PhDsylGoldstein

PhDsylGoldstein - UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA The Wharton...

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UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA The Wharton School FINANCE 912 – Financial Institutions Itay Goldstein Spring 2010 Course Objective: The objective of the course is to provide an introduction to the theory of corporate finance, financial intermediation, and financial markets. The goal is to expose students to existing work and provide basic tools to do research in the area. Course Organization: The course will consist of lectures, in which I will review papers from the literature. Some papers will be discussed in class in great depth, while others will be mentioned briefly and left for the students for further research. A tentative list of topics and papers appears below. Topics and papers may be dropped or added, depending on progress. The final grade will be based on an exam and on a project. Details will be discussed in class. Course Materials: Below, there is a list of articles for each topic. They are the core of the material for the course. In addition, I refer students to relevant chapters in the following books: Hart (1995), Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure , Clarendon Press, Oxford. Mas-Collel, Whinston, and Green (1995), Microeconomic Theory , Oxford Universi- ty Press. Tirole (2006), The Theory of Corporate Finance , Princeton University Press. Course Overview: Here is a tentative list of topics and relevant articles and book chapters: 1. Separation of Ownership and Control: Moral Hazard Book Chapters:
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Mas-Collel, Whinston, and Green, Chapter 14. Articles: Jensen, M., and W. Meckling, 1976, “Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure,” Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305-360. Holmstrom, B., 1979, “Moral hazard and observability,” Bell Journal of Economics 10, 74-91. Holmstrom, B., 1982, “Moral hazard in teams,” Bell Journal of Economics 13, 324- 340. Holmstrom, B., and P. Milgrom, 1991, “Multi-task principal agent analyses: linear contracts, asset ownership, job design,” Journal of Law, Economics, & Organiza- tion 7, 24-52. 2. Contracting and the Theory of the Firm Book Chapters: Hart, Chapters 1-4. Articles: Grossman S., and O. Hart, 1986, “The costs and benefits of ownership: a theory of vertical and lateral integration,” Journal of Political Economy 94, 691-719. Hart, O., and J. Moore, 1990, “Property rights and the nature of the firm,”
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This note was uploaded on 08/29/2011 for the course ECON 201 taught by Professor K during the Spring '08 term at Susquehanna.

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PhDsylGoldstein - UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA The Wharton...

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