore, say the postrevisionists, it is pointless to look for blame. The Soviets and the Americans had different goals at the end of the war. The Soviets wanted tangible possessions—~territory. Americans had intangible or milieu goalswthey were interested in the general context of world politics. Milieu goals clashed with possession goals when the United States promoted the global UN system while the Soviets sought to consolidate their sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. But these differences in style were no reason for Americans to feel sanctirnonious, say Roosevelt’s Policies I 19 the postrevisionists, for the United States benefited from the United Nations and with a majority of allies voting, was not very constrained by it. The Soviets ma frin had a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, but the United States also had a s lien; of influence in the Western Hemisphere and Western Europe. p The United States and the Soviet Union were both bound to expand say the postrevisionists, not because of the economic determinism that the revlisionists stress, but because of the age—old security dilemma of states in an anarchic system Neither the Americans nor the Soviets could allow the other to dominate Iiuro any more than Athens could afford to let the Corinthians gain control of Corc r‘g’s navy. As evidence, postrevisionists cite Stalin’s comment to a Yugoslav ledlder Mrlovan Djilas, in 1945: “This war is not as in the past; whoever occupies a territor ’ also irripuses on it his own social system. Everyone imposes his own system as far a: his army can reach."1 In other words, in an ideological bipolar world a state uses its military forces to impose societies similar to its own in order to enslire its securit‘ Roosevelt had said something similar to Stalin in the fall of 1944: “In this globzlll war there is literally no question, political or military, in which the United States is not interested.”2 Given this bipolar structure, say the postrevisionists a s iral of hostility set in: hard lines in one country bred hard lines in the other. Bdth bldgan to perceive the enemy as analogous to Hitler in the 19303. As perceptions became more rigid, the Cold War deepened. Since the end of the Cold War, a modest flow of documents from formerly inac’ cessibie Soviet archives has given new vigor to the debate over which side star-fed the confrontation. Gaddis, for example, has become increasingly convinced that the USSR was primarily responsible for the onset and the nature of the super ower conflict. He cites the ideological rigidity of Stalin and other Soviet leaders al: well as the Kremlin’s equally rigid commitment to maintaining a formal empii'e in its sphere of influence. Gaddis’s move back toward a traditionalist viewpoint has arv nered a skeptical reception in some scholarly quarters guaranteein that th d -‘ will continue into the foreseeable future. ’ g e 6 am ROOSEVELT’S POLICIES Franklin Roosevelt wanted to avoid the mistakes of World War I so instead of '1 Versailles—like peace, he demanded Germany's unconditional surrender He wanted a liberal trade system to avoid the protectionism that had damaged the “world (econ— omy in the 19305 and contributed to the onset of war. The United States would avoid its tendency toward isolationism that had been so damaging in the71\930s It would join a new and stronger League of Nations in the form of a United Nations with a powerful Security Council. Cordell Hull, U.S. secretary of state during most of the war, was a committed Wilsonian, and public opinion in the United States was strongly in favor of the United Nations. To promote his great design, Ronsevelt needed to maintain bipartisan domestic support for his international position. Externally, he needed to reassure Stalin that his security needs would be met by joining the United Nations. Roosevelt has hedn 12.0 CHAPTER 5 The Coid War accused of a naive approach to postwar planning. His design was not naive, but some of his tactics were. He placed too much faith in the United Nations, overestir mated the iikeiihood of American isolationism, and, most important, under— estimated Stalin. Roosevelt thought he could treat Stalin the way he would treat a fellow American politician, throwing his arm around him, bonding politician to politician. Roosevelt did not fully realize that Stalin, along with his men, was a totaiitarian “who in the name of the people, murdered millions of them; who to defend against Hider, signs a pact with him, divides the spoils of war with him, and like him, expels, exterminates, or enslaves neighboring peoples; who stands aside and fulrni» nates against the democracies as Germany moves west, and then blames them for not helping enough when Hitler moves east.” Roosevelt misinterpreted Stalin, but Roosevelt did not sell out American inter" ests at the Yaha Conference in 1945, as some later claimed. Roosevelt was not naive in all aspects of his policy. He tried to tie economic aid to political concessions by the Soviets, and refused to share the secrets of the atomic bomb with them. He was sim— ply realistic about who would have troops in Eastern Europe at the end of the war, and, therefore, who would have leverage in that region. Roosevelt’s mistakes were in thinking that Stalin saw the world his way, that he understood domestic politics in the United States, and that the same American political skills in which a leader blurred differences and appealed to friendship would work in dealing with Stalin. pawnswsmsm- The President acted as if genuine cooperation as the Americans understood the term were possibie both during and after the war. Roosevelt apparentiy had forgotten, if indeed he ever knew, that in Stalin‘s eyes, he was not all that different from Hitler, both of them being heads of powerful capitaiisr states whose longterm ambitions ciashed with those of the Kremlin. ———-William Taubman, Stalin's American Policy-a hmmmmm.mama..mswmm...mmamas.momma... Mastswmrswr.mm.memesmvmmmwmmmamawi STALIN’S POLICIES Stalin's immediate postwar plans were to tighten domestic control. World War II inflicted tremendous damage on the Soviet Union, not just the terrible losses of life and industry already described, but arise to the ideology of communism. Many in the Soviet Union collaborated with the Germans because of their deep resentment over the harshness of communist ruie. Germany’s invasion seriously weakened Stalin's control. Indeed, Stalin had to increase his appeals to Russian nationalism during the war because the weakened communist ideology was insufficient to motivate his people. Stalin’s isolationist policy at the end of the war was designed to cut off external infiuences from Europe and the United States. Stalin used the United States as an objective enemy, urging the Soviet peopie to tighten down, to pull in, yet developed a new strategy. Phases of the Conflict 121 to mistrust the outsiders. But it. does not follow th that actually developed. Stalin preferred some cooperation, eSpecially if it helped i Eastern Europe and brought: him some econom As a good communist, he believed the United nornic assistance because the capitalist system ha demand at home. Stalin also believed th at Stalin wanted the Cold War I...
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